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CHAPTER 1 
SETTING THE STAGE 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Land degradation is widely recognized as a problem for agricultural and rural 
development in many developing countries (Blanco and Lal, 2010; Lal, 2001; Pretty and 
Shah, 1997; Anderson and Thampapillai, 1990; Anderson, 1984). Because of its adverse 
agronomic, environmental, social and economic effects, it has attracted considerable 
attention from scientists and development agencies around the world (Amsalu, 2006).  
Land degradation as a result of soil erosion in Rwanda is well documented as a factor 
hampering agricultural development and land-based livelihoods. The agricultural sector 
constitutes an important part of the Rwandan economy and contributes greatly to the 
country’s overall economic growth. In 2008, the agricultural sector has contributed as 
much as 11.2 per cent to the national economic growth rate (MINECOFIN, 2009). The 
sector also provides a means of living for about 80 per cent of the total population.  
 
Many parts of the country are mountainous with steep slopes, which allows for easy 
soil run-off and, hence, contributes to soil erosion. It decreases the productive capacity 
of the land to support food demands of a population of more than nine millions 
inhabitants, which growths at a rate of about 2.6 per cent per annum (MINECOFIN, 
2007). At the same time, the per capita size of fields in Rwanda has diminished 
dramatically in the last 3 decades (Bidogeza et al., 2009). In order to increase agricultural 
production, farmers can no longer expand their fields by opening up virgin lands in area 
that have not yet been settled or cultivated (Clay and Reardon, 1996). Rwanda is 
characterized by small and fragmented farm holdings, declined soil fertility and increased 
soil acidity (Clay et al., 1998; Olson, 1994). In such situations and conditions, soil erosion 
aggravates the problem of food security, poverty and, eventually, other issues of quality 
of life. All this underlines the need to conserve soils and water in Rwanda.  
 
Experts have addressed the erosion question by arguing for the implementation of soil 
and water conservation programmes. Soil and water conservation (SWC) stands for any 
set of measures aimed at preventing or at least reducing the effects of soil erosion, water 
loss and run-off, to maintain the quality of soils and possibly to increase crop production 
(Posthumus and Stroosnijder, 2010; Morgan, 1986; Stocking et al., 1993). SWC measures 
range from ‘biological’, also known as ‘vegetative’, methods to ‘physical’ or mechanical 
methods, such as terraces (Hurni et al., 2008; Graaff, 1996). From pre-colonial times to 
the present, Rwanda has seen many organized attempts to implement SWC measures. 
Over the last 120 years, a variety of technologies and infrastructural devices have been 
put in place to reduce soil and water erosion. Bench and progressive terraces are part of 
the SWC techniques implemented by farmers in many parts of Rwanda over time, with 
or without support from government or from non-government organizations. However, 
many parts of the country still suffer from soil erosion. The 2008 National Agricultural 
Survey (NAS) estimates that about 40 per cent of the potential cultivable area needs to be 
protected with anti-erosive measures. Our own observations indicate significant variation 
in the extent to which SWC infrastructure has been put in place and used. Some farmers 
have not adopted bench terraces to protect the soils and others have done so marginally 
or do not use them. Rwanda is no exception. Research in other tropical countries 
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acknowledges that SWC measures are not always adopted (World Bank, 2006). This 
phenomenon raises questions about the way in which SWC has been implemented in 
Rwanda and about the choices that have been made past and present about which 
technologies and infrastructure to build. A critical analysis of SWC measures and policies 
will increase our understanding of why terraces are not used or only in part. We find this 
particularly important for contexts like Rwanda, which are characterized by high 
population density and scarce land resources.  
 
This thesis is constructed around a number of articles about soil and water 
conservation issues in Rwanda. Together, these articles explore the historical and 
contemporary dimensions of SWC interventions. We focus on bench terraces as these 
later have become predominant, for reasons that will be explained. The following part of 
the chapter provides an overview of some of the main theoretical perspectives and 
development approaches that have guided land degradation and conservation debates. A 
concise theoretical overview is useful for identifying the kind of questions that one needs 
to ask to understand the complexities of soil and water issues and phenomena in 
Rwanda. The chapter continues by formulating objectives and research questions, a short 
description of the research area and the data collection procedures.  
 
1.2 Theoretical perspective  
 
This section provides an overview of the three main theoretical perspectives on 
development approaches to land degradation and conservation in developing countries. 
The intention here is mainly to highlight the core assumption(s) of the causes (natural or 
human induced) and effects, and the questions that were raised to unpack land 
degradation and conservation, and how the various theoretical perspectives have inspired 
development approaches designed to deal with the problem.  
 
Three major theoretical perspectives on soil erosion in developing countries can be 
distinguished (Ananda and Herath, 2003). A first school of thought explains land 
degradation in a Malthusian way with reference to population increase and poverty 
(Amsalu 2006; World Bank, 2006; Hetermick 2007; Stephenson et al., 2010). The 
assumption is that population growth causes mounting pressure on the land, leading 
farmers to cultivate marginal and often fragile and steep lands. The people most affected 
are resource-poor farmers who depend heavily on these lands for their livelihoods and 
who are unable to invest in SWC measures to maintain land quality (Blanco and Lal, 
2010; Lal, 2009). The second strand explains erosion problems and phenomena through 
the nature of state policies. Price support, subsidized credits and soil conservation 
subsidies are not seen as conducive incentives for farmers to invest in land quality. The 
theory holds that incentives and subsidies from government and other development 
agencies distort the real sense of soil conservation and, hence, intensify soil erosion 
(Ananda and Hearth, 2003; Bunch, 1999). A third perspective associates land degradation 
with weak institutions. Developing countries with high erosion risks have often weak 
institutions, such as substandard property rights and high transactions costs. These 
institutions fail to secure property rights, promote markets, policies, and other 
regulations that are conducive to soil conservation ( Kirsten et al., 2009, Agrawal, 2001; 
Shiferaw and Holden, 1999; Barbier, 1997 ).  
As a whole, the above three schools of thought underscore the importance of factors 
and processes such as population increase, poverty, inappropriate incentives and 
subsidies, and weak institutions. This brings us to the second orientation of the literature: 
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measures and approaches to address land degradation. These approaches have been 
grouped and classified as classical, populist, and neo-liberal development approaches to 
land degradation (Biot et al., 1995; Blaikie, 2000). Although these approaches have their 
own specific sets of assumptions, they overlap in the sense that they do not associate in a 
linear way with one of the three theoretical perspectives outlined above. These 
approaches are theoretically eclectic and are differentiated primarily from one another by 
their conception of the role of the state to combating land degradation and of the 
developmental role assigned to farmers, their organisations and the views of experts and 
policy-makers (Biot et al., 1995:3-6).  
 
Classical development approaches  
 
The classical approaches depart from the assumption that ‘the extent of and 
solutions to the problem of land degradation are well known, but the problem is to get 
people to implement them’ (Biot et al., 1995:3). This development approach argues for a 
role of the state with top-down and coercive measures, focused on technology transfer, 
and often informed by state-sponsored scientific institutions (Blaikie, 2000). It assigns to 
the state a crucial role in driving rural development and land management in particular. 
The state is viewed, therefore, as an ‘engineer’ with a designed development master plan 
that needs people to implement it. However, the question is what motivations the state 
has to intervene in land conservation?  
Long-term SWC measures, such as bench terraces, require investments that, in many 
cases, go beyond a farmer’s capacity (e.g. Hurni et al., 2008). Few farmers implement 
these measures without external support from GOs and NGOs (Spiteri and Nepal, 2006; 
Winters et al., 2004; Bunch, 1999). On the other hand, soil conservation entails not only 
on-site (private) but also off-site (public) benefits, which explains why both private and 
public parties have an interest in land conservation. Consequently, different measures 
from state policies and regulations to direct incentives are used to induce adoption of soil 
conservation measures. However, emphasis is put on how to mobilize labour for the 
collective construction of soil conservation structures. Interventions under such classical 
or top-down development models are trapped in weak assumption(s) that labour is the 
major constraining factor for land conservation. That is, if labour is pooled and SWC 
structures are established, farmers will continue to use them and enjoy benefits from 
these SWC measures. Unfortunately, this is often not the case (Hudson, 1991).  
In many parts of Asia and Africa, land conservation followed these top-down 
approaches to induce adoption of SWC measures, mostly of bench or stone terraces (e.g. 
Java, Indonesia, Jamaica, Nepal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda) (Barbier, 1990; Gebremedhin 
and Swinton, 2003; de Graaff, 1996). Later, some of these techniques were abandoned, 
others were destroyed by farmers, because farmers’ priorities and abilities to use and 
maintain such technologies were insufficiently considered by SWC projects in the design 
and implementation (Amsalu, 2006; Mafuka et al., 2005; Graaff, 1996). Rwanda did not 
escape this era of soil conservation; we will describe this later in this thesis while 
discussing the role of the state in soil erosion control under different political regimes ( 
Chapter 2). 
 
Populists and development  
 
Populists are guided by the hypothesis that ‘the nature and extent of land 
degradation are imperfectly understood, that local people reject conservation 
technologies for good reasons and, in fact, adopt their own individual and collective 
approaches that have in the past resulted in sustainable livelihood practices’ (Biot et al., 
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1995:5). They advocate an anti-state position, and seek ways to promote people-centered, 
bottom-up and participatory approaches to land conservation. They support the view 
that decisions about land conservation should be based on farmers’ knowledge and 
farmers’ priorities. The change in this direction was driven by the recognition that 
farmer’s needs and their capabilities to adopt new technologies were diagnosed 
insignificantly by the classical approaches (Blaikie, 2000). Due to the need to embrace 
farmers’ skills in development activities, including natural resource management, new 
institutions had to be designed or existing ones had to be enforced through policy (see 
also Pant, 2000; Webb 2001; Brown, 2003 ). Both notions of participation in and 
institutional innovation of soil conservation cluster around common-pool resources, 
since many decisions about their management require collaboration and, hence, 
participation in the process of decision-making itself (Biot et al., 1995). Case-studies that 
dwell on people’s views about their participation in decision-making processes during the 
design and the implementation of SWC measures are scanty and limited.  
Over the years, and especially in the 1990s, farmers in Rwanda were encouraged to 
create different forms of organizations (such as associations and co-operatives) to 
improve their roles or to participate in rural development activities. Hence, the role of 
these organizations is perceived vital in policy, especially in SWC measures to counter 
soil erosion, such as terraces. There is a need to know how these farmers’ organizations 
operate vis-à-vis their members and policy or project interventions. How famers 
experience their participation in SWC interventions and how they perceive the role of 
their organizations increase the understanding of soil and water conservation issues in 
Rwanda.  
 
Neo-liberalists  
 
Similar to the populists, the neo-liberalists argue against a direct role of the state in 
land conservation. They maintain that ‘suitable technologies presently exist and can 
readily come into existence; the problem is to understand the present structure of 
incentives that prevents land users from adoption of them , and to design incentives that 
will induce adoption’ (Biot et al., 1995:6). Clearly, the structure of incentives and 
institutional arrangements required to induce adoption of SWC measures is at the centre 
of their argument (Biot et al., 1995, Spiteri and Nepal, 2006). Moreover, they also 
recommend an analysis of other factors affecting the adoption (or not) of soil 
conservation practices.  
Investing in soil conservation practices such as terraces demands strong decisions 
from farmers. Being economic optimizers, they will adopt new SWC measures if they 
expect better economic rewards from doing so (Barbier, 1990; Hudson,1991; Lutz et al., 
1994). Unfortunately, this ‘farmer rationality’ is overlooked by some policy or project 
interventions. This may explain partly why some farmers do not adopt and possibly 
abandon established SWC measures after GO and NGO interventions (Neil and Lee, 
2001). Nevertheless, in situations where farmers have to choose whether to adopt (or 
not) new conservation techniques, direct economic incentives such as increased 
production and economic returns expected from land conservation appear the main 
incentives to adopt ( Spiteri and Nepal, 2006; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998; Anderson and 
Thampallai, 1990). But long-term conservation techniques such as terraces take a long 
time to be both financially and technically effective. A study by Posthumus and 
Stroosnijder (2010) in the Peruvian Andes shows that bench terraces did not result in any 
short-term change in soil properties – fertility or infiltration capacity. Accordingly, in 
such situations, the net returns without soil conservation will potentially exceed those 
with conservation in the early stages until the gap declines to eventual higher net returns 
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with conservation (World Bank, 2006). Thus, lower returns at farm level may explain why 
certain farmers are risk averse to uptake more SWC measures (Tefera and Sterk, 2010). 
It is little known whether or not established bench terraces are cost-effective at farm 
level in Rwanda. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is usually used to test under which 
conditions bench terraces are profitable ( e.g. Posthumus, 2005; Pearce, 1998). In this 
thesis, financial CBA is applied at plot level to analyse under which socio-economic 
conditions bench terraces are profitable in Rwanda. Since financial incentives are not the 
only factors explaining adoption process of terraces, further analysis is required. 
In a context of extensive policy and project intervention in soil conservation, which 
occurs in many developing countries, adoption of conservation technology takes place 
within various and confounding situations. Some farmers adopt conservation measures 
due to coercive and/or direct material incentives (Speteri and Nepal, 2006; Pretty and 
Shah, 1997, de Graaff, 1996), while others adopt to comply with political and project 
goals (Blustain, 1985). In addition, adoption may occur as a result of collective decisions 
due to downstream and upstream effects, such as in watershed development approach; 
or simply as a result of increased farmer’s awareness of the costs and benefits of 
technology adoption. The latter is exception rather than rule in many developing 
countries (Blustain, 1985; Hudson, 1991).  
We will specify different econometric models based on previous studies of technology 
adoption to identify which factors explain current and future adoption of terraces in the 
highlands of Rwanda (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; de Graaff et al., 2008, Rezvanfar et 
al., 2009). We will consider the role of various local institutions (such as tenure security 
and social capital) and farmers’ capacities to invest in existing or new terraces. 
1.3 The research focus  
 
Following on from the above debate, we will develop relations between the 
perspectives and approaches on land degradation and conservation. The populist, 
classical and neo-liberalist approaches have in common that the solutions for the soil 
erosion problem are assumed to be well known. The technologies are there but not well 
implemented, well built or well embedded in proper policies. This is in contrast to the 
populist position, which supports reliance on indigenous knowledge and that failure to 
adoption is due to unsuitable government policies. The major difference between the 
three approaches is their perceived role of the state. The classical position is guided by 
the first perspective that population pressure on land and poverty are the major problem, 
calling for top-down implementation by the state. The neo-liberalists follow the 
perspective that inappropriate incentives are conducive to soil erosion. It poses that the 
state should not be involved directly in land conservation but rather that it should design 
incentives and institutions that are conducive to soil conservation. Though critiqued, the 
populist approach has become popular for many development agencies, especially in soil 
and water conservation (Biot et al., 1995). In all, the role of the sate, farmer participation, 
incentives, and institutions are major cross-cutting issues in all perspectives and 
approaches to land degradation and conservation.  
Successful shifts in the above policy and development paradigms in land conservation 
remain unclear in many developing countries such as Rwanda. The perspective guiding 
this study departs from the above debate on the classical, populist and neo-liberal 
development approaches. We will consider the role of the state and development 
agencies, farmer participation and the role of farmers’ organizations, incentives, and 
local-level institutions to be important ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’ to understand soil and water 
conservation issues in Rwanda.  
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Most farmers in Rwanda are resource scarce, making it difficult to invest in soil 
conservation practices (Clay et al., 2002). This provides ample reason for the government 
and NGOs to intervene in soil conservation practices. For this purpose, various 
incentives are used and new policies are designed to encourage farmers to adopt soil 
conservation practices. We have opted for a historical perspective to supply accounts of 
SWC measures used over time and of the role of the state in the environmental discourse 
in Rwanda (Chapter 2). Farmers are encouraged to participate collectively in soil erosion 
control through their organizations and other local-level institutions. At the same time, 
the government designs and implements other development policies, including land 
conservation. This makes it difficult to dissociate the roles of the state and of farmers 
and their organizations in land conservation. In Chapter 3, we will opt for a socio-
technical and institutional analysis of bench terraces to asses farmer participation and 
how the state–farmer relationships affect strategies for soil and water conservation in 
Rwanda. Different SWC measures such bench and progressive terraces have been 
implemented in Rwanda. However, there is limited research to show whether these are 
cost-effective from a farmer’s perspective (see Chapter 4). Likewise, as indicated in 
Section (1.1), some farmers have adopted terraces and others have not. There is little 
knowledge of factors affecting farmers to adopt (or not) SWC measures proposed by 
policy and projects in the Rwandan case. In Chapters 5 and 6, we have opted for an 
econometric approach to identify which factors affect adoption of bench and progressive 
terraces in Rwanda.  
 Despite substantial contributions of earlier work on technology adoption, studies that 
analyse the adoption of bench terraces in the historical context of state–farmer 
relationships and social and institutional arrangements are scarce. The thesis is, therefore, 
innovative in its interdisciplinary approach to bring new understanding of the issues 
emerging during the design, implementation, and continued use of SWC measures in 
developing countries. This is the first attempt to analyse the adoption of bench terraces 
from an institutional and socio-economic perspective in Rwanda.  
 
1.4 Objectives and Research questions  
 
This study attempts to increase the understanding of the complexity of the soil erosion 
problem and of how farmers and institutions affect the adoption and effectiveness of soil 
and water conservation measures in Rwanda. More specifically, the study aims to:  
 
1. Provide a historical account of SWC measures used and the processes of their 
implementation from the pre-colonial era to the independent state in Rwanda. 
2. Assess how farmers participate in soil conservation and how state–farmer 
relationships affect SWC strategies in Northern and Southern Rwanda. 
3. Investigate under which socio-economic conditions bench terraces are financially 
viable in the Northern and Southern Rwanda. 
4. Explore which factors explain the current and future adoption of terraces, with 
close attention to the potential effects of local institutions and farmers’ capacity 
to invest in bench terraces in the Northern and Southern Rwanda. 
 
In order to address the main issues raised in Section 1.1, the following research 
questions were formulated based on the specific objectives mentioned above: 
1. What soil erosion control measures have been used in Rwanda from the pre-
colonial regime to the post-independence state?  
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2. How do farmers participate in soil conservation and how do state–farmer 
relationships affect soil conservation strategies in Northern and Southern 
Rwanda? 
3. Do farmers with bench terraces receive higher investment returns from 
cultivating plots compared to those with slowly forming terraces or plots with no 
terraces at all?  
4. Which factors explain current and future adoption of terraces in Northern and 
Southern Rwanda?  
 
1.5 Research area and data collection procedure  
 
Rwanda is a developing country located in the central and eastern part of Africa. It is 
landlocked between Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). It is a mountainous country (1500 m absl), which is why it is nicknamed a 
‘country of thousand hills’. Since 2006, Rwanda is divided into four provinces plus the 
capital city Kigali: Northern, Eastern, Western, and Southern provinces. The provinces 
are subdivided into 30 Districts, which, in turn, subdivide into 416 sectors – a sector is an 
administrative unit above a village and constitutes the third administrative unit from the 
bottom under the District management. 
 The research was carried out specifically in the Northern and Southern provinces of 
Rwanda. These two areas are prone to soil erosion and have received great attention 
from projects and policies of soil erosion control using both bench and progressive 
terraces. The choice of the research sites and respondents was carried out using a 
multistratified random sampling procedure. Geophysical criteria such as altitude and 
slope steepness are the main criteria used. These are well documented in the literature as 
necessary conditions to establishing physical structures such as bench and progressive 
terraces.  
During slope mapping, two agro-ecological zones with somewhat similar physical 
conditions (mainly land slope) were selected in phase one: Crete Congo–Nile Watershed 
Zone (CNWZ), which covers major part of Nyamagabe District (South); and Buberuka 
High Land zone (BHLZ), covering the main part of Gicumbi District (North).  
In phase two, the two agro-ecological zones were classified into three main areas based 
on percentage occurrence of three slope categories: 12–25%, 25–55%, and 55–70%. 
Areas containing the two first slope categories were maintained and those in the third 
category were rejected as they are meant for conserving techniques other than bench and 
progressive terraces (see Appendix 1.1). Within the two slope categories maintained, 
randomly selected areas covered 20 sector administrative units. 
In phase three, we selected randomly one small-scale farmers’ association/co-operative 
from each sector containing 20 associations, whose members were involved in the focus 
group discussions carried out during February–March 2009. Information provided during 
these discussions is analysed mainly in Chapter 3. During these discussions, farmers 
guided the researcher and his assistants to locate, in their respective sectors villages or 
sub-catchment areas, where bench (BT) and/or progressive terraces (PT) were dominant 
and where there were areas with fewer or no terraces at all (NT) (see Appendix 1.2). At 
this stage, some maps were designed by farmers, from which we took GPS points (X(m) 
and Y(m), altitude (m)) to map the research area, using Geographic Information System 
(GIS) in phase four (see Appendix 1.3). Of the 20 selected sectors, 10 stand for places were 
BT are dominant, 6 for PT , and 4 for NT. 
Finally, 301 households were randomly selected from villages/sub-catchments 
maintained in previous stage for an extensive farm survey conducted in April–May 2009. 
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Out of 301 households, 54.8% (165) are from the North (BHLZ) and 45.2% (136) are 
from the South (CNWZ). The heads of these households provided information about 
their 907 plots, with an average of about 3 plots per household. Data collected during the 
survey is analysed in Chapters 3 to 6. Table 1 gives a summary of sample estimates per 
sample province (Northern and Southern).  
 
Table 1. An overview of the sample design  
 
Province  % Slope 
Category  
% 
Occurrence  
Sectors Sub-
catchment 
Sample 
Households 
Sample 
Plots 
Mean 
Altitude  
North ( BHLZ) 12–25*  
25–55** 
35–40 
60–70 
12 75 165 540 2053 
South (CNWZ)  12–25 
25–55 
35–55 
45–50 
8 34 136 367 2163 
Total    20  109 301 907 2103 
*: Appropriate for slowly forming terraces and ** for bench terraces  
 
1.6 Thesis outline  
 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage of the thesis in terms of 
problem statement, theoretical perspective, objectives and research questions, the 
research area and data collection procedure, and ends with this outline. Chapter 2 will 
provide an account of soil erosion against the background of the environmental 
discourses that have emerged over time in Rwanda. Chapter 3 will discuss how farmers 
perceive their participation, the role of their organizations and institutions in soil and 
water conservation in Northern and Southern Rwanda. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the financial profitability and technical effectiveness of 
established bench terraces in the research area, while Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned 
with the adoption of bench and progressive terraces in the study area. Thanks to 
information obtained from farmers during the survey, the impact(s) of various local 
institutions on the adoption of these terrace structures is estimated in Chapter 5. Chapter 
6 will ‘unpack’ the adoption process of bench terraces to estimate current and future 
adoption upon farmers’ capacity to invest in existing and new terraces. Finally, Chapter 7 
will provides some major conclusions and policy and research options for future 
generation of soil and water conservation in Rwanda. Figure 2 shows the organizational 
framework of the study of SWC issues in Rwanda. 
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Figure 1: The organizational framework of the study of SWC issues in Rwanda  
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CHAPTER 2 
SOIL EROSION IN RWANDA IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE1 
 
2.1 Introduction: environmental discourses in Africa  
 
 The colonial and post-colonial states in Africa have played key initiating and co-
ordinating roles in responding to environmental problems (Olson 1994, Bernstein and 
Woodhouse 2001). In the early part of the twentieth century, colonial states began to take 
serious cognizance of soil conservation issues (Pretty 1995). A series of environmental 
measures were implemented to halt soil erosion, particularly in the overcrowded reserves 
of settler colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Most measures were in 
the form of sanctions and regulations to prevent the overuse of land by cattle and 
people. The predominant assumption of the discourse has been for a long time that 
farmers are poor managers of land, ignorant of soil erosion problems, and not prepared 
to adopt expert-designed innovations such as terraces. This explains why decades of state 
implemented soil and water conservation programmes had little or no impact on soil 
erosion (Pretty and Shah 1997). 
Many authors have commented critically on the nature of the state’s environmental 
discourse. Common to the critique is that farmers should not be seen as ignorant but 
rather as knowledgeable and creative actors (Pretty and Shah 1997). The academic 
discourse has clearly shifted towards examining institutional factors that explain why 
farmers do not adopt new technology (e.g. lack of involvement of farmers in the design 
of innovations, improper incentives such as food for work) (Kirsten et al. 2009). There is, 
however, also some agreement in the literature about Africa and Rwanda, as we will see, 
that the discourses of the state ignore or marginalize other competing and perhaps robust 
discourses that have emerged in the past and continue to emerge in the present.  
 
Historical sources, for instance, show that during pre-colonial period and the early 
years of colonization there was some organised attention to soil conservation in Rwanda, 
either by cultivators and herders or by the then local authorities. This is in contrast to 
most environmental historians who argue that the colonial states in Africa have imported 
ideas of conservation from the United States, when the dust-bowls of the 1930s 
prompted the government to implement soil erosion programmes (Anderson 1984, 
Beinart 2003).  
 
This paper presents a literature review examining the Rwandan highlands and their 
problems of land degradation. It outlines and focuses on the environmental discourses of 
the colonial and post-colonial state in its endeavour to contain or prevent the 
degradation of highland resources. Environmental discourses are important as they feed 
state agrarian policies in Rwanda and elsewhere, and legitimize direct interventions with 
regard to land use (e.g. preventing and sanctioning certain practices) and the 
implementation of land tenure policies and the formation of markets (Bernstein and 
Woodhouse 2001). The measures taken in the realm of soil conservation and the 
dynamics they evoke can thus not be disconnected from the state and its agrarian 
                                                 
1 This chapter will be reworked into a journal article  
Farmers , Institutions and Land Conservation    
 12 
policies. The article also points out the shifts in environmental discourses that have 
emerged in Rwanda over time.  
2.2 Methodology  
 
An analysis of agrarian and land conservation policies and the discourses that underlie 
these is useful as it discloses how and why certain conservation measures are taken. 
Discourse analysis deals with ‘language-in-use’ in written texts (Gasper and Apthorpe 
1996), media, and journal articles, as well as in peoples’ narratives. There is a temptation 
in discourse analysis to indulge in philosophy and language studies. The test, as Gasper 
(1996) argues, lies not in the abstract reasoning but in our ability to provide insights and 
to convey to others how these can be generated. The study of discourse comes out of a 
tradition of post-structuralism, which builds on a notion of the world as socially 
constructed rather than pre-existing reality, and posits that language not only describes 
reality but also works to create it (Lehrera and Beckerb 2010). With this in mind we 
define discourse as a set of interconnected statements that provide explanations for 
processes and problems – in our case for problems of land degradation in mountainous 
regions such as Rwanda.  
 
The social science literature asserts that there is not one single discourse but rather a 
variety of often contrasting and competing but also opposing discourses. Some are 
articulated by the state in the form of policies and others by land users and their 
organisations as well as by civil society like non-governmental organisations (Leach and 
Fairhead 2000). The discourses articulated by the state are expressed in policy documents 
(i.e. texts) that build on and are usually derived from views and insights generated and 
expressed by experts, academics and politicians. Farmer discourses, on the other hand, 
are usually but not exclusively uttered in narratives (e.g. ‘this is how we farm’ or ‘how we 
build our terraces’) but also in their farming practices (Van der Ploeg 2003). These 
narratives are frequently documented and analysed in publications by historians, rural 
sociologists and development anthropologists studying process of agricultural and rural 
development (Basset 2003, Van der Ploeg 2003, Netting 1993). 
 
In this article we limit ourselves to an analysis of the discourses conveyed in Rwandan 
agrarian policy documents, specifically those with regard to soil erosion. A discourse 
analysis of the content of policy texts usually seeks to expose the theoretical assumptions 
about the nature of the problem and how (e.g. in what language) these are framed by 
experts and policy makers (Gasper 1996). Analysis of the content of policy documents 
will also show the kind of resources that are required to deal with the identified problems 
and how to deploy them Policy discourses tend to phrased in terms that seem to be 
politically neutral, such as ‘land’ or ‘mountain’ (Borras and Franco 2009). Keely and 
Scoones 2003) point out that the framing of problems is derived from a distinct body of 
knowledge. Pain (1996) and Scott (2009) for instance emphasize that it has become 
common in regional policy documents in Bhutan that ‘mountainous’ often stands for 
‘remote’ and ‘isolated’. Mountainous in most Rwandese policy documents is imaged and 
problematized as erosion sensitive areas which need protection. The solution for such 
problems are predominantly phrased in terms of building terraces to prevent run-off and 
loss of top soil. Leach and Fairhead (2000) refer in this context to policy discourses as 
‘received wisdom’, which contain assumptions about reality that are not tested in the 
conditions they apply (see also Leach and Mearns 1996). Environmental policy-making in 
this view is plagued by the hegemony of certain orthodoxies, taking for granted certain 
narratives about resource degradation and its underlying processes. As we will see, 
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constructing bench terraces have for long been seen as the best way technology to halt 
erosion, often ignoring other experiences with the battle against erosion. These 
orthodoxies lead not only to erroneous interpretations of environmental and socio-
economic change in Africa but also to ‘bad’ policy choices (Keeley and Scoones 2003).  
 
This paper is limited to a content analysis of policy documents that are relevant for 
agricultural development occurring in mountainous environments. We collected recent 
policy documents related to more broadly to agricultural development (Republic of 
Rwanda 2009, Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority 2005) as well as report on 
how soil erosion is identified and solutions discussed (Van Den Steen 1965, Republic of 
Rwanda 1982, Fleskens 2007). We also consulted scientific documents that assisted us in 
understanding how the erosion policy discourse has emerged over time and whether 
continuities exist at the level of discourse Investigating continuities and discontinuities is 
useful for an analysis of changes over time, not as a simple, unbroken line of events, but 
as a set of institutional and discursive linkages. The continuities that we explore here 
relate to the basic foundations of agrarian and environmental policies.  
The account of how farmers deal with and respond to erosion problems and how they 
interact with the expert system and the state is beyond the scope of this article and is 
subject to on-going research.  
 
2.3 Agrarian policy in Rwanda 
 
Rwanda has a favourable altitude, climate and rainfall regime for agriculture, in 
addition to fertile soils in some zones, though in many areas they are frequently high in 
acidity. The hilly topography, with many steep slopes, has been conducive to depleting 
soils through rapid runoff of surface water and soil erosion. More than half of Rwanda’s 
territory is identified as highlands. The discourse about African highlands and 
mountainous areas commonly view these areas not just as important in relation to 
climate and conservation (Lewis and Berry 1998). The eastern and central African 
highlands are particularly important because they support a large number of rural people 
in their attempts to construct livelihoods (Assmo and Eriksson, 1994). These areas are 
densely populated and receive substantial rainfall, which enables a productive, land- and 
labour-intensive agriculture. However, due to their steepness and physical characteristics 
the highlands are environmentally fragile and prone to erosion (Lewis and Berry 1998). 
 
The Rwanda Development Agricultural Authority (2005) estimates that 77% of 
Rwanda is threatened by soil erosion: 38% of the land has to be safeguarded from 
erosion, and 39% is considered to be at high risk. These figures underline the importance 
of a range of anti-erosion measures implemented by the colonial and post-colonial states 
over the past 100 years. A key dimension of Rwanda’s agrarian policy (see for instance 
Republic of Rwanda 2009), which also applies more broadly in central Africa, is the 
desire both to transform (highland) environments from open common property 
resources to closed common property (e.g. individual freehold property; Scott 2009) and 
to foster the commoditization of its social and natural resources (Bernstein and 
Woodhouse  2001). Highland and mountain resources (e.g. land, crops and cattle) will 
increasingly change from assets that are exchanged locally to commodities which will  
firmly integrate peoples’ livelihoods into global economic development. Bench terracing 
and land tenure reform have become the predominant socio-technical expressions of the 
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state’s land conservation policy discourse in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2009; 
Rurangwa  2002). 
 
2.4  Soil conservation in Rwanda 
 
Initiatives to prevent land degradation date back to the early twentieth century, when 
planting trees and constructing trench ditches were already being promoted to prevent 
erosion. In both pre-independent Rwanda and Burundi, 750,000 ha of land were planted 
with trees (Olson 1994). Today, the state encourages the construction of terraces to 
control soil erosion and reduce the loss of valuable top-soil ( Republic of Rwanda 2009, 
Bizoza and Graaff 2010). 
 
Soil conservation during the pre-colonial era 
 
Before Rwanda was colonised, it was ruled by a monarch. The King was the supreme 
political authority, assisted by a number of chiefs who were assigned specific tasks. There 
was a chief in charge of pasture (umwami w’umukenke), a chief for land issues (umwami 
w’ubutaka), and a chief heading the army (umwami w’ingabo). The monarch had absolute 
powers. With support from the chiefs, the King could demand the labour of commoners 
for general purposes such as building and maintaining infrastructure (Rurangwa, 2002).  
 
Soil erosion was not yet identified as a critical issue; access to and occupation of land 
was a major concern for commoners in Rwanda since the King and elites had overall 
control over the land and cattle (Newbury 2001). Most of the land was used for livestock 
production, with only a small portion of land set aside for cultivation. The predominant 
pattern was to cultivate a field nearest to the homestead, where cattle were kept during 
the night for safe-keeping. This system allowed the intensive use of manure and compost 
from household residues (Olson 1994; Newbury 2001). Conserving natural resources was 
an integral aspect of land use and consisted of inyanamo (strip-cropping) and raising 
rudumburi (stone rows) (Nyamulinda 1989). In strip-cropping, fallow spaces were kept 
between cultivated areas. The stone rows were meant to protect the land from run-off. 
The scale of these soil protecting practices was rather limited. Since the predominant 
land-use system hinged on livestock and pasture management, soil problems did not 
attract the attention of the Monarch. In turn, it may also explain why these soil and water 
conservation techniques were not recognized, nor was experience with these practices 
well documented by administrators and travellers. The practices were ignored and, hence, 
disappeared, gradually to be replaced by new structures (Verwimp 1991). 
 
Erosion control during the colonial era 
 
The German and, later, Belgian colonial administrations introduced a more intensive 
and sedentary use of land in Rwanda (Olson 1994; Van Den Steen 1965). Soil erosion 
control was initiated on a modest scale from 1937 onwards. The Mission anti-erosive was 
established in 1945, mandated to better disseminate existing soil erosion techniques. Due 
to the 1943–1944 famine and World War II, the colonial administration imposed a 10-
year development plan (1951–1961) to address food scarcity by stimulating the expansion 
of the production of cassava, sweet potatoes and coffee as the main cash crops in 
Rwanda. In 1958, the state introduced and enforced a range of conservation techniques 
and regulations to prevent erosion (Van Den Steen 1965). These included the 
construction of hedgerows, leaving spaces between farms for the movement of livestock, 
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and the digging of trenches alongside hedgerows. Burning of fields was forbidden and 
enforced through penalties and imprisonment. Tree planting, especially with exogenous 
species was stimulated (Olson 1994). Some of these measures were refuted by farmers 
due to intangible benefits and non-involvement during the introduction of the measures 
(Nsengiyunva 1993), or due to other side-effects. Indeed, the open spaces between farms 
potentially increased soil erosion as a result of intense cattle grazing. Digging trenches or 
ditches required a lot of labour for both construction and maintenance. The planting of 
trees was enforced through collective labour (umuganda) and did not provide answers to 
the real problem of decreasing agricultural production. Trees did not protect the 
vegetative cover downstream and improve soil fertility but supplied fuel, feed and fodder, 
and poles for construction (Republic of Rwanda 1982). 
 
Soil erosion 1962- 1994  
 
Rwanda gained independence in 1962. The change of government did not imply a new 
style of governance with regard to the development of mountainous areas and the 
control of soil erosion. On the contrary, the conservation techniques that had been 
introduced by the colonial state were maintained by the newly independent regime 
(Verwimp 1991). Only hedgerows (for mulching and as fodder for livestock) and bench 
terraces were new additions. The approach remained largely driven by enforcing farmers 
to adopt new techniques (Kayijamahe 1982). The immediate post-1962 period, however, 
saw trenches being abandoned and destroyed, which was perhaps an expression of newly 
regained freedom. Consensus exists over the top-down approach leading to techniques 
that were generally not trusted by farmers and local technicians (Ndindabahizi and 
Ngwabije 1991; Guichaoua 1989; Kayijamahe 1982). 
 
In the 1980s, soil erosion control was expressed actively in political terms. The former 
president Habyarimana labelled 1982 as ‘the year of soil erosion control’. The budget for 
soil erosion control was increased by 40%. In the same year, a seminar convened by 
agronomists, development practitioners and researchers explored appropriate soil 
conservation scenarios. Despite all efforts, the 1988 National Commission indicated that 
63% of the land was not protected by any of the available erosion control techniques 
(Ndindabahizi and Ngwabije 1991).  
 
After 1994 
 
The period 1990–1994 was a turbulent one. Up until the 1994 genocide, intense land 
conflicts forced people to migrate. To a certain extent, these internal migrations and 
displacements resulted in changes in land use and land cover through deforestation. 
People who left Rwanda due to the war and genocide then returned and reclaimed 
ownership of their lands, in successive phases from 1994–1996 (Musahara and Huggins 
2005). In 1997, the government encouraged people to share available land resources and 
it adopted a new policy (imidugudu) enforcing settlement in rural villages (Havugimana 
2009:24). Some state land (e.g. national parks) was allocated to settle new returnees. 
 
In the post-1994 period, the focus shifted to bench terraces; conservation objectives 
became closely linked to attaining food self-sufficiency and exporting cash crops. It 
represented a policy shift away from ‘food for work’, ‘cash for work’ or subsidies to 
lower input costs. The popular political slogan in the previous regime ‘work more and 
hard’ implied a development scenario geared towards the intensification of labour (Clay 
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et al. 1998). Together with increased pressure on land due to population growth, this may 
have accelerated land degradation and soil erosion (Moeyersons 1989).  
 
The emphasis on bench-terrace policies as an effective way to combat soil erosion and 
to maintain water and soil nutrients is supported by experts (Fleskens 2007). If well 
maintained they can also improve land management and increase crop yields (Kriegl and 
Preissler 1987). However, terracing on its own does not ensure increased production. It 
requires additional investments in inputs such as fertilizers, which farmers often find 
difficult to secure. Farmers also complain about the high labour input that is required to 
build and maintain the terraces (Bizoza and Graaff 2010, Fleskens 2007).   
 
At present, farmers are encouraged to combine both mechanical and biological 
measures: terracing, contour bunds, trenches, and water retention systems at field level, 
fallows (although limited), hedgerows, intercropping, mulching and tree planting. 
Additions to the array of conservation techniques include hedgerows planted with 
agroforestry species (e.g. Pennisetum purpureum), which are highly appreciated because they 
protect the soil and provide fodder for livestock. Zero grazing is being promoted because 
of its combined effects such as soil protection and integrated nutrient management 
through manuring, thus strengthening the (re)integration of cultivation and livestock 
production. Alongside these measures, farmers still have their own ways of protecting 
crops from run-off (Republic of Rwanda 1982). Unfortunately, these are hardly 
documented in the literature (Critchley et al. 1994). 
2.5  Current challenges 
 
The current environmental policy discourse in Rwanda hinges on addressing 
population pressure and privatizing land tenure (Republic of Rwanda 2009: 10). Land 
being a fixed asset at a time of population growth poses a serious challenge. A fivefold 
population increase between 1948 and 2002 (see Figure 1) has led to a chronic and 
continuous disequilibrium between population density and land size, jeopardizing rural 
people’s abilities to construct land-based livelihoods. In addition, field size decreased as 
landownership became more fragmented as a result of inheritance. 70% of farms are 
about one hectare or less and population density is about 376 inhabitants per km2 
(NWRMP 2005). Figure 2 shows land use in Rwanda for recent years. Unfortunately, 
data that show the shifts in land use over the years is not readily available but there are 
indications of deforestation and increased cultivation. May (1995), Clay (1996) and Clay 
and Reardon (1996) argue that the shifts in land use driven by population pressure 
certainly limits the options to intensify land use continuously. Likewise, Lewis (1992) and 
Lewis and Nyamulinda (1996) point towards the greater likelihood of severe land 
degradation and reduced agricultural production. Deforestation, cultivation of bottom-
lands and fragile marginal land on steep slopes previously farmed as pastureland, and 
woodlots have had a negative impact on productivity.  
Soil erosion in Rwanda in a historical perspective 
 17 
 
Population density (1948-2001)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008
Year 
Po
pu
lat
ion
 de
ns
ity
 
Figure 1: Trend of population density 1948–2008 
 
 
 
Figure 2: land Cover mapp generated based on Data from Ministry of Agriculture in  
              Rwanda 
 
Land tenure and security of tenure are considered to be key institutional dimensions. 
Indeed, land rights became a critical factor in the mid-1950s when farmers began to 
migrate in search of land (Clay and Lewis 1990). The wars of the 1990s led to the forced 
displacement of farmers, and their gradual return has added to an environmental 
question of great political sensitivity: all Rwandese people have the right to access land 
(Musahara and Huggins 2005) but this results in increased pressure on the land.  
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Land tenure and rights are part of a heated debate because of their strong links with 
land use. Policy documents state that for soil erosion control and water conservation to 
be successful, land relations need to be privatized. The assumed linear relationship 
between land investment and security of tenure is ambiguous, however. This is partly 
because of the coexistence and overlap of different legal systems in Rwanda. Until 
recently, the state has claimed ownership of the land with only usufruct rights for users 
(Musahara and Huggins 2005).The current law, adopted in 2005, moves away from 
usufruct rights and aims to register and commoditize land. Private land rights are 
considered an appropriate vehicle for a land market and land investments, and thus for 
constructing and maintaining terraces. 
 
However, customary land rights are still predominant in Rwanda. Inheritance rather 
than the land market shapes the transfer of land from generation to generation and from 
one person to another, effectively creating an informal land market. Farmers believe 
strongly that the land belongs to them despite the progressive nature of formal titling. 
Most farmers keep an ibuku (book) that contains measurements of their land. Farmers 
largely rely on their own land and have little opportunity for renting land elsewhere (Clay 
1996). In situations where land markets are absent, informal contracts appear to be the 
best strategy for accessing land. However, this may lead to situations where farmers are 
reluctant to invest in land or build terraces on rented fields (Clay and Reardon 1996). 
Informal land access arrangements are also likely to affect farmers applying for loans and 
credit.  
 
Current land laws in Rwanda thus do not necessarily create security of tenure but of 
ownership instead. In their study of Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda, Place and Hazell (1993) 
found that land rights were not a significant factor in determining investments in land 
improvement. Clay and Reardon (1996:9) argue that ‘the stability of tenure, rather than 
ownership, is the more important factor shaping a farmer’s decision to invest in soil 
productivity and adopt sustainable land-use practices’. Security of tenure allows farmers 
to maintain and invest more in their land and to obtain long-term land-use rights (Clay 
1996). The current legal situation in Rwanda is therefore not conducive to the soil 
erosion control declared as an important governmental goal (Musahara and Huggins 
2005). 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
 
This paper has provided evidence that both political authorities and farmers were 
cognizant of soil erosion during the pre-colonial and early colonial periods in Rwanda. 
Nevertheless, the colonial and post-colonial states began to import exogenous ideas 
about soil erosion, notably about the value of bench terraces. The ensuing measures took 
the form of regulations to prevent the overuse of land, leaving little room for local 
farmers to participate in and own the process of soil erosion control. The 
implementation process was generally enforced as a top-down process rather than being 
participatory, which would have allowed farmer perspectives to be included. Population 
increase and land tenure were identified by experts and the state as key social factors 
shaping soil erosion control processes.  
 
Past and current policies have shown a remarkable continuity of ideas. The persistence 
of continuities indicates the extent to which the transformation of institutional 
infrastructure in Rwanda has proceeded hardly unchanged in its content. Historical 
Soil erosion in Rwanda in a historical perspective 
 19 
analysis allowed us to underline the continuity of prescriptions and modes of ordering in 
the past and present. Distinctions between the pre-, colonial and post-colonial belie the 
existence of important continuities. Past and present policies set out to commoditise 
Rwanda’s highland and mountain resources (e.g. land, labour, crops and cattle) and to 
integrate peoples’ livelihoods more firmly into global economic circuits. Bench terracing 
and land tenure reform have become the predominant socio-technical vehicle to achieve 
these aims. While the state discourse increasingly seeks to privatise land as a key to 
solving erosion problems, farmers, supported by some academic researchers, contest that 
this is an appropriate institutional solution and continue to prefer their own land tenure 
arrangement. Moreover, the state’s discourse has given more attention to soil erosion 
control per se than to slowing down population growth vis-à-vis the available land. The 
latter seems to be a more promising trajectory for most mountainous regions in the 
world but requires changes at the level of the soil conservation discourse. If farmers, in 
collaboration with experts, find ways to improve the land (effectively increasing farm 
size), population pressure may be less problematic. If combined with a diversification of 
the rural economy, Rwanda may escape a doom scenario of poverty and insurmountable 
environmental problems.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOIL CONSERVATION IN RWANDA2 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Rwanda has a long history of providing technical and physical support to farmers and 
their organizations. The reasoning behind this has been that developmental problems 
such as poverty or soil degradation stem from problems of climate, soil and a lack of 
knowledge and information. The solutions that have been offered, however, have been 
mostly technical in nature: terracing, draining swamps, culling cattle, and so on. Farmers 
have also been encouraged to cooperate with the state and to work together. Farmers 
have usually recognized the benefits of collective and communal forms of labour, 
provided these did not interfere negatively with local production patterns (Newbury and 
Newbury, 2000: 865-869). The formation of farmer organizations, particularly after 
independence, served to channel traditional patterns of cooperation and these still feature 
prominently in the construction of SWC infrastructure today. The building of terraces is 
organized predominantly through collective labour arrangements.  
 
Over the last thirty years different types of subsidies like food or cash-for-work have 
been used to stimulate collective labour arrangements in the construction of terraces. 
Subsidies, however, have always been associated with induced development, 
inefficiencies and unsustainable outcomes. The experience in other developing countries 
shows that subsidy induced SWC is often abandoned (Winters et al., 2004; Bunch, 1999). 
Rwanda has not escaped this phenomenon, and SWC structures that have been 
abandoned or which are ill-maintained and in dire need of repair are commonplace. The 
re-investments required for such repairs and maintenance are often beyond the means of 
farmers. Moreover, the food-for-work and cash-for-work incentives used to develop 
SWC infrastructure tend to create ‘dependency syndromes' and undermine people’s 
efforts to implement SWC measures themselves. Bunch (1999: 216) links the dependency 
syndrome with the role of the state: ‘farmers develop a feeling of paternalistic 
dependency that they are unable to practice or manage SWC without artificial incentives 
and continuing assistance’. Newbury and Newbury (2000) trace this paternalism back to 
the pre-colonial and colonial eras and relate it to the central role of the Rwandan state in 
development. 
 
Subsidies also transform the dynamics and meaning of ‘mutual assistance’ and labour 
relations in Rwanda’s rural areas. Cultural repertoires of mutual cooperation and 
reciprocity are central to communities and to the social relationships between farmers. 
They are important local institutional building blocks and an essential part of the 
strategies that farmers employ in order to develop their livelihoods and deal with 
uncertainties and crises such as difficulty in accessing land and labour (Berry, 1989; 
Cleaver, 2002). In Rwanda, forms of mutual cooperation often involved alliances forged 
by local elite groups (e.g. local leaders) since they controlled land and cattle (Newbury, 
2001). Over time, the relations that hinged on elite-commoner cooperation became 
increasingly tied to the state, particularly in the field of land improvement. Both the 
colonial and post-colonial states have used various means to drive investment in land. 
                                                 
2 This chapter will be reworked into a journal article 
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These include direct monetary incentives (e.g. tax policies, cash for work) and in kind 
incentives (e.g. food for work). This has resulted in commodity dependant labour 
relations. In addition, the Rwandan state has initiated the formation of farmer 
cooperatives and organizations over the years. These organizations play a prominent role 
in the development of SWC infrastructure, such as terraces.  
 
Little is known about farmer organizations and how they function in relation to their 
members and the agrarian policies of the state. Local people’s opinions about the 
organizations they have joined or formed is something of a mystery. This article aims to 
contribute to the knowledge about these organizations by addressing two questions. The 
first deals with how farmers perceive their role and participation in the decision making 
process that leads to the establishment of SWC measures. Given that terraces are 
constructed under different SWC interventions, the second concern of this paper is to find 
out how farmers perceive the importance of their organizations or institutions in this 
process and how these perceptions affect SWC strategies in Rwanda. Section two of the 
paper reviews some of the theoretical links between farmer organizations and 
institutions, on the one hand, and the particular socio-technical characteristics of SWC 
structures, on the other. Section three describes the study area and explains why 
particular research methods were used in the study. In section four, we describe how the 
Rwandan state has strategically used the customary language of local, traditional forms of 
organization in order to encourage soil and water conservation. The fifth section presents 
and discusses the results of the study. 
3.2 Organizations, institutions, soil erosion control structures  
 
This paper aims to capture the dynamics involved in the construction and maintenance 
of SWC structures such as bench terraces. The basic theoretical starting point for such an 
analysis is the contention that the construction and maintenance of bench terraces and 
similar devices is the outcome of locally specific interactions between farmer 
organizations and other institutions. The nature of state-farmer relationships and the 
particular technical and physical characteristics of SWC structures are important factors. 
Other factors include the effectiveness of terraces, the economic benefits derived from 
them and the degree of participation in their construction, maintenance and use. The 
effectiveness of terracing depends not only on the physical characteristics of the 
structures but also on the dynamics within farmer organizations and relations between 
the state and farmers. The opinions of farmers regarding bench terraces are shaped by 
their experiences during the use, construction and maintenance of these structures, as 
well as by the nature of the organizational and institutional arrangements that evolve 
around them. Bench terraces cannot be understood in isolation from their social and 
institutional environments. Our challenge in this paper is to synthesize several different 
lines of inquiry in order to make sense of the processes involved. The next section 
consists of a short review of some of the relevant literature on organizations and 
institutions as well as an analysis of bench terraces as socio-technical constructions. 
 
Organizations and Institutions  
 
North (1990) describes institutions as the rules of the game in a society, or, more 
formally, the protocols that shape human interaction. They encompass norms, social 
values, rules and regulations which shape – but not necessarily determine – opportunities 
for people to access and utilize resources. Institutions mediate people-environment 
relations (Leach et al., 1999; Agrawal and Gibson, 2001). Central developmental 
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questions include understanding how such institutions develop, how rules and laws are 
designed, and more importantly, how they are understood in specific localities. 
Institutions can viewed, therefore, as normal patterns of behaviour that, as we will see in 
the second part of this paper, are in most but not in all circumstances accepted by a 
range of actors (Roep, 2000; Long, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 2004).  
Organizations and associations are the (formal and informal) manifestations of the 
social structures that societies create to order and guide governance. Usually, 
organizations have a certain bureaucratic model of governance with appointed and/or 
elected positions (e.g. chair persons, secretary). While associations ‘emerge from below’ 
and are well embedded in local cultural and organisational repertoires (Shanin 1973; 
Berry, 1993), in contrast and historically, many farmer organizations in Africa (e.g. 
producer cooperatives) are formed and controlled by the state. The formation of 
cooperatives has become an institutional vehicle for the state in Africa to stimulate 
agricultural development and economic growth (Bates, 1983; 1989). In addition, foreign 
aid institutions like Western states have been funding and sponsoring various state and 
NGO implemented programmes. The implication is that the nature and direction of local 
development are shaped, influenced and, at times, determined by national and 
international processes and actors.  
An understanding of organizations and associations, as we have said, is central to our 
analysis. Such an understanding should be informed by the debates concerning the 
constitution of communities. The notion of community is often misleading and it is 
striking the degree to which simplistic notions of community are being reinvented in the 
context of practical efforts towards community based sustainable development (Fabricius 
2004; Leach et al., 1999; Guyer, 1981). Although it assumes a high degree of 
homogeneity and harmony, the opposite is often the case. As is the case with 
communities, rural people’s organisations and associations have become increasingly 
disaggregated (McKeon et al., 2004). Like communities organisations are not static either. 
They are composed of people who, in the struggle for resources, actively monitor, 
interpret and shape the world around them and create and utilize various alliances. This 
echoes a perspective that revolves around social actors, agency and action. Structure, or 
rules and norms, are the product of human practices, actions and interactions. Certain 
actions may be intended; others may have unintended outcomes (Long, 2001, Van der 
Ploeg, 2008). The tenant of the political ecology literature is that social behaviour and 
action is shaped and constrained by the wider environmental, economic, political and 
cultural institutional frameworks in which social actors find themselves, and by their 
location within a society (Warren et al., 2001; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003; Robbins, 
2004). While the decisions and actions of actors may well be affected by what happens 
elsewhere, it does not follow that these decisions and actions are determined by such 
events. Actions cannot be reduced to the expression of an actor’s position within a 
system of social relations in any simple way. The actions of people are influenced, but 
not necessarily structured or determined, by outside forces such as markets or the state’s 
agricultural policies. Authors like Watts (2007) and Agrawal and Gibson (2001) stress the 
importance of unpacking the notion of community and insights emerging from this  
should be extended to the analysis of (farmer) organizations and associations. Gender, 
age, social and economic inequalities, unequal access to resources and power differences 
all contribute to the existence of communities that are socially and spatially differentiated, 
rather than equal and consensus driven (Arce and Fisher 2003). Agrawal and Gibson 
(2001) and Mckeon et al., (2004) argue that it is important to focus on the multiple 
interests of actors within communities and their associations and the ways in which these 
actors shape decision making processes. Cousins and Kepe (2004), Platteau and Gaspart 
(2003) and Platteau (2004) highlight the tendency of the so-called ‘big men’ or local elites 
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and gate keepers of the state to gain control over community and farmer organizations 
and their development projects.  
Recent literature suggests that there is a growing consensus that one way to escape 
from the simplistic notion of community is to focus instead on institutions (see for 
instance Ostrom,1990, 2004; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Leach et al., 1999). This shift 
potentially offers a more fruitful approach to understanding what constitutes 
organizations and how these function practically. There is, however, disagreement in the 
literature with regards to understanding and interpreting data concerning the governance 
of institutions and organizations and their dynamics. The major contention is between 
perspectives that emphasize the normative and structural aspects of organizations and 
their influence on social behaviour and the relationship patterns between people and 
their social and natural resources (Uphoff, 1986; North, 1990), and those which present 
institutions as a set of rules and regulations that provide individuals with room for 
manoeuvre (Ostrom, 1990, 2004; Scott, 1985; Long, 2001). An institution and 
organization may thus simultaneously be used to denote a process, an object and a 
subject. A key question is whether (and to what extent) we attribute power only to those 
social actors who create institutions and who formulate and maintain the rules to which 
others feel bound, or whether agency should also be attributed to those with less power.  
The distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, which is often made in the analysis of 
governance and institutions, denotes a difference between what exists in an idealized 
form on paper and what actually happens in practice. Focussing on what people actually 
do in their daily lives enables one to identify locally specific forms of organization. (see 
for instance Mosse, 2004). It allows one to document visible, but also unexpected, 
practices. Some social scientists (Long, 2001; Moore, 2005; Scott, 2009) link this with 
issues of agency, fragmentation and power differentials. They point at the many ways in 
which people skilfully manage to get around laws and regulations and to resist political 
interventions to defend their own interests. Yet, typically, these informal practices and 
forms of organization provide people with room for manoeuvre to pursue their 
individual and collective interests. Van der Ploeg (2008) associates this with resistance of 
the ‘third kind’. The perspectives outlined here do not necessarily reject the notion of 
community or (farmer) organization, but following Leach et al. (1999: 230) ‘rather 
contextualize it by describing a more or less temporary unity of situation, interest or 
purpose.’ Watts (2007) takes a similar analytical position. Key to any analysis is a firm 
grounding in the locality that places emphasis on how local people and other relevant 
actors such as policy makers and scientists (including ourselves) read the institutional and 
physical landscape and the changes that occur around them.  
 
Soil and Water Control Structures 
 
The approach taken in this paper is that technologies or engineering devices are 
artefacts developed by people. The field of technology and engineering has been studied 
by a variety of disciplines employing perspectives that have ranged from technological 
determinism and an (neo-classical) economic view of technology development to social-
constructivism (e.g. Kloppenburg, 1988) and actor network theory (e.g. Latour, 2005). 
We will not provide a complete overview of all these theoretical perspectives. Instead, we 
will formulate a synthesis of the different positions which, we believe, can be used to 
understand soil and water conservation as structures that are man-made, and which, 
consequently, contain and reflect codes and assumptions about how to construct and use 
these structures. 
Technology development and transfer necessarily involves an interface between the 
world of designers and experts and that of the users. Bench terraces are not simply 
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neutral engineering devices but are designed on the basis of assumptions made by 
engineers about how they should work in particular contexts (MacKenzie and Wajman. 
1999; Jasanoff, 2004; Hebinck, 2001, Rip and Kemp, 1998). Technologies are socially 
shaped: bench terraces can only work (in the eyes of the designers) if they are 
constructed and maintained in certain ways. When designing terraces, agricultural 
engineers tend to situate them in hypothetical rather than real societies. Assumptions, for 
example, about the amount of labour available for construction and maintenance feed 
into the design. But bench-terraces are socio-technical rather than purely technical 
constructions. An example of this is when their construction is undertaken by state 
driven forms of farmer organization. 
 
Terraces are seen as effective technical devices to conserve and improve soil properties 
and soil productivity in the highlands of erosion prone countries like Rwanda 
(Posthumus and de Graaff, 2005; Kannan et al., 2010). Apart from terraces, other 
technologies to protect and improve soils include trenches and contour bounds, water 
harvesting techniques and planting trees. Numerous studies show that the construction 
and maintenance of bench terracing entails huge labour and financial investments. This 
means that it is extremely difficult to erect them on an individual basis. The shortcoming 
of these studies and classical approaches to soil conservation, however, is their one-
dimensional focus on the technical dimension of terrace construction, notably steepness 
and soil suitability, the lack of any account of the position of the participants (the natural 
resource users themselves), and the reliance on experts (Biot et al., 1995, see also Blaikie, 
1985). While there has been a substantial analytical focus on local knowledge in 
interaction with expert knowledge (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Chambers et al., 1989), 
few studies actually analyze the difficulties of terrace construction and maintenance in the 
context of the histories of state-farmer relationships and social and institutional 
arrangements or procedures. Figure 1 shows the interrelation between the social and 
technical dimensions of bench terraces. The Rwandan state has historically as well as 
contemporary occupied a central role in the construction of soil and water conservation 
infrastructure and in the formation of farmer organizations’. The underlying dynamics 
involved with the construction of bench terraces and organizations and the results of 
conservation programmes in Rwanda are thus understood in this article as the interplay 
between the attempts of the state to bring ready-made technologies and institutional 
frames and codes of conduct (that are expert designed) and the local reworking (or 
adaptation) of these by local people.  
 
                                              Social                      State                     Technical  
                                                  Institutions              
                                                                                        Biophysics/ Chemistry of soils  
                                 Policies/regulations     
                                                                  Terrace         Land use and degradation  
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                            Collective action                          Crop suitability/ production  
            Community bylaws                         Physical effectiveness  
                                                                  Land intensification                     
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Figure 1: Socio-technical constructions of bench terraces 
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3.3 Study area and Research methods 
This study is based on data obtained from a survey of 301 respondents randomly 
selected from areas in Southern and Northern Rwanda. The data is complemented with 
information that resulted from a number of group discussions with members of 20 
farmer associations and interviews with key informants at district level. The farmer 
associations were selected from the 20 sectors that constitute a major part of two agro-
ecological zones: the Congo-Crete Nil Watershed Zone (South) and the Buberuka 
Highland Zone (North). These two zones are hilly and are considered particularly 
suitable for both bench and progressive terracing.  
 
The field sites were selected on the basis that they belonged to the joint slope category, 
which is comprised of two groups with gradients of between 12 to 25 and 25 to 55 per 
cent respectively. The first group in the category is suitable for progressive terraces (PT) 
while the second is better suited to bench terraces (BT). Using Geographic Information 
System (GIS) mapping techniques, we mapped the areas in which slopes of these 
gradients are common and selected 20 out of the 38 sectors in the two zones for our 
study. One farmer association from each sector was selected for a group discussion. We 
mapped the SWC structures with farmers in order to identify where bench and/or 
progressive terraces are located (Figure 2). These locations were geo-referenced by taking 
GPS points from which the location maps were generated (Figure 3). Finally, about 4 
households per sub-catchment/village were randomly selected for detailed interviews. 
 
This paper, as mentioned earlier, undertakes an analysis of farmer organizations, their 
relationships with the state and their related experiences. The analysis is based on data 
relevant to the characteristics of association membership, members developmental 
priorities and needs, the role of mutual assistance, existing policies for soil and 
conservation, farmer participation and decision making in SWC, types and sources of 
agricultural advice and perceptions about the effectiveness of established SWC structures. 
In respect to data analysis, both quantitative and qualitative methods have been used. 
The aim of this paper, though, is not to provide quantifiable data about the causal 
relationship between local institutions and soil erosion control, but rather to provide 
descriptive and qualitative insights.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Dominance mapping of bench and progressive terraces by farmers 
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Figure 3:  Location of the study sites 
 
3.4 State policies and collective soil conservation in Rwanda 
 
Historically Rwanda's colonial and post colonial governments have played an 
important organizing role in the implementation of soil and water conservation policies 
and programmes (Newbury and Newbury, 2000). We will focus on the construction of 
terraces, the first of which were built shortly after independence was gained in 1962. The 
change of government led to the introduction of some new methods of controlling soil 
erosion. Most of the SWC measures that had been introduced during the period of 
colonial rule were imposed from above; their rejection by farmers after independence 
may be perceived as an expression of the farmers newly regained freedom. This is 
certainly the view of Olson (1994). He notes, though, that the 1962 ‘social revolution’ 
also had other effects on land management. These included the conversion of land that 
had been reserved for pasture to land for cultivation and human settlement. A political 
explanation may be that the top-down approach of the colonial government led to 
techniques which the majority of farmers and technicians did not agree with or trust 
(Ndindabahizi and Ngwabije, 1991; Guichaoua, 1989; Kayijamahe, 1982). Nevertheless, 
there is still a remarkable continuity in terms of SWC techniques between the colonial 
and postcolonial eras. Most of the conservation techniques that were introduced by the 
colonial regime were maintained by the newly independent regime (Verwimp, 1991). 
Only hedgerows (for mulching and fodder for livestock) and bench terraces were new 
additions.  
Different approaches to terrace construction have been applied in Rwanda at different 
times. Initially, terraces were mostly built on public or government land (known as 
Ibisigara). The assumption was that farmers would be attracted to use them. Organizing 
labour and securing complementary inputs were major constraints, however. These were 
among the reasons why some of the terraced plots were not fully utilized and maintained 
by farmers. A response to these emerging problems was to mobilize collective labour to 
establish terraces on private land. However, the fact that individual plots were scattered 
within villages and cells (one of the smallest administrative units in Rwanda) limited the 
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large scale implementation of SWC programs, and the approach had to be modified 
again. Currently there is a two pronged approach based on the realization that bench 
terraces are ready made constructions which require substantial financial and institutional 
investments. Slow forming terraces, also referred to as progressive terraces, have begun 
to be promoted. These are advantageous in that they are built up gradually during the 
process of cultivation and the simultaneous planting of hedge rows. Slow forming 
terraces require less labour and financial input from the users. While the overall approach 
of government is now to encourage both bench and slow forming terracing, bench 
terraces are still perceived as being superior to the slow forming ones. Mustering labour 
and resources for the construction and maintenance of bench terraces remains a key 
aspect of the state’s conservation drive. State-farmer relationships, therefore, continue to 
be essential to soil conservation efforts in Rwanda and to bench terrace construction in 
particular.  
Farmer organizations are an effective vehicle that the state can use to shape its 
relationship with farmers in order to implement its conservation and agrarian policies. 
The relationships formed within the farmer organizations in turn nurture collective 
action and mutual assistance. They enable the pooling of labour and the sharing of farm 
implements for terrace construction and maintenance. A key research question arises: 
whose interests are served through these mechanisms? This article argues that while local 
organizations have been used as a means to facilitate the implementation of SWC 
programmes, they are not the result of the policy or project implementation. It is also 
true, however, that little is known about how farmer organizations and their members 
perceive their role(s). The sustainability of the collectively constructed SWC structures is 
also unclear.  
Umuganda, Imihigo, Ubudehe and Agasozi Ndatwa are policies designed to achieve a range 
of societal objectives. These include the construction and maintenance of soil and water 
infrastructure that can simultaneously reduce soil erosion and modernize agriculture. The 
modern Rwandan state currently taps into traditional forms of collaboration, notably 
those that adhere to the notion of collectivity and cooperation. These are crucial 
institutional vehicles to achieve its aim of promoting development. These arrangements 
are continuously being adapted to accommodate change in Rwanda today. The advent of 
labour migration, the reorientation of rural livelihoods to incorporate non-agricultural 
activities and the Genocide of 1994 have all had an impact on the ease and feasibility of 
organizing labour collectively and calling on the assistance of friends and neighbours. 
The term Umuganda derives from Kinyarwanda and expresses the idea of building a 
house collectively. Nowadays it refers to the rallying of communal labour for the 
reconstruction and repair of basic public development infrastructure under the 
supervision of village heads. Umuganda requires everyone to contribute free labour, even 
the president of the state and other political leaders. Umuganda is rather similar to the 
notions of gotong royong in Indonesia (Bowen, 1986) and Salongo in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo during the Mobutu regime (Adelman, 1975). Umuganda is mainly 
called on in SWC in order to construct and repair water canals and irrigation systems. It 
is also used for the implementation of water harvesting techniques such as ibitega, tree 
planting and, occasionally, the construction of trenches and bench terraces.  
Imihigo draws its meaning from mutual promises meant to increase social capital, civic 
awareness and political efficacy. Imihigo was initiated at the end of 2005 and entails a 
performance contract between the state and communities to facilitate the implementation 
of SWC measures, crop production and other developmental goals. In terms of soil 
erosion controls specifically, each district pledges a number of hectares of land to be 
protected from soil erosion on a yearly basis. Evaluations are done annually by the 
central government. Good performances, as defined in the service contract, are 
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rewarded. Imihigo also promotes the notion of vertical accountability between local 
communities and the central government. 
Ubudehe also builds on the Rwandan experience and cultural value of collective 
problem solving. It was initiated towards the end of 2001 with the objective of enforcing 
collective action at village or community level in order to alleviate poverty. It is 
considered a pillar of the ongoing political and financial decentralization process. Local 
people at cell level, the last but one administrative unit in Rwanda, are provided with 
interest free financing in order to implement locally designed projects aimed at poverty 
reduction. The reduction of poverty is the main motivation for the reactivation of this 
traditional arrangement. Mr Kayira ,the Ubudehe programme coordinator at the Ministry 
of Local Governance at the time, confirmed in an interview with IRIN (2005), that ‘the 
most important element in this programme is not the money they spend but treasuring 
the spirit of local communities coming together design their own strategies and address 
their day-to-day problems [sic]. This process nurtures also concepts of collective problem 
identification and solving, and collective benefits [sic]’. Ubudehe also sustains other 
policies of the Ministry of Local Government and the National Programme for Poverty 
Reduction at the Ministry of Finance and Economic planning. The extent to which the 
Ubudehe initiative has achieved its aim of being all-inclusive requires further detailed 
study.  
Agasozi Ndatwa was launched in 2008 by the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Local Government. This is an extension policy that is being 
implemented at village level in the administrative unit known as Umudugu. The aim is to 
jump-start self improvement activities on one ‘model hill’ in each Umudugudu. It involves 
all issues and activities related to land management, such as the prevention of soil 
erosion, agricultural intensification, animal husbandry, water management, kitchen 
gardens and land consolidation. Agasozi Ndatwa is also performance based and 
complements other development policies at the ‘hill’ level, such as those related to 
education and health. Administrative units and model farmers are provided with awards 
in order to encourage competitive land management and soil erosion controls. 
These measures demonstrate how the state skilfully draws on the traditional 
repertoires of local forms of organizations in order to address the developmental issues 
of modern Rwanda. The new institutions it encourages or forms are based on a blend of 
the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’. This institutionalization process does not only build on 
and enforce the idea of collective action, mutual assistance and the mentality of self- 
reliance, however, it also fosters a spirit of competitiveness. The challenge for researchers 
is to analyze the properties that emerge from this blend of new and traditional practices. 
Another important issue that needs to be addressed is the way in which farmers are 
responding to the initiative and learning from it. Farmers, after all, are at the centre of the 
programme. 
3.5 Farmer cooperatives and associations at work 
 
The analysis of the data collected reveals how the farmers who participated in the 
interviews and group discussions perceive their organizations and their role in soil 
conservation. It also identifies the development needs expressed by farmers and how 
these are addressed through their institutions. Opinions about the effectiveness of the 
terraces that were established in the past also emerge.  
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Characteristics of farmer associations 
 
This sub-section describes some major characteristics of the 20 farmer associations 
that were sampled to get an idea of their role in soil conservation and how this relates to 
the modalities of the project and state interventions. Both the survey and the group 
discussions confirm that farmer associations have been part of the institutional 
framework of Rwanda since the 1980s. The formation of these associations was, 
however, mostly driven by farmers, a fact confirmed by 68 per cent of the 20 associations 
that were sampled. At first sight this is not consistent with the usual understanding that 
farmer organizations in Africa are almost always initiated and formed by local leaders, 
church leaders and agents of the state in order to facilitate the implementation of agrarian 
policies. But the farmers also confirmed that many of the activities in which their 
associations engage are shaped by leaders. These include the implementation of soil 
erosion control measures and training. The associations that we sampled had an average 
of 41 individual members each. It appeared that the membership of some associations 
fluctuates. Most associations suffer from a lack of the skills that are required to manage 
their daily activities. Few of their members have completed primary school. Consequently 
they have to rely mostly on their own knowledge and experiences and on the informal 
skills that they have obtained from agricultural training, field visits and meetings held 
with local leaders. Figure 4, drawn from survey data, shows a relatively positive trend in 
relation to association membership since 1975.  
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Figure 4: Trend of association membership in Southern and Northern Rwanda  
 
The operational capital of the organizations is generated by the collection of 
membership fees (ubunyamuryango fatizo) as well as from income derived from the 
collective or contractual activities that members perform on behalf of their associations. 
Operational capital is about 1.200.000 FRW per year (about $ 2.000). These operational 
funds are used to finance joint crop production at association or cooperative level. 
Farmers maintain that this is not sufficient to cover their needs. Bingen and Munyankusi 
(2002) draw a similar conclusion. 
Two different types of farmer organization in the research area can be distinguished, 
each operating at a different level. At sector level, a third level administrative unit, 
informal and formal organizations can be identified. It should be borne in mind, though, 
that writers such as Cleaver (2002) are critical of such distinctions since it is difficult to 
accurately identify all the different organizations that are socially embedded in 
communities. The first so-called ‘informal’ category consists of small groups, known as 
amatsinda. These are small-scale and multi-purpose associations. Some of them are only 
active temporarily. They are based on kinship and locality and serve to respond to daily 
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issues. These small-scale associations, begun in the 1980’s, are still the organizational 
structure that most farmers prefer. The ‘formal’ organizations consist of cooperatives 
and have been backed by the government since 2006. The formation of these 
cooperatives stems from the need to receive recognition as a legal body in order to get 
access to more lucrative services such as financial loans. The government has set criteria 
that small associations have to meet if they wish to become cooperatives, but many of 
these associations are not able to comply with these criteria. Moreover, the shift to 
formal cooperatives has produced complaints regarding the low levels of trust between 
cooperative members, in contrast to the greater levels of trust that exist in the less formal 
associations. Social interactions are more complicated in the cooperatives since they 
amalgamate people from several smaller associations and from different areas. This partly 
explains why small-scale associations are still dominant in the rural areas. 54 per cent of 
the 101 members surveyed belonged to small-scale associations as compared to 19 per 
cent who were members of the cooperatives.  
 
Major development needs and mutual assistance  
 
Table 1 summarizes the major development priorities and daily needs that were 
brought forward during the group discussions. These needs have customarily been 
addressed by social arrangements such as mutual assistance (known as gufashanya in 
Kinyarwanda). Mutual assistance is the engine that sustains the pooling and sharing of 
labour from individual farmers. It allows them to solve labour shortages in relation to the 
establishment of soil conservation measures. Bench terracing is a labour-intensive 
activity. Terraces are difficult for individuals or families to construct on their own. Many 
households attribute their success in constructing bench and progressive terraces on their 
individual fields to collective arrangements.  
 
The sharing of labour has also led to practices such as ‘twibature’ and ‘abahwituzi’. 
Twibature is especially common in the North. Certain farmers (known as Abahwituzi) get 
up at five in the morning and wake up the rest of the people in the village. Work is then 
begun on terracing the hill that has been selected under the new policy of Agasozi Ndatwa. 
In most cases, people cultivate terraces collectively and share the harvest. The reciprocity 
entailed in these relationships has become part and parcel of the socio-technical grammar 
required for the construction of bench terraces. Both the inherent costs and benefits of 
terrace construction and maintenance are shared. 
 
Table 1.  Major daily needs mentioned in group discussions 
Source: Focused group discussion 
 
Farmers in the north report that access to water is a real concern. They have to fetch 
water over long distances. Others rely on harvested water but the relevant infrastructure 
is limited. Access to electricity and health services is also irregular. Farmers assist each 
other through their associations. They might for instance contribute financially to the 
purchase of a membership card for the health insurance scheme known as ‘mutuelle de 
Lack of potable water  
Electricity and access to health services  
Insufficient livestock to provide manure  
Lack of liquidity to financially support farming activities including soil erosion controls  
Lack of access to markets, agricultural inputs and credit 
Unpredictable climate and climate change  
Small field sizes 
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santé’. Farmers pay about 10 to 15 per cent of the costs of the treatment with this card. It 
is difficult for farmers to generate money to support their farming activities and home 
expenses because opportunities for off-farm income generation are limited. Most farmers 
have small and fragmented fields (less than one hectare in most cases). One result of this 
is that soil conservation practices such as fallowing are disappearing. 
Two-thirds of the associations whose members were sampled identified problems with 
accessing agricultural inputs. The prospect of climate change was another major issue 
that was frequently mentioned. Mutual assistance plays an important role in dealing with 
these sorts of issues. Farmers lend and borrow money from one another by means of a 
system that they call ‘Ikimina’. This helps them to circumvent the banks and local money 
lenders. Trust, honesty (ubunyangamugayo or ubupfura) and the shared notion of mutual 
assistance (‘umutima wo gufashanya’) are the collateral in such exchanges. ‘Ikimina’ allows 
farmers to purchase inputs and/or pay health insurance and school fees for their 
children. In addition, farmers share agricultural inputs such as labour, seeds, fertilizer and 
manure, and exchange agricultural experience. Some farmers even go so far as to lend 
their cattle to their neighbours so that they can get manure to improve their acidic soils. 
Sharing cattle, known as ‘inka ya kaguru’, is a practice which dates back to pre-colonial 
times (Newbury and Newbury, 2000). The owner of the cow also benefits since he does 
not have to purchase as much feed as usual. The neighbour has the use of the milk and 
might get a young calf as well. Forms of mutual support such as these are an important 
characteristic of the social relations between association members.  
 
Effects of induced soil erosion control  
 
We investigated whether the SWC structures that were created through these labour 
arrangements were well constructed and whether they produced both short and long 
term benefits such as better soil and water conservation and increased soil fertility and 
productivity. We also explored whether or not individual farmers were involved in 
deciding when and where to establish infrastructure such as bench terraces. We asked 
farmers to compare terraces that were built before 2006 with those that have been built 
since. Many international and local NGOs were actively involved in the development of 
SWC structures in the period before 2006. Research shows that farmers were only 
marginally involved themselves during the planning stages of these projects (Bingen and 
Munyankusi, 2002; Bizoza et al., 2007). They were mobilized with food-for-work 
incentives in order to provide labour and to make their land available for terracing. On 
the whole, they were more interested in getting part time jobs than in soil erosion 
control. The short term incentives distorted farmers’ perceptions of SWC (Pretty and 
Shah, 1997). As a result, little attention was given to the maintenance of the terraces 
constructed in the research area before 2006, especially after the genocide in 1994. Since 
poorly made and maintained SWC structures affect soil properties and lead to nutrient 
depletion (Lewis, 1992; Pretty and Shah, 1997; Fleskens, 2007), the state and other 
development agencies have committed themselves to supporting the repair of old 
terraces before they are utilized again by farmers. The cost of repairing a bench terrace, 
however, is often higher than its initial construction cost. These costs are not only 
monetary but include the loss of soil nutrients and fertility due to soil disturbance. 
Farmers point out that if they are to make disturbed soils productive again they will have 
to be supplied with more manure and fertilizers than usual.  
Support programmes before 2006 were generally inadequate. The group discussions 
provided us with some key aspects that characterized the modus operandi of SWC in this 
period. Farmers describe how some of them were recruited by the support programmes 
to construct terraces before they had received relevant training. Supervision and guidance 
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were mostly provided by their own representatives, known as abagapita. It was incorrectly 
assumed that these people were familiar with the necessary construction techniques. 
Some terraces were constructed without technical consideration for factors such as the 
appropriate slope gradient relative to the available area. There was also a lack of attention 
given to matters of terrace outlining, such as the shape of the bed and the terrace riser or 
‘umukingo’ as well as the type of risers and the species of grasses planted on the risers (e.g. 
pennissetum). Insufficient effort went into saving top soil with the result that the soil 
fertility of many terraces will now take a long time to restore. The selection of sites was 
also identified as a problem. Some sites were chosen simply on the basis that they were 
conveniently located for evaluation visits. Other terraces were constructed on plots that 
belonged to the government (e.g. ibisigara) or big farmers on the assumption that the 
users would cultivate and maintain them with the assistance of their associations. This 
was, however, not always the case. Organizations like World Vision International 
constructed terraces near homesteads, but this was also problematic since houses are 
widely scattered across the hills.  
In contrast, the bench terraces that have been made since 2006 are perceived to be 
technically better and more productive. Farmers have become more aware than they 
were in the past of the importance of saving and spreading nutrients on the terraces. 
While they were previously reluctant to make their fields available for terrace 
construction, their improved understanding of the problem of soil erosion has motivated 
farmers to build terraces through contracts with their associations. Payments are 
sometimes in cash but some farmers will help construct a terrace in exchange for the 
right to cultivate the terrace for two to four cultural seasons. Certain farmers have not 
only adopted the technique of terrace building but have also begun playing extension 
roles. Some farmer associations encourage their members to protect their fields by 
employing appropriate SWC measures. Many farmers are currently re-adopting the SWC 
techniques, such as bench terraces and trenches, that they previously rejected despite the 
subsidies that were On offer at the time. 
 
Perceived farmer participation and decision sharing in soil conservation  
 
Gauging the degree to which farmers are involved in soil conservation is not easy. 
Participation levels have to be measured at the different stages of SWC project 
implementation: the decision making process, implementation of SWC programmes, 
sharing of benefits and the evaluation of the programmes (Oakley, 1991). Winters et al. 
(2004) and Posthumus (2005) examine farmer participation in the implementation stage 
as a discrete variable: participant or non- participant. This view of participation hinges on 
whether or not a farmer is selected for the programme and whether or not he receives 
benefits. Whether or not a farmer provides labour is also treated as a key variable. 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that an analysis of genuine participation requires more 
than this. They maintain, for example, that the incorporation of farmers’ knowledge in 
the design of SWC is a critical dimension of farmer participation. Vigiak et al. (2005: 309) 
refer in their study in Tanzania to a number of studies that document the importance of 
farmers’ knowledge in the assessment of soil fertility, landscape processes, the relation 
between soil productivity and relief position, and erosion assessment. They argue in line 
with the neo-populist paradigm (see Blaikie, 2000) that “the incorporation of local 
knowledge in erosion assessment offers many advantages for SWC planning”.  
In our study, we have explored farmer participation in relation to shared decision 
making when establishing bench terraces in the research area. We have focused 
particularly on the role of farmers in the decision making process during two major 
phases of the process of terrace construction. The first relates to the decision regarding 
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when and where to construct bench terraces in communities. The second relates to the 
criteria for site and beneficiary selection. Farmer participation at this stage of SWC means that 
they have a share in the decision-making process regarding the construction of bench 
terraces. This is often described in terms of ownership of the programme or project. 
Farmer participation and decision sharing have the potential to translate into farmer 
ownership of the existing or future SWC infrastructure and may help to ensure its 
sustainability. We have used the survey to gauge farmer perceptions about their 
ownership of SWC projects. Table 2 presents data that reflects the proportion of the 
perceptions of farmers regarding when and where to construct terraces. Out of 301 
survey respondents, 47 per cent maintain that local leaders at the village and sector levels 
decide when and where to construct terraces. Only 41 per cent of respondents state that 
farmers themselves make these decisions. Analysis of the number of local leaders 
involved as compared to farmers themselves, reveals that the mean difference is positive 
and statistically significant at 15 critique level (t = 1.17). Comparing local leaders to 
extension agents (t= 3.82) and farmer associations (t=13.03), the mean differences are 
also positive and statistically significant even at a critique level of one per cent.  
 
Table 2.  Decision makers with regard to construction of terraces  
 
Decision makers  South Nyamagabe North Gicumbi  Overall study area  
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Local leaders 36.0 0.48 56.1 0.49 47.0 0.49 
Farmers themselves  37.5 0.49 44.5 0.51 41.2 0.50 
Extension Officials  43.4 0.54 22.6 0.41 31.0 0.48 
Farmer Organizations  6.6 0.25 3.7 0.18 5.0 0.22 
All together  11.8 0.32 10.4 0.30 11.0 0.31 
Total respondents (n) 136 165 301 
Source: own survey  
 
Table 3 indicates the criteria that are followed when it comes to the selection of sites 
for terracing and also the beneficiaries of these terraces. 64.9 per cent of farmers view the 
identification of places with soil erosion risks (64.9 per cent) as the dominant factor in 
the selection process. 33.8 per cent consider government regulations to be the chief 
factor. Only 12.4 per cent maintain that the community is consulted before terrace 
construction. These descriptive statistics suggest that most of the terraces that are 
constructed are supply driven and that farmers do not participate in the decisions 
regarding where and when to construct them. When farmers do participate, it is mostly 
only through some consultation and their own efforts to mobilize collective labour for 
the construction of the terraces (see also Pretty, 1995). Once again this underlines the 
fact that the state plays a prime role in SWC and that the role of extension agents and 
farmer associations is marginal. The latter are meant to sustain the vertical links between 
individual farmers and state agents. The data suggests, however, that rather than 
involvement at the planning stage, their role is limited to mobilizing labour and, 
sometimes, to identifying land for terracing. Agronomists attached to the extension 
services provide advice at each sector level. They have little contact with farmers, 
however, since agricultural advice is only one of their responsibilities. Community 
representatives (abagapita), most of whom are members of the farmers’ associations 
themselves, have been trained to provide additional support and advice to farmers.  
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Table 3.  Criteria for site/Beneficiary selection 
 
Criteria for selection of sites and 
beneficiaries  
South 
CNWZ(Counts
) 
North 
BHLZ(Counts) 
Study area 
(Counts) 
Soil erosion risk  63.2  66.3 64.9 
Self interest in the available land  19.1 14.7 16.7 
Government regulation 31.9 35.6 33.8 
Interest of support programmes  18.4 8 12.7 
Community consultation 9.6 14.7 12.4 
Farmer organization membership  2.2 1.8 2.0 
No transparency  3.7 3.1 3.3 
Don’t know  16.9 10.4 13.4 
Number of observations (N) 136 165 301 
Source: own survey 
 
Table 4 shows the extent to which the government’s new policies for collective soil 
conservation have been acknowledged or implemented by farmers. The policies aim to 
promote the idea of self-reliance with regard to the construction and maintenance of 
bench terraces. The Ubudehe, Imihigo and Agasozi Ndatwa policy initiatives all began 
between 2001 and 2008. Only the Umuganda policy is older. Most of the policies have not 
been in place long enough to analyze their impacts accurately. The survey data does give 
an idea, however, of their relative importance in encouraging farmers to participate 
collectively in development projects, including soil conservation. 73.8 per cent of 
respondents know about Umuganda compared to Ubudehe (52.3 per cent), Imihigo (52.5 per 
cent) and Agasozi Ndatwa (68.4 per cent). One explanation is that Umuganda was 
implemented in the 1950s. It is also incorporated into the Imihigo performance contracts 
and the Agasozi Ndatwa policies. Agasozi Ndatwa is an indication of the key role played by 
local leaders and other important citizens. Unlike Ubudehe and Imihigo, both Umuganda and 
Agasozi Ndatwa attempt to use farmers’ collective labour and mutual assistance 
arrangements in order to control soil erosion. The number of respondents who recognize 
the importance of these four policies is an indication of the success of the state in its role 
as a driver of development.  
 
Table 4. Recent policies for SWC and agricultural development (N=301) 
 
Policies that aim to 
implement soil erosion  
South_Nyamagabe
(Std.Dev) 
North_Gicumbi 
(Std.Dev) 
Study area 
(Std.Dev)  
Ubudehe  68.4 (0.47) 39.0 (0.48) 52.3 (0.50) 
Imihigo  43.4 (0.49) 60.0 (0.49) 52.5 (0.50) 
Umuganda 68.4 (0.46) 78.2 (0.41) 73.8(0.44) 
Agasozi Ndatwa  61.8 (0.49) 73.9 (0.44) 68.4 (0.45) 
Note: Answers were pre-coded  
Source: own survey 
 
Farmer associations and support programmes  
 
There are different ways in which the relationship between farmer associations and 
their respective partner institutions can be analyzed. Stakeholder or network analysis, 
which has its origins in network theory, is one such way (Ellis and Biggs, 2001; Clark, 
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2008; Mitchel, 1974). It helps to achieve an understanding of the ways in which 
stakeholders operate at the level of the individual, the organization, the institution and 
the community (Morgan and Taschereau, 1996; Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000; Ridaura, 
2005; see also McKeon et al. 2004). This sort of analysis provides insights into the 
characteristics of stakeholders in terms of their behaviour, intentions, inter-relationships 
and interests as well as the influence and resources that they pool in order to achieve 
common goals (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000; Grimble and Wellard, 1997). The 
network analysis that we conducted reveals the nature and intensity of the linkages 
between farmer associations, support programmes and agencies. It shows how these are 
distributed across the study area. Farmer associations were also asked to identify the 
support programmes or partnerships that they could draw on in their efforts to combat 
soil erosion. Table 5 shows that support programmes are not equally allocated between 
farmer organizations and/or sectors in the study area. Those nearest to the towns or the 
District administration receive more SWC support (more or equal to 2 SWC projects) 
than those in more remote sectors (with less than 2 SWC projects). This corroborates the 
findings of Bingen and Munyankusi (2002). Their macro-level study concluded that 
NGO support to farmer associations was not evenly distributed among or within the 
provinces of Rwanda. The accounts of farmers and the survey data reveal some of the 
explanations for this situation. Firstly, farmers are tied to or dependent on the plans and 
priorities of their local leaders. The attitudes of local leaders towards support 
programmes and their links with such programmes are crucial. Secondly, farmer 
associations base their demands on their knowledge of what potential supporters can 
deliver (see also Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Thirdly, support programmes often go into 
areas in which it is easy to work regardless of the priorities of farmers.  
 
Table 5.  NGOs and SWC projects in the study area  
 
Intensity / Area (AGEZ) South (CNWZ) North (BHLZ) 
 Sector  SWC projects  Sector  SWC 
Projects  
High ( 2≥n SWCP) Kibirizi 5 Nyankenke 3 
 Uwinkingi  2 Nyamiyaga 4 
 Gasaka 3 Miyove 2 
 Cyanika 6 Kageyo 2 
 Tare 4 Cyumba 3 
 Musebeya 2   
 Gatare  3   
Total 1 7 25 5 14 
Low ( 2n SWCP)     
 Buruhukiro 1 Rukomo 1 
   Giti 1 
   Muko 1 
   Byumba 1 
   Mukarange 1 
   Kaniga 1 
   Mutete 1 
Total 2  1 1 7 7 
Source: own survey 
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Table 6 shows the present support programmes/institutions and their areas of 
operation. The types of programme were identified in the focus group discussions with 
farmers. Terrace construction, terrace maintenance and farmer training activities receive 
by far the most attention. In contrast, the supply of credit to enable farmers to acquire 
agricultural and other productive inputs and to market their crops receives little attention, 
despite the fact that farmers view this type of support as critical to the success of their 
efforts to improve and maintain their terraced land.  
 
Table 6. Possible areas of intervention by support programmes  
 
 Possible areas of intervention 
Program/instituti
on 
Community. 
mobilization 
Farmer 
training  
Exten
sion  
Input 
marke
ting  
Marke
ting 
crops 
Terrace 
constru
ction 
Terrace 
maintena
nce 
Input-
output  
credit 
Cre
dits  
Government 
officials  
*  * *  * *   
UNICOPAGI     * *     
Vi-Life project  * *    * *   
HPI          
World Vision 
International  
 * *   * * *  
MIG  *        
RADA       * *  
PDCRE       *   
PAPSTA       *   
ISAR   * *       
Bank Populaire          * 
Source: own survey 
 
We also asked farmers where they normally seek and receive agricultural advice and 
related services. Table 7 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (see appendix 1.4) summaries the 
answers we received. Farmers living near towns get agricultural advice easily from local 
leaders and extension agents. Those in remote sectors tend to seek advice from their 
neighbours, family members and association members. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 represent the 
existing linkages between farmers and support programmes/institutions. Our 
respondents were drawn from four areas: two that were close to big centres and two that 
were situated in remote districts. The results confirm that distance is an important factor 
in the uneven distribution of support for soil conservation in the study area.  
 
Table 7.  Sources of agricultural advice 
Where do you get 
agricultural advice?  
South 
Nyamagabe 
Std. 
Dev 
North 
Gicumbi  
Std. 
Dev 
Study 
area 
Std. 
Dev 
Neighbours 42.8 0.65 83.6 0.37 65.4 05 
Far. Association 17.3 050 44.8 0.89 32.5  0.7 
Extension Officials 65.4 0.52 29.7 0.46 45.6 0.52 
Local Leaders 46.9 0.50 0.6 0.07 21.2 0.40 
Private Dealers 2.2 0.14 3.6 0.18 3.0 0.17 
Family members 37.6 0.19 67.3 0.97 38.9 0.80 
Observations (N)  135  166  301  
Note: Answers were pre-coded , Source: own survey 
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
We maintain that soil conservation in Rwanda can only be properly understood when 
situated in the context of evolving state-farmer relationships. Opinions regarding bench 
terraces are formed not only on the basis of relevant technical matters. The dynamics of 
farmer associations and organizations and the relationship between farmers and a range 
of support agencies, such as NGO’s and extension agents, are also critical factors that 
need to be taken into account. Farmers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of established 
bench terraces vary depending on the period in which the terraces were built and the 
nature of the intervention that led to their construction. The study shows that problems 
in accessing agricultural input-output markets are a major concern and have hardly been 
addressed by the multitude of government and NGO designed programmes. Local forms 
of organisations hinging on mutual assistance and reciprocity among farmers and other 
members , on the other hand, is a key element of the ability of farmers to deal with 
everyday problems, including those of soil erosion. Mechanisms such as food- or cash-
for-work to establish SWC are not sustainable in the long term. Farmers view  limited 
participation in decision-making in soil and water conservation. They are most likely to 
contribute to the construction of soil erosion control measures on their own initiative, or 
after they have been properly consulted. Local leaders play a major role as an extension 
of the central state when it comes to land improvements and the planning of SWC. The 
role of farmers and extension agents, by contrast, has been a rather marginal one. 
This paper underscores the value of a socio-technical and institutional analysis of soil 
conservation endeavours. The need to include a critical analysis of the role of the state in 
land conservation is clear in the Rwandan case. The state skilfully deploys a language of 
development in conjunction with various institutional arrangements that are derived 
from the traditional organization of Rwandan society. The intention has been to 
encourage an attitude of self-reliance and reduce the dependency that was created by 
SWC projects in the period between 1994 and 2006, while also retaining central state 
control over the politics of land. However, neither developmental discourse nor the use 
of traditional social structures can guarantee that conservation measures will be 
implemented as planned, or that they will be sustainable.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 FINANCIAL COST- BENEFIT ANALYIS OF BENCH TERRACES IN 
RWANDA3 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Background 
 
Soil erosion and declining soil fertility are major concerns for agricultural development 
in Rwanda. About 77 percent of the land suffers from moderate to severe erosion 
(Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority, 2005). Efforts for soil erosion control 
have been made since 1930s. Currently farmers receive support from government and 
non-government programmes to construct bench terraces in order to minimize soil 
erosion on their farms. This technique is generally  considered to be effective to combat 
soil erosion and to maintain water and soil nutrients (Posthumus and de Graaff, 2005; 
Fleskens, 2007). But these terraces entail huge investments in labour and operating costs 
for both construction and maintenance (Winter-Nelson and Amegbeto, 1998; Ndiaye 
and Sofranko, 1994; Pannell, 1999). Alternative labour payment mechanisms such as 
food-for-work and cash-for-work (Abbott, 1992; Pretty and Shah, 1997) have been used 
in Rwanda and Ethiopia to induce farmers to address soil erosion through terracing 
(Barrett et al., 2004). Bench terraces have been introduced in Rwanda since 1970s and 
received much attention due to many GO and NGO interventions after the 1994 war 
and genocide. World Food Programme  and World Vision International with USAID 
support are the main organizations that worked with farmers to construct bench terraces 
in many parts of Rwanda after 1994 (Bizoza et al., 2007). Due to food shortages and 
poverty, farmers participated actively in building these terraces to gain food rations and 
cash for their labour input. Not soil erosion control but these food rations and cash were 
the main reasons for many farmers to participate (Bizoza, 2005). Of the 17,482 ha of 
existing terraces, 56.3 percent was built before 2006 compared to 43.7 percent 
constructed during 2006-2007 under the government performance contract ‘Imihigo’ 
(Ruhigana, 2008). Through such contracts the construction of SWC measures and other 
agricultural development activities are facilitated. Little attention was paid to coordination 
between different actors in soil erosion control and this resulted in many duplications. 
Currently the government is taking the lead to reinforce the implementation of the same 
technique and yet field observations show that many terraces are not (fully) used by 
farmers (although there are no reliable figures yet on terraces that are not used). This 
constitutes a problem in a country where land scarcity and high population density (376 
inhabitants /km2) are evident. In addition, Rwanda has many soils with a mostly acidic B-
horizon, which comes to the surface after terracing. On unused terraces soil properties 
are affected and crop yields deteriorate, unless continuous maintenance is ensured 
(Lewis, 1992; Fleskens, 2007). This maintenance requires for instance proper liming to 
account for the acidity of these soils but this in turn needs sufficient liquidity which
                                                 
3 This chapter has been published as:  Alfred R. Bizoza and Jan De Graaff (2010). Financial Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Bench terraces in Rwanda. Journal of Land Degradation & Development :   In Press.  
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farmers have difficulty to afford. Consequently, some plots receive soil conservation 
measures and others not (Clay et al., 1998; Ndiaye and Sofranko, 1994).  
 
Soil conservation programs often work with farmers in a collective mode and expect 
that they will adopt, use, and maintain soil conservation measures beyond their 
intervention period. Experiences from the Philippines, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Tanzania 
and Kenya have shown the opposite (Pannell, 1999; Lutz et al., 1994; Tenge et al., 2004).  
Local perceptions of soil conservation practices are distorted due to short-term 
incentives paid to farmers through such collective actions (Pretty and Shah, 1997). 
Likewise, greater costs of conservation than expected benefits, uncertainty of land tenure, 
and misguided efforts of earlier interventions in soil conservation restrain farmers to 
construct and maintain existing terraces (Pretty, 1995; Ndiaye and Sofranko, 1994; 
Pannell, 1999). To a certain extent incompatibility of this technology with prevalent 
socio-economic conditions of farmers and its inconsistency with farmer’s objectives 
explain low adoption rates and use by farmers (Tenge et al., 2004; Pannell, 1999; Lu and 
Stocking, 2000). Terracing is largely being implemented for soil erosion control without a 
proper maintenance strategy, which is a risky investment. For instance the government 
has availed about 2000 USD for each District in 2007 to construct or maintain existing 
terraces. Yet, quality of their construction and maintenance needs higher consideration 
(Lewis, 1992;  Fleskens, 2007). Farmers have already started to cultivate on some of these 
terraces. But little is known about whether farmers find better returns from cultivating 
plots with bench terraces compared to those with slowly forming or progressive terraces  
or plots with neither bench terraces nor slowly forming ones.  The latter, in East Africa 
also referred as Fanya juu, are initiated by digging a ditch and throwing the excavated 
soil upwards to form a bund, which by trapping sediment will gradually develop into a 
terrace.   
Therefore, this study opts for a cost-benefit analysis approach to assess under 
which socio-economic conditions bench terraces are profitable in the Southern and 
Northern provinces of Rwanda (Dinwiddy and Teal, 1996; Gittinger, 1982; 
Kuyvenhoven and Mennes, 1989).  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 gives some conceptual issues of cost-benefit analysis being the main analytical 
tool. Section 3 describes the research area and methods for data collection. And section 4 
presents results and discusses major findings, and this is followed by conclusions.   
 
4.2 Cost- Benefit Analysis: conceptual issues 
 
Whereas the concepts behind Cost-Benefit Analysis were already developed in the 19th 
century, the actual technique was devised in the 1930s and it was firstly applied in the 
USA for large water development projects. Since then, the technique has been used in 
many other related fields to indicate whether benefits of undertaking a given activity 
exceed their costs. These benefits and costs are of different types as domains of 
application vary also considerably. CBA has been used in many agricultural related 
research and development projects to inform on project efficiency (e.g. Posthumus and 
de Graaff, 2005;   Lu and Stocking, 2000; Tenge, 2005; de Graaff, 1996).  The scale 
mostly considered in agriculture is the field level.  The objective of the CBA at this level 
is ‘financial analysis’.  It is used as a decision tool  after computing all costs against 
benefits valued in local currency to come up with a ‘net benefit’ or  a ‘net income’ 
(Gittinger, 1982).  Better quantification of cost-benefit variables is crucial for better 
decisions. Simply stated, the aim of using financial CBA is to find out whether a given 
activity or project intervention is financially profitable for participants. CBA has also 
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been used to relate costs and benefits to adoption rates of soil conservation measures 
such as bench terraces. Technology adoption is not entirely explained by its profitability 
but also by many other factors (Ervin and Ervin, 1982). A broader analysis is compulsory 
to capture other determinants of adoption (Lutz et al., 1994). Apart from private or 
financial CBA, as applied in this paper, economic CBA and social CBA are used to 
determine costs and benefits of a certain project beyond the private perspective. Then a 
society or the national level becomes the basis for analysis (for details see:  Kuyvenhoven 
and Mennes, 1989). Net Present Value ( NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) are 
commonly used as decision criteria for determining profitability at both the activity or 
project level and at the national level (Abelson, 1996; Kuyvenhoven and Mennes, 1989; 
Gittinger, 1982), and are briefly discussed below. 
 
Decision criteria   
Net Present Value (NPV) 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV) compares the total benefits and total costs for a certain 
period and discount rate. Discounting translates future costs and benefits into present 
values. The discount rate applied should represent the opportunity cost of capital. As 
with other investment criteria, its choice entails possibly two types of errors in choosing a 
profitable project among others: a very high discount rate decreases the NPV and may 
lead to rejection of a project which might be a good one and vice versa.  A positive NPV 
indicates a positive net benefit. In case of mutual exclusiveness the project with the 
highest (positive) NPV is favoured, other things being equal.  The formula is: 
∑
= +
−
=
n
t
t
t
r
cbNPV
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)(                                                                                [ 1.1] 
Where b stands for benefits and c for investment and recurrent costs. The super and 
subscripts represent respectively future and current time while r stands for the discount 
rate at time ( t ). 
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)  
The alternative decision criterion to choose a profitable project is the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR). This is the rate which renders the NPV to be zero. When the IRR of a 
project is greater than the discount rate, then the NPV of that project is positive. In 
decision terms, the project is acceptable. Occasionally IRR and NPV may yield a 
different ranking of projects. Two remarks can be made: - the size of projects matters in 
calculating NPV: large projects with high costs and benefits are likely to have higher 
NPVs than small projects. This is not the case with IRR. On the other hand it may be 
difficult to obtain an IRR, when there are no (high) investment sums made in the first 
years. While a NPV can always be calculated.   In formula: 
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4.3 Materials and Methods 
 
Brief description of the study area  
 
This research is carried out in two districts: Nyamagabe district in Southern and 
Gicumbi district in Northern Rwanda. They are located in two somewhat different agro-
ecological zones in respectively Crete Congo-Nile Watershed Zone (CNWZ) and 
Buberuka Highlands Zone (BHLZ).  Both zones are characterized by low chemical soil 
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fertility due to important leaching and soil acidity problems. Generally, good soil 
structure and good to excessive drainage characterize the area. Moderate and steep slopes 
prevail (25 - 55 %) at an altitude of about 2100 m for CNWZ (South) and 1900-2000 m 
for BHLZ (North). The annual precipitation is between 1200 and 1400 mm for BHLZ 
and greater than 1600 mm for CNWZ.  Soils are quite deep in both sites with 0.50 to 
1.00 m for CNWZ and greater than 1.00 m for BHLZ. The soil texture is characterized 
by a clay content of about 35-60% for both zones. Major and suitable crops include 
potatoes, beans, peas, wheat and maize (Fleskens, 2007; MINAGRI, 2008). Both zones 
have tea plantations and tea factories at which some farmers find part-time jobs. An 
overview of production of major crops is provided in Table I. It shows, among others, 
that Irish potatoes are more frequently cultivated in Northern Rwanda (14 percentage of 
cultivated area) than in Southern area.  This study will focus on potatoes, since that crop 
is most often found on terraces. 
 
Table I. Information on production of major crops in Southern and Northern Rwanda 
 
Crop  Percentage of 
cultivated area (%) 
Average Production ( MT)  Average Yield 
(Kg ha-1) 
 South  North Rwanda  South  North Rwanda  South  North 
Maize 11 9 12 2734 2719 138442 869 900 
Wheat 1 7 2 153 6555 44616 300 1800 
Beans 18 25 22 5193 8077 194498 988 970 
Banana 20 15 21 29923 35193 1373588 5058 7400 
Irish Potato 7 14 7 12387 47072 632313 5250 8900 
Vegetables 4 4 4 11920 10458 335791 10500 8860 
Fruits 2 3 2 6354 9227 196615 10500 10800 
   Source: MINAGRI (2008) 
 
In both Nyamagabe and Gicumbi Districts, an extensive construction of bench 
terraces has taken place under GO and NGO support after 1994. Other techniques used 
for soil erosion control, apart from bench terraces, include:  progressive (slowly formed) 
terraces, hedgerows, agro- forestry, tree planting, mulching, zero grazing, intercropping 
and water harvesting. As can be expected, there is much variation in use of these 
techniques by farmers from one district to another and even within each district. 
Collective actions take place in both districts through farmer organizations and through 
GO development programmes. Economic options are limited, only some farmers are 
occasionally employed in the tea plantations as part-time jobs. Existing credit sources are 
scarce and hence make it difficult for farmers to finance their farming activities despite 
the fact that this constitutes their major economic activity. Yet, the average cultivable 
land area per household is very small (about 0.74 ha), which resulted from the fast 
population growth since the 1940s. Figure 1 shows the maps of the two research 
locations and their position on the overall map of Rwanda.  
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Northern Province _Gicumbi District (BHLZ) 
    
            
      Rwanda 
 
Southern Province _Nyamagabe District (CNWZ) 
 
        Fig 1. Maps showing the research areas and their location  
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Soils and soil and water conservation (SWC) measures 
 
Little is known from the literature on SWC in Rwanda about what type of soils are 
appropriate for what type of SWC technique. To the authors’ knowledge, only 
Habarurema and Steiner (1997) attempted to link soil classification and principle crops 
using farmers’ knowledge in Southern Rwanda. Yet, the need to establish better 
knowledge of the existing relationships between types of soils and SWC techniques is 
well felt by farmers, development officials, and researchers. An open window for further 
investigation by soil scientists and geologists is then available. In this study’s perspective, 
an attempt is made to establish the linkage between soil types and existing SWC 
techniques in the study area using farmers’ classification of soil types. Farmers have 
considerable knowledge about SWC (Vigiak et al., 2005; Tenge et al., 2007; Habarurema 
and Steiner, 1997). Two techniques namely bench terracing (BT) and progressive or 
slowly forming terraces (PT) were considered (See Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Bench terraces with partly grassed risers and two stadia of progressive terraces 
(also known as Fanya Juu). Adapted from Liniger, H.P. and Critchley, W. (Eds), 2007. 
 
Data collection and sample design  
 
Information needed for this study has been derived from a survey among 301 
randomly selected farmers. This provided also other information for this research 
project. The sample includes households who received subsidies (about 37 %)  and 
others who did not receive support from SWC programs, in terms of labour for terrace 
construction (63%). A sub-sample of 101 plots of 82 households was randomly selected 
(after fulfilling a few criteria, e.g. regarding slope) to analyze the profitability of bench 
and progressive terraces. This sample is sufficient for financial analysis (Gittinger, 1982;  
Posthumus and  de Graaff,  2005; Tenge, 2005). To measure the yields, we selected plots 
with potatoes (for two seasons) as this is the crop most often found on the terraces and 
constitutes a major food and cash crop in the research areas. The 101 plots were selected 
from areas with a dominant and typical combination of soil, slopes and crops. Plots in 
sub-catchments within the slope categories of 12 to 25 and 25 to 55 percent were 
considered for CBA (see Table II).  
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Table II. Percentage occurrence of slope categories by agro-ecological zone 
 
Agro-Ecological zone Percentage 
slope (%) 
Percentage of 
occurrence  
Decision  
Buberuka Highlands zone (BHLZ-North)  
  ( in which Gicumbi falls)  
12-25 35-40 Considered   
25-55 60-70 Considered  
55-70 4 -6 Rejected   
Crete Congo-Nile Watershed Zone (CNWZ-
South) ( in which Nyamagabe falls)   
12-25 35-55 Considered  
25-55 45-50 Considered  
55-70 0-2 Rejected  
 
In principle CBA compares the ‘with’ and the ‘without’ cases and these are respectively 
represented by plots with terraces and plots with no terraces at all. These terraces are 
either bench terraces (BT) or slowly forming or progressive terraces (PT). Additionally, 
most of the bench terraces constructed in the last ten years (1997-2007) were subsidized 
either by GO or NGOs. This leads to another grouping distinction between subsidized 
and non subsidized  plots with bench terraces. Relying on these criteria four groups can 
finally be obtained: (1) plots with subsidized  bench terraces (SBT) (construction with 
direct project support for labour), (2) plots with not subsidized  bench terraces (NSBT), 
(3) plots  with progressive terraces, as alternative means for soil erosion control (PT) and 
(4) plots without terraces at all (NT) (Table III).  We also compare the first two 
categories and the third one to investigate the differences.  
Data on costs concern all direct costs (inputs) involved in initial investment and 
for subsequent annual operation, while information on benefits relates to all additional 
direct earnings (outputs) as a consequence of the investments. 
 
Table 3. Sample plots per agro-ecological zone   
 
Type of plots   SBT  NSBT PT NT Total 
North_ BHLZ 12 32 9 9 62 
South _ CNWZ 13 10 11 5 39 
Total  25 42 20 14 101 
1) SBT: Subsidized bench terraces 2) NSBT: Not subsidized bench terraces   3) PT: 
Progressive terraces 8) NT:  Non terraced plots 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Awareness of benefits of bench terraces  
 
Awareness about or access to complete information constitutes a key step in the 
adoption process (Saha et al., 1994; Dimara and Skuras, 2003). Table IV shows (in its 
lower part) that farmers are aware of benefits of bench terraces, in the sense that they are 
productive i.e. having a positive effect on production (85.3 percent), effective for soil 
erosion control (90.6 percent), and that they increase soil fertility (56.2 percent). But, 
evidence in the research area also supports the notion that being ‘aware’ or having 
‘complete information’ is a necessary but not sufficient precondition to explain adoption 
of bench terraces. For example, from those who adopted bench terraces, the average 
time lag for adoption is about 14 years  after having become aware of the technique. This 
lag period represents, among others, the time that farmers took to realize the above 
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benefits of bench terraces or simply the time to real adoption (Lindner et al., 1979). The 
introduction of Imihigo program led to large-scale implementation of soil conservation 
technologies, partly explaining the time lag of 14 years. This supports the idea that 
farmers can have sufficient information about benefits of a given agricultural technology 
and decide not to adopt for various reasons. As mentioned, most bench terraces 
observed in the research areas were promoted by GO and NGO projects, using food or 
cash for work as incentives. But, not all farmers received these incentives for terrace 
construction. Table IV also shows the extent to which farmers did eventually take up the 
enlisted techniques, with or without government and other programme subsidies. None 
of these techniques is indigenous in the research areas; they have been introduced by 
development officials and some have been promoted repetitively throughout the history 
of SWC in Rwanda. Fallowing was the main technique but disappeared due to the ever 
increasing population, which led to small and fragmented per capita land size and 
reduced soil fertility: the two major constraints to agricultural development.  Apart from 
bench and progressive terraces farmers use other techniques for soil conservation. For 
example, the cultivation of crops with good soil cover is higher in the South (80 percent) 
than in the North (2.4 percent). This concerns among others tea plantations and sweet 
potatoes. The slightly higher uptake of other soil conservation technologies in the South, 
such as agroforestry and hedge rows (coupled with trenches) can be explained, all equals, 
by the fact that the South has received more SWC programs. Since Nyamagabe belongs 
to the poorest districts, it has received relatively much development assistance. 
 
Table IV. The uptake of soil erosion control technologies and the perceived benefits of 
bench terraces in the two study areas 
 
Soil erosion control 
 Technique 
South 
(N=136) 
North  
(N=165) 
Both study areas 
(N=301) 
 Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%) 
Trenches 34.5 46.7 41.2 
Bench terraces 25.0 60 44.2 
Progressive terraces 35.3 33.3 34.2 
Agro forestry 22.1 15.7 18.6 
Intercropping 2.2 1.2 16.6 
Cultivation of crops with good soil cover 80.0 2.4 49.8 
Hedge rows 18.4 11.5 14.6 
Hedge rows coupled 
 with Trenches 
36.8 15.2 24.9 
Perceived  benefits of bench terraces  N=134 N=165 N=299 
Productive ( Have positive effect on 
production ) 
90.3 81.2 85.3 
Effective for soil erosion control  96.3 86.1 90.6 
Increase soil fertility  55.2 57.0 56.2 
 
Farmers’ classification of soil types in relation to soil erosion control  
 
Criteria considered mostly in SWC interventions in Rwanda and when constructing 
bench terraces include soil erosion risk, slope, and farm size. Less attention is paid to soil 
properties. But these remain important to determine the physical situation of the fields 
and respective SWC options (Tenge et al., 2007). In view of the above, a question was 
asked during the survey to indicate the dominant soil type on surveyed plot(s) with bench 
and/or progressive terraces. Alternative names of soil types were enlisted based on the 
farmers’ classification in Southern Rwanda in Habarurema and Steiner’s study (1997). 
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Their classification is mainly based on farmers’ perception with regard to crop suitability 
(good or bad soils, fertile or infertile soils) and soil productivity. It is clear from Table (V) 
that Mugugu (Ferralsols) (with deep but poor soils and less response to organic 
fertilizers) is dominant in the Crete Congo- Nile Watershed Zone (CNWZ) (37 percent) 
while Urunombe (Nitosols) (a deep soil with high content of clay and only moderate 
permeability) is dominant in Buberuka Highland zone (BHLZ). Both bench terraces (33 
percent) and progressive terraces (35 percent) are most often constructed on plots with 
Urunombe soils (Nitosols), more or less in line with their occurrence. These soils are 
often found on sloping land, which can explain the fact that terraces are more often 
found on Urunombe soils than on Mugugu soils. Terraces are proportionally less often 
found on Mugugu (Ferralsols) and more sandy soil types, although these have better 
drainage. To improve their soil fertility, manure is applied on the two dominant soil 
types: 33 and 18 % on Urunombe and Mugugu respectively. The soil type of 
Urukurwe (Ferralsols/Alisols) was not identified in any of the sample plots.  
 
Table V. Soil types and Soil erosion control 1) 
 
Soil type Description  Agro-Ecological zone  Soil and Water 
Conservation 
Techniques 
Location of soil types 
vis-à-vis the hill 
Local name:  FAO- soil 
classification 2)   
Classification criteria  3) 
 
CNWZ 4) 
(N=367) 
BHLZ 5) 
(N=540) 
BT 6)   PT 7)  Top 
 of  hill  
Middle 
of hill  
Foot 
of hill   
Urunombe Nitosols Medium-high fertility , 
loamy-clay, moderate 
permeability 
31.6  33.7 32.7 34.7 32.7 36.8 27.9 
Mugugu Ferralsols  Low fertility , loamy, 
well drained 
37.1  0.035 19.37 11.0 11.7 21.7 22.7 
Urusenyi Arenosols High fertility, sandy, very 
well drained 
13.1  11.8 0.10 13.0 14.2 10.7 12.33 
Urubuye Lixisols  Variable fertility,  sandy 
gravel, very well drained 
0.03  18.15 0.07 11.0 12.8 0.097 13.8 
Umusenga Luvisols/ 
Acrisols  
Medium-high fertility , 
loamy 
0.03  0.02 0.014 0.04 0.016 0.016 0.04 
Igishonyi Cambisols Low-medium fertility, 
loamy, well drained 
0.003  0.016 0.014 0.01 0.008 0.020 0.006 
Ikigwagwa Cambisols Low fertility, sandy 
gravel, very well drained 
0.003  0.002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.006 
Urubumba Alisols 
/Acrisols  
Variable fertility and 
texture 
0.02  0.015 0.003 0.01 0.008 0.017 0.025 
Urukurwe Ferralsols/ 
Alisols  
Low fertility , loamy- 
clay, insufficient 
permeability 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  1)  Figures are percentages of plots with respective soil types; 2) Approximate FAO classification 
by IUSS Working Group WRB(2006);  3) Classification criteria by Habarurema and Steiner (1997);           
4) CNWZ: Crete Congo- Nile Watershed Zone;  5) BHLZ: Buberuka High Land Zone;  6) BT: Bench 
terraces;  7)  PT: Progressive terraces.  
  
The effectiveness of bench terraces (BT) established on plots with Urunombe soils 
depends on the depth of the soils and whether the sub-soil properties are (not too)  
compacted and plastic (what Habarurema and Steiner characterize as Urunombe rwa 
rutsima or Urunombe rwa bukara).  This property is important especially when 
constructing the riser (‘umukingo’) of a terrace. Farmers contended that some terraces 
constructed earlier were destroyed because of the type of soil erosion known as isuri ya 
nyamurigita,  that leads to land slides and is more related to the soil permeability 
property,  as depicted in Figure 3. The Urunombe soils contain much loam and clay, and 
could be vulnerable to slides. Pore sizes and their connectivity also determine whether a 
soil has a low or high permeability. If the soil has a high clay content, small pores and 
impervious layer underneath, it then has usually a low permeability. There exists a high 
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risk of rotational land sliding as shown in Figure 3, whereby several benches may collapse 
when there are no proper waterways. How  these terraces were constructed, how terraces 
risers were used and how tillage was practiced explain partly the nyamurigita erosion 
type observed by farmers and that has destroyed their terraces. Most of these terraces 
were constructed collectively using the food or cash incentives. In such circumstances, 
there is little chance that technical considerations are the major concern. What matters 
mostly is the accomplishment of the tasks and getting paid, unless more supervision is 
available. In such cases, some holes could be created by excess water which may lead to 
the collapse of the risers of a terrace. The tillage practices also matter and change with 
technological innovations. The topography of Rwanda does not allow agricultural 
mechanization in many parts of the country. Tillage is mainly done by the hoe and relies 
on labour. With bench terracing, tillage is no longer practiced ‘downslope’ but changes to 
a ‘horizontal and rotating tillage’. Farmers cultivate the layout or the ‘bed’ of the terrace 
in horizontal direction and this has to change accordingly to cultural season. The reason 
is that the slope has been broken down in steps and this allows not only to maintain the 
top soil with high soil nutrients but also to keep a riser intact. When this riser is well 
constructed, it allows farmers also to regain the space lost in terrace construction by 
planting fodder (e.g. Pennisetum is dominant) in hedge rows which in turn are used for their 
livestock or for additional liquidity. Farmers contend that a terrace row of about 15 meter 
(length) can feed one cow for about three days with an average of three bundles (imiba) 
per day. Thus, bench terracing could help to integrate both agriculture and livestock in 
the context of limited space for grazing and the zero grazing policy promoted in Rwanda.  
 
 
Figure 3. Terraces with good drainage (left) and features of a rotational slide 
(slump), due to insufficient percolation. Adapted from Carson (1989) and Asch 
(1980) respectively. 
 
Unlike Urunombe soils, the effectiveness of bench terraces established on plots with 
Mugugu soils (Ferralsols) will depend more on soil fertility and less on soil permeability. 
These soils are characterized by poorer soil fertility due to nutrient depletion leading to 
increased soil acidity which, in turn, declines yields unless fertilizer is applied (Hartemink 
and Van Kekem,1994). Despite technical considerations during terrace construction, 
bench terracing has been claimed to be efficient in conserving soil moisture as result of 
the levelling of the slope followed by  reduced soil run-off (Kannan et al., 2010). Thanks 
to a relatively good drainage on Mugugu soils, crop performance on terraces can 
therefore be explained by other factors, including subsequent use of fertilizers, farm 
management and particularly inherent variation of physical and chemical soil properties 
(Kannan et al., 2010; Siriri et al., 2005).  
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Socio-economic characteristics of households and sample plots for financial CBA   
 
In Table VI we present some household and plot level characteristics of the sample 
plots for the financial CBA. The average age of the head of household (44 years old) 
suggests that the sample population is generally in the active age. Taking into account 
that bench terracing is labour intensive, a family with an average of three active persons 
can construct one hectare of bench terraces within a period of about two years or 667 
person days (less than the  estimate of 2002 MD ha-1 used by World Vision International 
Rwanda) (Bizoza, 2005). However, farmers usually have less than 1 ha of land and only 
construct terraces on part of their land. Table VI shows that plot size considered for 
terraces was in most cases only between 0.16 and 0.32 ha, except for the subsidized  
bench terrace construction, which showed an average plot size of not less than 0.70 ha 
(large in relation to available labour). With respect to gender, women headed  households 
seem to go more for PT than BT. A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
test shows that male heads go more for BT  than females heads and that the difference is 
statistically significant at 1 % level (Z=3.5). The test also shows that  male heads  go less  
for progressive terraces compared to females (Z =0.039).   
 
Family size of six people is high. It is well known that land tenure in the research 
area is mostly determined by traditional inheritance. Due to this family size land 
fragmentation will increase unless the industry and services sectors can accommodate the 
extra labour and reduce the dependency on the agricultural sector. Interesting to note is 
that not subsidized BT are found on steeper slopes, more in need of erosion control. The 
Mann-Whitney test shows indeed that on average NSBT are found on steeper slopes 
compared to SBT (significant at 5% level, Z=1.97). This measurement of slopes is based 
on farmer estimates and SBT and NSBT plots are still in the same class of gentle slopes. 
Not less than 55 % of sample plots fall in the gentle slope category against 20 % in the 
flat and steep and 5 % in the very steep slope categories. The lower part of Table VI 
shows the difference in the mean of characteristics for terraces and non-terraced plots 
and whether these differences are statistically significant or not. Households with 
subsidised bench terraces have on average a significantly larger family size, plot size, and 
farm size than those with non terraced plots.  
 
Table VI. Some characteristics of (the heads of) households for sample plots, by type of 
terracing    
Characteristics Gender 
(Female=1) 
Age 
 
Family 
size 
Family  
members  
> 16 years  
Mean 
plot size 
 (ha-1) 
Mean 
Slope 
category1 
 Farm 
size  
(ha-1) 
SBT (Obs=20) 2 0.25 46 6.5 3.4 0.70 1.7 1.4 
NSBT ( Obs=42) 0.33  45 6.2 3.3 0.32 2.1 1.2 
PT (Obs=25) 0.72 41 6.0 2.9 0.16 2.1 0.56 
NT (Obs=14) 0.57  42  5.1 2.7 0.17  2.2  0.66 
Total sample (Obs=101) 0.45 44 6.0 3.2 0.34 2.1 1.02 
        
T-test for significance of mean difference between plot with terraces versus not terraced plots  
SBT  versus NT  plots   3.7 1.4** 0.6 0.5** -0.4 0.7* 
NSBT versus NT plots   2.7 1.2** 0.6 0.15 -0.07 0.8* 
PT versus NT plots    -1 0.9 0.2 -0.04 0.02 -9.2 
1Slope categories are: 1= flat,  2= gentle slope, 3=steep,  4 = very steep:   
 * =P 0.05, ** =P 0.01 
2   SBT = Subsidized  bench terraces; NSBT = Not subsidized  bench terraces; PT = Progressive terraces; 
NT = Non terraced. 
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Plot level financial CBA of bench and progressive terraces  
 
This sub-section presents an overview of investment costs, yields, operating costs and 
gross margins used for the financial CBA of bench terraces. Subsidized  bench terraces 
have relatively low costs (to farmers), and lower potato yields (significant at 10 %) and 
larger fields than those that were not subsidized  (Table VII). A possible explanation for 
the relatively large field sizes could be the fact that some of the plots were constructed 
under the support of NGOs (e.g. DAP project of World Vision International funded by 
the USAID and WFP). This support provided short term benefits, leading to rather large 
terraced plots, some of which were thereafter not fully used and/or others received 
inappropriate maintenance (like liming and other fertilizers). Inadequate terrace 
maintenance can lead to an increase of soil acidity and lower crop yields, making it 
difficult for the investment to pay itself back (Lewis, 1992; Fleskens, 2007). Finally, a lack 
of access to enough inputs like improved seeds, manure, and inorganic fertilizers will 
affect the input-output combination and possibly lower the yields until soil fertility is re-
established. With regard to progressive terraces, most of them are still in the forming 
stage making it difficult to determine their overall establishment costs on the basis of the 
farm survey data. Therefore these investment costs feature not in Table VII, and in the 
financial costs-benefit analysis on basis of survey data no comparison could be made 
between BT and PT (Table VIII). Farmers contend that progressive terraces need a 
period of 5 to 8 years to become level (comparable to benches) which is similar to the 7 
years stated by Hudson (1988).  
 
Table VII.  Overview of investment costs, revenues, operating costs and gross margins 
of potato production for the four situations (in Rwandan francs 1) per ha) 
 
 Situations  
SBT4 
(n=20) 
NSBT5 
(n=42)  BT 2) 
     PT 
  (n=25)       PT 2) 
NT8 
(n=14) 
 
Field 
Data 
Field  
Data 
Standard  
Estimate   
Field 
data  
Standard 
Estimate  
Field 
Data   
Plot size        
Mean (ha) 0.7 0.32   0.16   0.17 
Investment (per ha)       
Mandays  858 894 1019 -    none 
Costs  366508 339772 10178500   500000  - 
Annual gross revenues (per ha)        
Yield (Kg) 6857 9000 15000 5254 15000 5313 
Value  (Frw) 795262 927043 825000 604198 825000 637619 
Annual operating costs (per ha)       
Seed (Kg) -   2000   2000   
Seeds (Frw) 122605 195458 300000 87604 300000 111503 
Fertilizers(Kg) 90 60 300 37 300 10 
Fertilizers (Frw) 44339 24479 105000 20411 105000 4365 
Manure (kg) 1080 904   813   1281 
Manure (Frw) 173620 144800   91315   44203 
Pesticide (kg/liters) 10 13 25 7 25 3 
Pesticide (Frw) 742 375 45000 607 45000 257 
Labour (Mandays ) 487 841 470 505 470 572 
Labour (Frw) 201853 302316 235000 177088 235000 245427 
Total operating costs (per ha) 543159 667428 685000 377025 685000 405755 
Gross Margin per ha 252103 259615 140000 227173 140000 231864 
Total operating costs, in case opp. 
costs (50%) of manure & labour 3) 355423 443870 567500 242824 567500 260940 
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Gross margin, in case opp.costs 
(50%) of manure and labour 3)  439840 483173 257500 361375 257500 376679 
  1) 1USD = 550 Frw in 2008   2) Generated  from  Fleskens, 2007. 
  3)  Alternative calculation  with opportunity costs for manure and labour equal to 50 % of market prices; see below 
  4) SBT: Subsidized  bench terraces  5) NSBT: Not subsidized  bench terraces   6) BT: Bench terraces   
  7) PT: Progressive Terraces   8) NT : Non terraced plots  
 
 
Table VII shows that the Gross Margins per ha for bench terraces are only slightly 
higher than for progressive terraces and for not terraced plots, when the input data 
obtained from the farmers are valued at market prices. Differences in gross margins are 
not statistically significant. The Gross Margins at this stage do not take into account 
investment costs, only the annual maintenance costs of the terraces. A more thorough 
analysis that takes into account these investments costs is conducted in the next part. 
Differences in revenues from potato yield and expenditure on fertilizers, manure, 
pesticides and even labour inputs are not in proportion to differences in their quantities 
due to non-uniform (products and) prices within the research area.  
The standard estimates, derived from a national survey (Fleskens, 2007), were 
used to compare with farmer’s estimates. The former show lower GM’s per ha, since the 
level of material inputs is considered much higher. That the standard estimates of labour 
costs for investment are considerably higher than those obtained from the farm survey, is 
due to the fact that they used national level wage rates. They considered that operating 
costs for progressive terraces would be the same as for bench terraces, as they would 
eventually be similar to bench terraces. We found in the farm survey higher operating 
costs for bench terraces, possibly partly due to the fact that the progressive terraces were 
not all fully developed as yet.. 
 
Financial CBA is used to examine under which social and economic conditions bench 
terraces are profitable. Benefits of bench terraces have been perceived by farmers 
themselves in this research as being very productive, increasing soil fertility and effective 
for soil erosion (see Table IV).  Increased yields on bench terraced plots are found to be 
a key stimulus for further adoption of bench terraces. But, other variables like soil 
properties, farm management, crop and rainfall patterns determine the magnitude of this 
potential and actual increase of yields.  
 
Farmers’ estimates of investment and operating costs and potato yields, as shown in 
Table VII, were analysed to determine at plot level whether bench terraces provide 
sufficient financial benefits. Subsidized (SBT) and not subsidized bench terraced plots 
(NSBT) constitute the ‘with case’ while not terraced plots (NT) under the same physical 
conditions (of slope, etc.) stand for the ‘without case’.  It has been assumed that the 
Gross Margins in the without case will show an annual decline of 3 % as result of 
continuing soil erosion, assuming that continuous soil mining may lead to abandonment 
in 30 years. A discount rate of 13 percent and a time period of 20 years were considered. 
The discount rate was chosen with reference to the interest rate applied  by a local bank 
‘Banque populaire’ when farmers request a loan. Results summarized in Table VIII show 
that SBT are not profitable when market prices are applied. The Net Present Value 
(NPV) is negative (- 47384 Frw) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR, of 11%) is lower 
than the discount rate of 13 %. A possible explanation is that subsidized  households 
have a (too) large plot size but do not fully use it due to lack of labour and liquidity, 
among others. The NSBT on the other hand seem to be just profitable when considering 
both the positive NPV (27959 Frw) and the IRR (14%) criteria. We performed the T-test 
to check whether the average yield of the samples collected in the North is not 
significantly different from the yield of the samples collected in the South. The analysis 
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shows that the mean difference of potato yields in the two samples in the two regions is 
not statically different even at 10 % critique level (t = -1.2383). Thus, we confirm that 
these results are neither distorted by differences in potato yield nor by the fact that more 
plots with NSBT (about 76 %) are from the samples collected in the North. 
 
But in effect much of the labour used is family labour and manure is from own 
farms. Markets for labour and manure are also imperfect and formal wage rates and 
market prices of manure are quite high. Thus, there is a good argument to apply 
opportunity costs of 50 percent of market value for manure and labour. When this 
option is considered, SBT are financially viable, with IRR of 25 %.  Costs of manure and 
labour represent important components of total operating costs making the NPV very 
sensitive to their changes. This explains partly why some farmers are resistant to adopt 
bench terraces unless assistance is provided from SWC interventions to pay for labour 
and inputs for maintenance. Positive NPVs and IRRs higher than the discount rate (13 
%) are observed for NSBT even with no opportunity cost of labour and manure. It must 
be admitted that survey results show some variability of conditions between farmers, as 
shown in Table 6.  Posthumus and de Graaff ( 2005) also assert that whether terracing is 
financially attractive to a farmer depends to large extent on personal socio-economic 
circumstances. 
 
Table  VIII.  Plot level Financial Cost-Benefit Analysis, using farmers’ estimates  
 
Category of plots  SBT 1 (N= 20)  NSBT 2(N=42) 
Bench terracing investment costs ( ha-1 ) 366508 339772 
Labour for terracing (MD ha-1) 858 894 
Gross margin with BT (FRW ha-1) 252103 259615 
Gross margin without BT (NT case) (FRW ha-1) 231864 231864 
Annual decline GM as result of erosion, without BT 3 % 3 % 
NPV (at 13 % discount rate) (FRW ha-1) -  47384 27959 
IRR (%) 11 14 
Gross margin with BT (FRW ha-1), using opp. costs.* 439840 483173 
GM without BT (NT case) (FRW ha-1), using opp. costs* 376679 376679 
Annual decline GM as result of erosion, without BT 3 % 3 % 
NPV, opp.costs manure and labour *(FRW ha-1) 356517 654553 
IRR, opp.costs manure and labour* (%) 25 37 
Note: * Opportunity costs for manure and labour equal to 50 % of market prices 1) Subsidized  bench 
terraces  2) Not subsidized  bench terraces    
 
The information on establishment costs of terraces (including waterways) by farmers is 
based on rough estimates by farmers themselves and is lower than the official standard 
estimates. Therefore, we considered also a situation with the standard investment cost for 
BT and PT to see whether under such investment these techniques are still viable (see 
Table IX). Without considering any opportunity cost, none of the terraces are viable, 
although PT show better results. When for the three alternatives opportunity costs (50 % 
of market value) for manure and labour are considered, PT (IRR of 22 %) and also 
NSBT seem to be profitable (IRR of 16 %).  
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Table  IX.  Plot level Financial Cost-Benefit Analysis, using standard estimates of terrace 
construction  
 
Category of plots  SBT3  
(N= 20) 
NSBT4 
(N=42) 
PT5 
(N=25)  
Bench terracing investment costs ( ha-1 ) 800000 800000 200000 
Labour for terracing (MD ha-1) 2000 1) 2000 1)  
Gross margin with BT (FRW ha-1) 140000 140000  
Gross margin with PT (FRW ha-1)   140000 
Gross margin without BT (NT case) (FRW ha-1) 231864 231864 231864 
Annual decline as result of erosion, without BT 3 % 3 % 3% 
NPV (at 13 % discount rate) (FRW ha-1) -511850 -465153 -72863 
IRR (%) 2 3 9 
Gross margin with BT (FRW ha-1), using opp. Costs2) 257500 257500  
GM  with PT  (FRW ha-1), using opp. Costs 2) 361375 361375 361375 
Annual decline as result of erosion, without BT 3 % 3 % 3% 
NPV, opp.costs manure and labour *(FRW ha-1) -91649 161440 191249 
IRR, opp.costs manure and labour* (%) 11 16 22 
Notes: 1) We used this estimate  as this was the standard used by World Vision International for labour 
payment during the construction of BT in the research area ( Bizoza , 2005) 2) Opportunity costs 
for manure and labour equal to 50 % of market prices   3) Subsidized  bench terraces  4) Not 
subsidized  bench terraces   5)  Progressive terraces  
 
These results seem to suggest that bench terraced plots can be financially 
profitable when they are substantially intensified (consistent with Fleskens, 2007).  A 
further analysis is needed  to show whether they are also profitable beyond private 
perspective. The ongoing policy for one cow per family and other interventions aimed at 
creating enabling conditions for easy access of inputs by farmers are part of the solutions 
for a sustained profitability of bench terraces. These results suggest that establishing 
SWC measures should respond not only to the goal of soil erosion control but should 
also generate better financial gains compared to the situation before the introduction of 
the technology. In addition to these results, a further analysis to determine costs and 
benefits of bench terraces at community and national level is recommended.  To improve 
the efficiency of bench terraces in the future, farmers need to be strictly guided in terms 
of land capability, soil and crop suitability, maintenance and fertility management after 
BT construction. And in some cases top soil preservation techniques are required, which 
will mitigate soil disturbance and initial yield reductions. This technical guidance, at 
construction stage, and improved efficiency of BT will, in turn, increase crop yields, 
lower maintenance costs and respond, among others, to the overall goal of soil and water 
conservation in Rwanda. Other studies show that under such conditions bench terracing 
can be efficient and contribute to sustainable agriculture (Carson, 1989; Tenge, 2005). 
   
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This study investigates under which socio-economic conditions farmers find better 
returns from cultivating plots with bench terraces compared to those with slowly forming 
terraces or plots with neither bench nor progressive terraces in Southern and Northern 
Rwanda. Since soil type constitutes a major criterion for the successful construction of 
terraces, the study also investigated on which soil types terraces were built, using farmer’s 
classification of soil types.  Results showed that both bench terraces (33 percent) and 
progressive terraces (35 percent) are often established on plots with Urunombe soils 
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(Nitosols with much loam and clay).  In some situations, with low permeability these 
soils are vulnerable to a type of soil erosion known as isuri ya nyamurigita, which leads 
to rotational land slides and the destruction of terraced land. This study recommends a 
further investigation on soil property variability on plots with bench terraces in order to 
avoid future terrace construction on less suitable soils. 
            The national interest in using bench terraces is mostly for soil erosion control. 
Less attention is paid to its financial profitability for farmers. Although considerable 
efforts are made to promote terraces, many farmers have not yet introduced this 
technology in their farming system. This is partly explained by the huge investments that 
this technology demands. On the other hand farmers themselves indicate that bench 
terracing provides benefits in terms of increased soil fertility, increased production and 
effective soil erosion control. We assessed to what extent these perceived benefits are 
consistent with the actual financial profitability of these terraces with and without the 
support from SWC projects. The bench terraces built with help of these projects could 
well have been established on too large (and thus underused) plots and less suitable soils, 
resulting in less than expected benefits. In these cases sometimes not enough labour is 
available for weeding, etc 
A first analysis of costs and benefits, based on farmers’ estimates and market prices 
shows that Gross Margins on terraced plots are not much higher than those on non-
terraced plots and that bench terracing is hardly profitable. However, since use of labour 
and manure were found to be the main determinants of profitability and these are mostly 
available on the own farm, the Cost-Benefit Analysis was subsequently also undertaken 
with opportunity costs for labour and manure (both at 50 % of market prices). This plot 
level CBA analysis, using both farmers’ estimates and official standard figures, showed 
that bench terraces in that case are profitable. The implication is that bench terracing can 
be a financially viable option for SWC, when either costs of labour and manure can be 
reduced or more intensive use is made of the terraces, with higher potato yields. That 
farmers perceive the terraces as profitable, could also show that they value the 
opportunity costs of their own labour below the market value. For this study, the 
profitability of bench terraces was assessed and based on farmers’ estimates, obtained in 
only 1 year. Subsequent studies should also consider other crops and collect data over 
more years to assess costs and benefits of bench and progressive terraces. Finally, a 
broader analysis is required to determine all possible effects and impacts of bench 
terraces at community and national level. 
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CHAPTER 5  
INSTITUTIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGIES: BENCH 
TERRACES IN RWANDA4 
 
5. 1 Introduction and motivation 
 
The alarm of soil erosion and declining soil fertility in Africa is still buzzing. Who is 
going to switch it off? How and when? These remain important policy and research 
questions about land degradation and conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Soil and water 
conservation has been an integral part of agricultural development in Africa since the 
early twentieth century. Successive governments and development organizations invested 
heavily in different measures to reduce erosion and to promote sustainable agriculture 
since colonial Africa. However, soil erosion problems persist. Bench or stone terracing is 
one of the soil and water conservation (SWC) techniques promoted in East Africa (e.g. 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda) since the 1960s. Its adoption and continued use by 
small-scale farmers has been criticized invariably by scientists. 
Previous studies identify factors that drive adoption of agricultural technologies. 
These vary from bio-physical, socioeconomic, and institutional factors (Rezvanfar et al., 
2009; Graaff et al., 2008). However, much remains ill-understood. Why? In the past, 
focus has been more on geographical conditions, people’s economic and demographic 
characteristics, than on the role of local institutions. The current trend in the literature 
recognizes the specific role of local institutions in land conservation and in natural 
resource management more generally (e.g. Sanginga et al., 2010; Bouma and Bulte , 2008; 
Isham, 2002 ).  
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of various (local) institutions 
on the adoption of bench terraces in Northern and Southern Rwanda. The paper 
responds to one question in particular: are institutional or geographical variables more 
relevant to explaining the adoption of terraces? This study fits into the wider literature 
(mainly cross-country) on institutions versus geography/endowments as determinants of 
development. 
 
The paper’s outcomes are relevant for policy and research options in land 
conservation. Measuring the impact of local institutions on the adoption of terraces 
allows the Rwandan government to tailor further investments in land conservation to 
existing social and institutional arrangements at the local level. Relevant institutions are 
empowered to ensure the long-term sustainability of established SWC measures by both 
governmental and non-government organizations (NGOs). One of the controversies 
centres on the issue that previous attempts in soil and water conservation by these 
organizations were top-down with only partial success in many developing countries, 
including Rwanda (e.g. Graaff, 1996).  
The results contribute also to the increasing scientific debate on the substitutability or 
complementarity of local versus formal institutions (e.g. Ahlerup et al., 2009; Bigsten et 
                                                 
4 This chapter has been accepted as an article for presentation into the international conference on 
‘Challenges and opportunities for agricultural intensification of the Humid Highland Systems of Sub-
Saharan Africa’  organized by the CIALCA, Kigali, Rwanda , 24-27 October 2011.  
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al., 2002). It appears in the Rwandan context that both government (formal) and local 
people (informal) based institutions are functional in rural development. Soil and water 
conservation serves for a fertile ground where both types of institutions coexist. The 
measure of the impact of local institutions presented in this paper is based on 
investments in bench terraces of which both public and private benefits evolve. Results 
show that local institutions affect the adoption of bench terraces and that they can serve 
for alternative resources for farming implements in poor-based economies such as 
Rwanda. 
The paper assesses the impact of social capital variables and tenure security (among 
others) on the adoption of bench and progressive terraces. Similar to earlier studies of 
technology adoption, the findings show that some geographical and household-level 
variables will explain the adoption of bench and progressive terraces. Importantly, social 
capital based on trust and co-operation in collective action matters in the adoption of 
bench terraces but not of progressive terraces. These findings echo the literature that 
states that soil and water conservation is driven by local institutions. Unlike earlier work 
on the adoption of SWC measures, tenure security does not explain the adoption of 
bench and progressive terraces in rural Rwanda.  
 
There is a lengthy academic debate on tenure security and land investments in Africa. 
Deininger and Feder (2009) summarize some of the discussion: tenure security lowers 
spending to protect (land) rights, increases levels of investments (as the future fruits of 
current investments are likely to appeal to investors) and, possibly, empowers women. 
However, these effects are less certain in situations of better functioning land markets 
(including rental rights) and improved access to credit (due to collateral).  
Many African states have attempted to ensure long-term land rights through 
formalization (Barrows and Roth, 1990). The formalization of land rights is not a 
panacea. Sometimes it is not necessary as customary land-right systems are functioning 
well (André and Platteau, 1998), and due to the considerable costs associated with a full-
fledged titling scheme (e.g. definition, measurement, and enforcement). A recent study by 
Saint-Macary et al. (2010) in Vietnam also concludes that ‘the issuance of land titles is a 
necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite to encouraging the adoption of soil 
conservation practices’. This brings us to the distribution of socio-economic power, 
governance and the nature of interventions (Deininger and Feder, 2009). In relation to 
governance issues, one needs to know whether there is impartial access to the judicial 
system in order to guarantee land rights. If not, land rights may only exist on paper. 
Hence, we should look beyond tenure rights to understand investments in land quality. 
Turning to the local level, do other dimensions of the institutional framework matter? 
The literature suggests that social capital is relevant. Social capital translates into reduced 
transaction costs (precluding the necessity to write contracts that capture all 
contingencies), facilitates the exchange of information, and enhances trust. In addition, 
social capital enables communities to overcome social dilemmas, which is particularly 
relevant in the context of sizeable investments such as the construction of bench terraces 
to counter erosion. Bouma et al. (2008) show that social capital based on trust and co-
operation enabled community resource management in India. On the other hand, social 
capital does allow for different interpretations due to the variability of cultures that 
endorse different mechanisms and expressions of social capital (Krishina, 2004).  
Social capital is important in Rwandan rural society. This paper distinguishes between 
different types of social capital. It examines cognitive (or soft) social capital and 
structural (or hard) social capital, and their effects on technology adoption. There is a 
growing body of literature that associates social capital with improved adoption of new 
technologies (e.g. for an overview, see Landry et al., 2002; for applications to Africa 
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Boahene et al., 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2002; Isham, 2002). A recent study by Ahlerup 
et al. (2009) suggests that social capital and formal institutions are each other’s substitutes 
in development, so that social capital is especially important for the poorest countries 
where formal institutions are of relatively low quality – Sub-Saharan African springs to 
mind. 
Microanalyses of the role of social capital in Africa confirm its important economic 
role, and its significance when formal institutions are weak (e.g. Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999; Bigsten et al., 2004, Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). For instance, a positive 
experience in Machako, Kenya, shows how social capital serves private assets by which 
farmers could access resources and services that were formerly subjected to high 
transaction costs in soil conservation (Nyangena, 2008). In addition to tenure security 
and social capital, this paper explores other plot-, farm-, and household-level 
determinants of soil conservation.  
Traditionally, large-scale investments in soil and water conservation are associated 
with high investment costs and external effects, which would explain the perceived need 
of the state and NGOs to intervene. Indeed, historically it appears as if large-scale 
terracing requires a certain level of top-down planning. This intervention approach 
invested more in labour pooling for soil conservation and less in social and human 
capital creation. As Pretty and Ward (2001) put it: ‘international agencies, governments, 
banks, and NGOs must invest more in social and human capital creation, and to ensure 
the transition is made from dependence to interdependence, which in turn helps to build 
assets’. Clearly, past interventions were involved less in strengthening social arrangements 
between farmers in order for them to address soil erosion problems by their own 
institutions. This explains, at least partially, why past interventions in soil and water 
conservation failed (Hurni et al., 2008; Graaff, 1996).  
Section 2 presents an overview of bench terraces in Rwanda. Section 3 describes the 
data and the empirical strategy used to analyse the impact of local institutions on the 
adoption of terraces in Section 4. Section 5 ends with a discussion of the major findings 
and conclusions.  
 
5.2 Bench terraces in Rwanda 
 
Bench terracing were introduced in Rwanda in the 1970s. Other SWC techniques had 
been established earlier, such as hedgerows and progressive terraces (trenches coupled 
with hedges). Both bench and progressive terraces received a lot of attention from 
different development interventions in agriculture. Establishing these terrace structures 
requires a few topographical criteria, including angle of slope. A bench terrace is 
constructed by breaking up the slope (with a gradient of 25–55%) into different segments 
in order to maintain the top soils, which are rich in nutrients, and to keep the riser of the 
terrace intact. Progressive terraces result from tillage practices combined with the 
planting of hedgerows over a certain period of time, and they  are recommended on plots 
that are less steep (12–25% gradient). These two techniques differ partly in terms of 
effectiveness to counter run-off, soil erosion control, capacity to conserve water, and the 
time needed to change soil properties (Kannan et al. 2010). Mountainous areas similar to 
most parts of Rwanda are very sensitive to rain erosion. In the short term, bench terraces 
are deemed to be more effective technically at soil erosion control than progressive ones 
(Posthumus and Stroosnijder, 2010). The layout or ‘bed’ of progressive terraces takes 
longer to form (about seven years); this explains their technical effectiveness in the long 
run (Hudson,1988). Nevertheless, bench terraces call for substantial material and labour 
inputs in the early, installation stage compared to progressive terraces (Hurni et al., 2008).  
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The history of bench terraces in Rwanda is linked to state policies and regulations and 
to interventions by NGOs (Bizoza and Hebinck, 2010). The approach used to promote 
these terraces has shifted over time from top down to somewhat participatory. Various 
development policies promoted by the current government, such as the ‘performance 
contracts’ (known as Imihigo), collective communal work (Umuganda) and Agasozi Ndatwa ( 
literally meaning a ‘model hill’), entail certain aspects of community-based development, 
promotion of farmers’ associations and co-operatives, and a self-reliance mentality 
towards rural development. In the case of soil and water conservation, these policies are 
geared primarily towards collective awareness and soil erosion control. At the same time 
farmers operate in small-scale associations and co-operatives from which different forms 
of social capital originate (e.g. trust, co-operation, and mutual assistance or reciprocity).  
Despite theoretical claims that social capital matters for investments in SWC 
measures, few empirical case-studies exist for Eastern Africa ( e.g. Nyangena, 2008; 
Isham, 2002). Moreover, Graaff et al. (2008) present a summary of factors affecting 
adoption and continued use of SWC measures (including terraces) from recent studies in 
five developing countries: Tanzania, Ethiopia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mali. Institutional 
variables considered include land tenure, extension contracts, programme participation, 
and group participation. These factors measure ‘structural’ social capital. Trust, as part of 
‘cognitive’ social capital, is not considered. To the author’s knowledge, no study has 
related empirically these forms of social capital to the adoption of SWC measures in 
Rwanda. This paper investigates their impact on the adoption of bench and progressive 
terraces in the North and Southern provinces of Rwanda.  
Apart from government interventions, NGOs such as World Vision International 
played prominent roles in the construction of terraces in the period after the 1994 war 
and genocide in Rwanda (Bizoza et al., 2007). Bench terraces were constructed in some 
areas using food support from the USAID. The food-for-work programmes have been 
contested in the literature for nurturing a dependency mentality, among other effects. 
Material incentives and the commoditization of labour may have created paternalistic 
behaviour and possibly distorted the real sense of existing local institutions such as  
mutual support.  
Despite efforts and progress made, the job of soil erosion control continues. The 
2008 National Agriculture Survey (NAS) showed that 62.2 % of the cultivable area (an 
estimate of 1 280 750 ha) is protected by anti-erosive measures. Furthermore, 4.2 % of 
the protected area is provided by bench (radical) terraces compared to 69.2 % by anti-
erosion ditches of which progressive terraces are formed. Kannan et al. (2010) indicate 
that 93.2% of the total potentially cultivable area is positioned on hillsides under rain-fed 
conditions and, thus, would be sensitive to soil erosion unless measures are taken. With 
bench terraces being encouraged by policy in the last three decades, why is progress so 
slow?  
From private perspective, bench terracing is not obviously an optimal soil 
conservation option (Hurni et al., 2008, Saint-Macary et al., 2010). As indicated above, 
bench terracing leads to higher investments, which take longer for farmers to pay back 
unless they are coupled with additional, improved agricultural practices (Posthumus and 
Graaff, 2005; Bizoza and Graaff, 2010). Since the top soils of these terraces have been 
disturbed from an early stage, it has resulted in low soil fertility and high inputs. 
Typically, in places like Rwanda where per capita land holdings are very small (less than 1 
ha), farmers hesitate easily to invest in a such technology. Unless measures to use 
terraced plots effectively are provided by govermental organizations and NGOs, farmers 
are rational not to construct terraces on small plots, much of which they depend on for 
their livelihoods. Indeed, this case-study proves that some smallholders abandon their 
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terraced plots or fail to use them productively (approximately 10%). Results from Bizoza 
and Graaff (2010) in the same research area show that bench terraces built with help of 
support projects could well have been established on plots that are too large (and thus 
underused) and on less suitable soils, resulting in less than expected benefits. Equally, the 
same NAS (2008) shows that 10% of farm land is uncultivated. This is noteworthy in a 
land-scarce country such as Rwanda.  
Therefore, the government intends to further promote terracing through different 
public and private initiatives. Hence, it is important to learn more about the 
characteristics of the adopters and the role of local institutions in fostering adoption. For 
this purpose, a distinction is made here between bench and progressive terraces to guide 
policy to tailor future interventions by responding to which types of terrace are 
demanded by which categories of farmers in rural Rwanda. 
5. 3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
The aim here is to analyse the impact of various local institutions on the adoption of 
bench terraces in rural Rwanda. The hypothesis will be maintained that dimensions of 
social capital matter in the adoption of bench terraces. For this purpose, household-level 
data were collected among 301 households who also provided plot-level information on 
907 plots located in the North and Southern provinces in Rwanda. Specifically, the 
research is carried out in areas (sectors) that cover major parts of the Gicumbi 
(Northern) and Nyamagabe (Southern) districts of Rwanda.  
The data collected allow for testing the impact of variables on the adoption of 
terraces, vector grouped as follows: plot controls, farm and household-level 
characteristics, tenure security, sector-level aggregates, and social capital. Plot-level 
controls (X) include slope (dummies), plot size, origin (inherited or otherwise), and the 
walking distance from home to the plot. Farm and household-level factors (W) comprise 
altitude, farm size, erosion potential, and socio-demographic characteristics of the heads 
of sample households (gender, age, family size, formal and informal education). The 
sector-level aggregates (Z) consist of support programme (World Vision) and average 
income. 
Social capital (SC) and tenure security (TS) are the institutional variables of interest. 
As Krishna (2004) points out, ‘it is not easy to observe social capital; people carry it 
inside of their heads’, making it difficult to measure and to associate it with economic 
outcomes such as investments in bench terraces. Trust and membership of an 
organization are two indicators often used for empirical measurement of social capital 
(Glaeser et al., 2002; Krishina, 2004). Accordingly, social capital can be divided into two 
categories: cognitive social capital (SC 1 ), manifested by trust and participation in 
collective labour teams, and structural social capital (SC 2 ), observed through 
membership of voluntary organization(s). 
 
In order to measure trust, the survey asked the following question: Do you trust any 
of the following categories of people: household members, members of the extended 
family, neighbours, people in the community, local leaders, and leaders of their respective 
churches? Trust was coded on a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 4 (‘very 
much’).  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of variables fitted in the analysis of adoption of bench and progressive 
terraces  
 
Explanatory 
Variables  
Description Obs. Mean SD 
Institutional Factors (SC)  
Trust the community  Average score of community trust (1= not all and 4= very much ).  301 3.42 0.38 
Collective action  Equals 1 if the plot has been terraced through collective action.  907 0.06 0.24 
Association 
membership  
Equals 1 if a farmer is a member of the association and 0, if 
otherwise 
300 0.33 0.47 
Tenure security (TS) Equals 1 if a farmer perceive land secured in the future and 0, if 
otherwise  
301 0.83 0.37 
Plot controls (X)      
Steep Slope  Equals 1 if the slope of the plot (s) is steep and 0, if otherwise 907 0.21 0.41 
Gentle Slope  Equals 1 if the slope of the plot (s) is gentle and 0, if otherwise 907 0.55 0.49 
Plot size  Size of the plot in are (1 are = 0.01 hectare) 907 35.94 107.8 
Inheritance  Equals 1 if a farmer inherited the land and 0, if accessed the land 
by other means 
299 0.62 0.48 
Distance  Distance from home to the plot in minutes  907 12.92 17.05 
Farm and Household characteristics (W)    
Altitude (m absl)  Average altitude of the sub-catchment / Village  301 2103 163.34 
Farm size  Total farm sizes in Ares ( 1 are = 0.01 hectare)  301 107.4 255.46 
High erosion 
potential  
Equals 1 if the household is located in an area with high risks of 
erosion. 
301 0.14 0.35 
Moderate erosion 
potential 
Equals 1 if the household is located in an area with moderate risks 
of erosion. 
301 0.32 0.46 
Female head  Equals 1 if female and 0, if otherwise 301 0.50 0.50 
Age Number of years old of the head of household  299 43.37 13.59 
Family size  Total family members  301 5.73 2.07 
Formal education  Years of formal education completed  301 2.75 3.18 
Informal education  Equals 1 if a farmer has received agricultural training/field visit/ 
extension meeting and 0 if otherwise.  
301 0.31 0.46 
Total Livestock Unit 
(TLU) 
Cattle size (=0.8), pigs (=0.2) , sheep and goat (=0.1) 301 1.25 1.19 
Sector-level variables ( Z)  
Programme support  Equals 1 if a farmer is from a sector supported by World Vision 
International.  
301 0.41 0.49 
Average Sector-level 
Income  
Average of income per sector  301 68640 45575 
District  Equals 1 if the plot (family) is located in the North and 0, if the 
Southern region.  
301 0.55 0.49 
Depedent Variables  
Adoption of bench 
terraces ( BTA) 
Equals 1 if a given plot (family) has bench terraces and 0 if 
otherwise.  
907 0.32 0.47 
Adoption of 
progressive terraces  
( PTA) 
Equals 1 if a given plot (family) has progressive terraces and 0 if 
otherwise.  
907 0.28 0.45 
 
The survey questionnaire asked also whether terraces had been constructed through 
collective labour, in order to measure its effect on the adoption of terraces. Labour is a 
major component of investments in bench terraces; and social capital is considered 
important in playing an economic role in labour markets (Knight and Yueh, 2008). 
Collective action aimed at pooling labour to construct terraces at the individual plot level 
is regarded to be an alternative asset for farmers in addressing labour constraints for soil 
conservation and probably with regard to other farming constraints as well (Meinzen-
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Dick, 2009). Hence, a positive and conducive effect of collective action on investment in 
terraces is expected here.  
Membership of associations is an important local institution expected to have a 
positive effect on the adoption of bench terraces. Farmers join their associations for a 
variety of reasons, such as mutual support (reciprocity), access to input credit, training, 
and sharing of agricultural implements. Therefore, farmers who are members of 
associations are more likely to share experiences and pool resources, which, in turn, 
might allow them to adopt terraces on their private lands. The government also 
encourages membership of farmers’ co-operatives. In addition, due to the increasing 
cognizance of the role of women in rural social and economic life, women-based 
organizations are taken into account. Hence, the survey asked whether the respondent 
was a member of any of these voluntary organizations (Yes/No).  
Tenure security (TS) is another institutional dimension expected to influence the 
decision to invest (or not) in terraces (Deininger and Jin, 2006). Land titling is still going 
on in Rwanda. The survey included a question about perceived tenure security, whether 
the respondent(s) thought that he/she would continue to use the land during their 
lifetime. Table 1 describes other independent and dependent variables identified in the 
model.  
 
Data have been analysed at plot level. It is possible for a given household ( i ) to have 
more than one plot ( k ) with variant physical characteristics and household-specific 
variables. Probit ML estimator has been applied (Wooldridge, 2002), with robust 
standard errors clustered at household level in order to estimate our adoption model 
specified as Equ.1. A district dummy (Z) was included in variables to control for 
potential heterogeneity between the two districts in the study area. The dependent 
variable Y  stands for either bench terrace adoption (BTA) or progressive terrace 
adoption (PTA).  
  
 ikcikiiiik ZWXTSSCSCY εγγγβββα +++++++= 32132211                                (1) 
 
Where i  indexes the household, k  stands for the plot, while c  denotes sector-level 
variables. ikY  stands for either BTA or PTA with ikY =1 if adoption occurs or ikY =0 in 
the case of non-adoption. iSC1 , iSC2 , iTS , kX , iW  and cZ  are the vectors of 
observable explanatory factors as described above, while iβ  is a vector of estimated 
coefficients. Finally, ikε  is the error term, which is assumed to be random. 
Endogeneity of regressors is not of concern for the geographical variables since they 
are given. However, some of the institutional measures, namely trust, tenure security (TS) 
and association membership, are potentially endogenous. The standard Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test was applied to investigate whether exogenous variation in these 
factors could be identified (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The difficulty in the use of 
instrumental variable approaches when establishing the causal effects of social capital is 
finding relevant and valid instruments (Knight and Yueh, 2008). This is the case for the 
‘trust’ variable. Alternatively, average scores of community trust were used, which are less 
likely to be correlated with individual residuals.5 The DWH test for endogeneity of tenure 
security (TS) and association membership resulted in a strong acceptance of the null 
                                                 
5 Another option is to compute trust and association membership scores at household level using factor 
analysis (Narayam Pritchett, 1999; Nyangena, 2008). These scores were loaded and tested in the analysis. 
Only the trust index has both positive and significant associations with BTA. However, reported results are 
those with an average score for community trust. 
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hypothesis that TS (F(1,300)=0.697208; (p=0.4044)) and association membership 
(F(1,300)=0.700373; (p=0.4033) are both exogenous. Therefore, the assumed 
endogeneity of tenure security and association membership variables is no longer a 
problem. Hence, they can be identified in the regression analysis.  
5.4 Empirical results 
 
Two equations have been considered: one for bench terrace adoption and one for the 
adoption of progressive terraces. The purpose is to examine what factors determine 
adoption of bench and progressive terraces, with a focus on local institutions. Obtained 
coefficients are based on robust and clustered standard errors at household level. The 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables are computed at their sample means. 
Table 2 presents results from the analysis of BTA. The results show that, among the 
three sector-level variables (Z), the coefficients of sector-average income and district 
dummy suggest positive impacts on the adoption of bench terraces (both significant at 
the 1% level). The inference is that higher income farmers are more likely to adopt bench 
terraces compared to those with a low income. The dummy coefficient indicates that 
farmers in the Northern province have adopted more bench terraces compared to those 
in the Southern province. This outcome is in line with expectations. Bench terracing 
started in the Northern province before being introduced in the Southern province, 
which provides a partial explaination of the difference. Surprisingly, World Vision’s 
support programme, although positive, proved to have no significant association with the 
adoption of bench terraces. This is difficult to explain. A possible answer can be found in 
the higher number of samples used in the analysis from random sectors that did not 
receive much support from World Vision for bench terrace construction (about 65%).  
 
Table2  
Probit regression of adoption of bench and progressive terraces with robust standard 
errors ( clustered at household level)  
Variable  Bench terrace adoption 
(BTA)  
Progressive terrace adoption 
(PTA)  
Coefficient  
( Robust Std. Dev) 
Marginal 
effect  
Coefficient  
(Robust Std. Dev) 
Marginal effect  
Institutional factors (SC)      
Trust  0.408 (0.132)*** 0.141 -0.163 (0.122) -0.052 
Association membership -0.182 (0.126) -0.061 0.010 (0.121) 0.003 
Collective action  2.136 (0.297)*** 0.678 -0.069 (0.232) -0.021 
Tenure security (TS) 0.104 (0.137)  0.035 0.118 (0.148) 0.037 
Plot Controls (X)      
Steep Slope  0.489 (0.169)*** 0.178 -0.254 (0.143)* -0.078 
Gentle Slope  0.339 (0.133)** 0.115 -0.055 (0.118) -0.017 
Plot size (Log) 0.157 (0.052)*** 0.054 0.164 (0.048)*** 0.053 
Inheritance  -0.223 (0.104)** -0.077 0.105 (0.097) 0.033 
Distance  -0.021 0.004)*** -0.007 -0.009 (0.003)*** 0.003 
Farm and household level variables (W)     
Altitude (m absl ) 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.0007 0.002 (0.0003)*** 0.0007 
Farm size  -0.104 (0.068) -0.036 -0.095 (0.074) -0.031 
Higher erosion  -0.648 (0.151)*** -0.193 0.193 (0.147) 0.065 
Moderate erosion  -0170 (0.120) -0.057 0.189 (0.122) 0.062 
Female head  -0.534 (0.121) -0.052 0.171 (0.115) 0.0554 
Age  -0.013 (0.023) -0.004 -0.008 (0.025) -0.003 
Age (squared)  0.0001 (0.000) 0.00002 0.00007(0.000) 0.00002 
Formal education  0.001 (0.019) -0.0004 -0.008 (0.017) -0.002 
Informal education  0.315 (0.133)** 0.111 0.181 (0.121) 0.059 
Family size  0.058 (0.034)* 0.020 -0.028 (0.028) -0.008 
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Total Livestock Unit (TLU)  0.013 (0.056) 0.004 -0.084 (0.054) -0.027 
Sector-level variables (Z)      
Programme Support  0.105 (0.129) 0.036 0.292 (0.132)** 0.095 
Average sector-level income   4.07E-06 
(1.24E-06)*** 
1.42E-06 -2.07E-06 
(1.37E-06) 
-6.70E-07 
District  0.577 (0.138)*** 0.190 0.807(0.141)*** 0.244 
Constant -6.630 (1.163)***  -5.287 (0.994)***  
Regression diagnostics      
Log Likelihood -430.754  -485.904  
Chi-square (23) 193.49  116.04  
Probability > Chi-square 0.0000  0.000  
Pseudo R-square  0.2494  0.1007  
Predicted Probability at mean  0.294  0.258  
Sample size (n) 906  906  
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, and *** P < 0.01. 
 
Some farm and household-level variables (W) correlate with the adoption of bench 
terraces at different critical levels: altitude (m absl), high potential erosion, informal 
education, and family size. Farmers with plots located in mountainous catchment areas 
with high potential erosion are more likely to adopt bench terraces for easy cultivation of 
steep plots and to protect the soil from run-off than farmers in the lowlands (significant 
at the 1% level).  
Formal education is specified in most of literature as conducive to adopting 
conservation agriculture (e.g. Graaff et al., 2008; Diagne and Demont,  2007; Dimara and 
Skuras, 2003; Mbaga-Semgalawe and Folmer, 2000). However, this does not apply to 
most cases (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). A possible explanation lies in the assumption 
that number of years of education correlates strongly with decision to adopt. In small-
scale and traditional farming practices such as in Rwanda, it is difficult to believe that 
formal education plays a major role (Welch, 1978). For instance, it is debatable whether a 
sample farmer with an average age of 43 and with 3 years of primary education will rely 
on the knowledge obtained back at primary school after 34 years (assuming he or she 
started primary education at 6 years old). Instead, informal education explains most of 
the adoption of conservation technologies such as bench terraces (significant at the 5% 
level). Therefore, it is more likely that farmers adopt because of the experiences they 
share with neighbours, training they receive, and their contacts with extension officials.  
 
Plot characteristics such as gradient level and plot size, mode of land access, and the 
distance from home to the plot matter in a farmer’s decision to invest in soil and water 
conservation. Bench terraces are established on steeper plots (gradient levels of 25–55%). 
While progressive terraces are supposed to be established on plots with slope percentages 
of 12–25%, in this research both slope categories (steep and gentle) are correlated 
positively with the adoption of bench terraces (significant at the 5% level). To some 
extent, this reflects insufficient technical consideration at an early stage of terrace 
construction. The estimated positive coefficient of plot size has an important effect on 
soil and water conservation investments (significant at the 5% level). Plot size together 
with steepness of the plot may affect the width and the length of a terrace, and thus the 
choice of whether or not to adopt, all else being equal. 
Distance from home to the plot discourages investment in soil conservation 
(significant at the 1% level). Clay et al. (1998) found a similar result in their Rwandan 
study. The more remote a given plot from the homestead, the greater the transactions 
costs expected, especially when farmers rely on head transport for their household 
residues and other inputs. The security issue seems relevant in this situation. The 
correlation between tenure security and distance from homestead to the plot was tested 
and it was found negative and not statistically significant (even at the 15% level).  
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From the above, it does appear that farmers respond to economic incentives. In spite 
of the evidence that the cost–benefit ratio for investing in bench terraces is not very 
favourable, farmers do seem to focus their terracing efforts on the plots they use most 
intensively: plots close to the house and plots with the highest labour intensity.6 Results 
from the T-test confirm that terraced plots receive more labour inputs compared to 
unterraced or progressively terraced ones ( t =–6.28; significant at the 1% level). This is 
consistent with Bizoza and Graaff (2010), who show that not all terraced plots are 
cultivated and that labour costs constitute a major part of the operating costs in rural 
Rwanda. Therefore, comparison of bench terraces with other soil conservation 
techniques will show that better consideration of labour requirements is critical for 
cultivation, terrace construction costs, and maintenance (Dehn, 1995). 
 Customary land tenure is dominant in Rwanda. Often, family inheritance systems 
determine how people access land in Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa (André and 
Platteau, 1998). The majority of the samples in this research accessed their land through 
inheritance (62%) and few purchased (26%). Equally, the 2008 National Agricultural 
Survey reports that 45.5% accessed their land through inheritance compared to 24.7% 
who bought their lands. Our empirical evidence indicates that the more the land (plot) is 
inherited, the lower the adoption probability of bench terraces (significant at the 5% 
level). Meanwhile, vast claims have been made in the literature for the need for 
individualization and registration of plots in Rwanda. The government has instigated a 
process of land registration and the issuance of formal land rights. However, this may not 
be necessary to induce investments in land conservation. There is little empirical evidence 
from similar contexts in Africa and other developing countries to support the position 
that formal land titling or traditional rights have increased investment in agriculture 
(Barrows and Roth, 1990 Saint-Macary et al., 2010). Hence, whether formal or traditional 
land rights are conducive to the adoption of soil conservation measures should be 
considered context-specific and remains open to empirical debate in Rwanda.  
Next up are the effects of local institutions on bench terrace adoption. The analysis 
shows a positive association between some of the measures of social capital and an 
increased probability to invest in bench terraces. Trust as part of cognitive social capital 
(SC 1 ) is highly conducive to investments in bench terracing (significant at the 1% level). 
This is consistent with Bouma et al. (2008), who also maintained that farmers in villages 
with high levels of trust are likely to contribute willingly to community resource 
management. Terracing leads to site as well as downstream effects that require farmers to 
act collectively. Efforts by one farmer to invest in bench terraces may be undermined if 
other farmers up- or downstream do not adopt ( Nkonya et al. 2008). Thus calling for 
collective adoption. In such a situation, social capital will ease co-operation among 
people for them to work collectively. One believes that others will reciprocate and also 
contribute to the public good. The research also shows that collective action in the form 
of labour pooling, another measure of SC 1 , has a positive association with the adoption 
of bench terraces (significant at the 1% level). This had been expected. As noted earlier, 
building a terrace is a big job, best done in a group. Living in a community where such 
forms of co-operation occur helps in the construction of terraces, a task much more 
difficult for individuals to perform on their own.  
 
                                                 
6 Labour allocation per plot (excluding labour for terrace construction) was rejected in the estimation as it 
was found to correlate positively and strongly with BTA (at the 1% level).  
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Surprisingly, the effect of structural social capital (SC 2 ), represented here by 
membership of farmers’ associations, is zero. This outcome stands in contrast to other 
empirical findings from previous studies where membership of associations has positive 
and significant associations with investment in soil conservation (e.g. Nyangena, 2008, 
Rezvanfar et al. 2009). Farmers receive services from their organizations, including 
information about the need for terracing. Typically, these organizations are multipurpose 
in nature. It is, therefore, possible for someone to be a member of an organization 
without necessarily having to adopt bench terraces, ceteris paribus.  
Tenure security (TS) does not explain BTA. The results contrast with earlier studies 
that maintain that tenure security favours long-term investments in SWC (Nyangena, 
2008; Shiferaw and Holden, 2001; Gebremedhin and Switon, 2003). Two offsetting 
effects might explain this outcome: (i) farmers can invest in soil conservation measures 
when they feel they have tenure security, or (ii) they can invest in order to achieve tenure 
security for their landholdings. There are no formal titles in Rwanda although the land 
titling process is ongoing. Nevertheless, about 80% of the survey respondents feel they 
have tenure security – these are people farming plots that they inherited from their 
fathers compared to farmers who have purchased plots (holding deeds) or who have 
accessed plots by other means. In addition, the need to secure land is justified mainly 
when risk of appropriation is significant or when better land markets exist. None of these 
two cases are evident in the study area, which explains the low impact of tenure security 
in the adoption of bench terraces in Northern and Southern Rwanda. In conclusion, 
farmers need to feel their land is secured when they have made substantial investments; 
however, this requires additional measures such as credit subsidies to improve the 
capacity to invest in terraces.  
Overall, results from the analysis mirror the growing academic debate that local 
institutions matter in the adoption of soil and water conservation. However, not every 
dimension of the institutional framework (as specified) is found to be important in the 
Rwandan case. Trust and collective action are instrumental in explaining terrace 
adoption. There is no empirical proof that the adoption of bench terraces can be 
explained through association membership or tenure security justify, although this is 
relation is assumed important in policy and other researches.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present results from the analysis of progressive terrace 
adoption (PTA). Only six of the variables used are instrumental in explaining the 
adoption of progressive terraces. Sector-level estimates (Z) of programme support (by 
World Vision) and the district dummy suggest increased probability of PTA (significant 
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively). Average sector income is not significant, which 
suggests that farmers in areas with higher than average incomes are likely to prefer BTA 
over PTA, under ceteris paribus conditions. Contrary to the outcomes of the analysis of 
BTA, programme support does explain PTA (significant at the 5% level). A possible 
reason could be World Vision International Rwanda’s recent development strategy to 
promote progressive terraces after recognizing that some of constructed bench terraces 
were too expensive for farmers to use.  
Among the farm and household variables (W), distance from home to the plot and 
plot altitude (m absl) correlate with PTA. These variables are estimated with their 
expected signs and the implications of results is the same as for BTA. Among the plot-
level variables, only plot size is instrumental in explaining PTA (significant at the 1% 
level). Therefore, plot size matters when considering investing in either BTA or PTA.  
Of the institutional variables, neither trust, collective action, association membership 
or tenure security explain PTA. Since progressive terraces are build slowly because of 
tillage and use of hedges, reciprocity in pooling labour or sharing agricultural implements 
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is less common compared to bench terracing. Trust lubricates co-operation in situations 
where reciprocity in sharing labour and implements prevails (Pretty and Haward, 2001). 
Similar to the results in the analysis of BTA, there is no empirical evidence that 
association membership and land tenure security encourage PTA.  
In summary, the empirical results reflect that social arrangements are necessary in 
order to establish bench terraces but not for progressive terraces. The marginal effects (at 
sample mean) of trust ( =dxdy / 0.141) and collective action ( =dxdy / 0.678) suggest 
social capital an alternative asset(s) to be taken into consideration when investing in 
bench terraces in Rwanda. That is, farmers in areas endowed with high levels of social 
capital are likely to adopt bench terraces when the government and NGOs decrease or 
stop their interventions (Bouma et al., 2008, Ahelerup et al., 2009).  
5.5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this study, the role of local institutions, among other factors, is considered in the 
adoption of bench terraces in rural Rwanda. The results of the analysis sustain the 
ongoing discourse that social capital maters for soil and water conservation. Soft 
institutional factors – trust and the ability to co-operate in collective action – affect the 
adoption of bench terraces more than ‘hard’ ones – association membership. None of 
the local institution variables explain adoption of progressive terraces. Furthermore, 
perceived tenure security does not explain adoption of either bench terraces or 
progressive terraces. This may be due to the peculiar nature of the case study, where 
informal (customary) tenure rights still play an important part. 
Another significant insight from the analysis is that farmers do want to have terraces 
and allocate their best plots for this purpose – plots that are large in size, close to the 
house, and intensively cropped. On the other hand, it is revealed that some farmers are 
unable to secure complementary materials and labour inputs. Consequently, some fail to 
use effectively their terraced plots. In addition to the promotion of terracing, 
interventions by NGOs and policy-makers should also focus on the sociocultural settings 
in the early stage of soil and water conservation measures. In poverty-based economies 
such as Rwanda, local institutions can supplement government and NGO investments in 
soil and water conservation. Farmers can construct terraces themselves through their 
own local institutions. This does not imply total withdrawal of state involvement in soil 
conservation, but the need for the state to co-operate with local institutions in a variety 
of innovative ways to sustain complementarity (Meinzen–Dick 2009). Therefore, 
government and NGOs need to allocate further investments in the consecutive use of 
established terraces than in the construction of new ones. New thinking rather than 
reviving old institutions and traditions is needed to develop forms of social organization 
that are structurally suited for soil and water conservation at the local level and for the 
overall development of agriculture (Pretty and Ward, 2001).  
Results show also that bench terraces were constructed on plots with either gentle or 
steeper slopes. Farmers need more training before they embark upon the terracing 
process to ensure technical efficiency and sustainability of established terraces. Finally, 
the above findings confirm the hypothesis that local institutions play an important role in 
the adoption of bench terraces in rural Rwanda. More research is needed to advise how 
these social arrangements can play better their roles and into the extent to which they can 
supplement or even substitute direct interventions by NGOs and the state in soil and 
water conservation on private land in Rwanda.  
 
Returning to the research results, some general lessons can be drawn about the role 
of institutions on the adoption of new agricultural technologies. First, the effect of tenure 
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security on a farmer’s decision to invest in agricultural technologies should be analysed 
with caution, especially in developing countries similar to Rwanda. Land tenure security 
does depend also on the interaction with other factors such as land governance, credits 
and markets in agriculture (Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Moreover, measuring the extent to 
which farmers feel they have tenure security, often with a single binary indicator, seems 
oversimplified to accommodate confounding effects of such factors on land tenure in 
microanalysis. This explains partly why in most studies, including this case-study, the 
effect of land tenure on the adoption of technology is found to be insignificant (for a 
review, see Feder et al., 1985; Gebremedhin and Switon, 2003; Knowler and Bradshaw, 
2007; de Graaff et al., 2008). Especially in Africa, costly soil conservation measures such 
as bench terraces involve public interventions that, in many cases, may be calculated into 
private decision-making to adopt such soil conservation measures. Therefore, proper 
analysis of the role of tenure security in adoption of soil conservation is expected at 
government or institutional level rather than micro-economic analysis (Meinzen-Dick,  
2009); such analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper.  
Second, there is a general claim in recent literature that membership of farmers’ 
organizations is conducive to natural resource management (Sidibé, 2005; Nyangena 
2008; Rezvanfar et al., 2009). However, membership can also predict a range of social 
capital measures (Glaeser et al.,  2002). It is assumed invariably that farmers may gain 
through membership many kinds of support from government and NGOs, such as 
credit, training, sharing of agricultural implements, including labour pooling to erect soil 
conservation structures (Sidibé, 2005; Nyangena, 2008). Moreover, farmers’ organizations 
provide an intermediary layer of institutional arrangements through which extension and 
other development agents operate. Therefore, better analysis of membership needs to 
open up this ‘black box’ and investigate the extent to which farmers gain (or lose) 
assumed benefits from membership. This will explain much better the role of 
membership of farmers’ organizations in soil conservation and rural development in 
general.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THREE-STAGE ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION OF SOIL AND WATER 
CONSERVATION IN THE HIGHLANDS OF RWANDA7 
6.1  Introduction  
 
The knowledge of why some farmers will or will not adopt new technologies is 
fundamental, and has been analysed by many economists (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Feder 
et al.,1985, Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). It is well documented in the literature that 
technology adoption by farmers requires a multistage process of decision-making, rather 
than the single, dichotomous decision to adopt or not (Dimara and Skuras, 2003; 
Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). The explanation is that some of the deciding factors 
are dynamic and require, therefore, a shift from static to a dynamic observation (Dimara 
and Skuras, 2003; Feder et al., 1985). Typically, less attention is paid to why some of the 
adopted technologies are discontinued by farmers after their decision to adopt and 
programme support stops. 
A variety of soil and water conservation (SWC) measures have been introduced in 
developing countries, including Rwanda, to counter soil erosion and to increase 
agricultural production. Early efforts focused mostly on soil erosion control rather than 
on integrating such efforts with programmes aimed at increasing agricultural production. 
Winters et al. (2004) argue that, in a situation where the location of terraces is determined 
by an outside expert rather than the farmers themselves, development officials may 
construct terraces on areas where they are effective for soil erosion control, but not 
where they are conducive to agricultural production. Accordingly, terracing that does not 
fit the farmers’ capacities to invest in additional inputs will have possibly no effect on 
production. This may explain why some SWC techniques established in many parts of 
Rwanda (and elsewhere) were underused, abandoned, and eventually disappeared (Olson, 
1994; Bizoza and Hebinck, 2010).  
If so, the explanation is not that farmers are not cognisant of soil erosion problems 
and their effects on production (Clay and Lewis,1990). Instead, the limited ability to 
secure complementary inputs required by the technology could be part of the story. This 
inability restrains farmers from achieving goals of soil erosion control, poverty reduction, 
and increased agricultural production (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). The latter goal 
is a key incentive to increase land conservation by farmers. Farmers are sufficiently 
rational to continue using as well as adding aspects of technologies that have proven to 
be profitable, all else being equal.  
 
Terraces (both bench and progressive) are the most important SWC techniques in the 
recent history of soil conservation in Rwanda. Terracing entails substantial construction 
costs in terms of labour and complementary inputs, especially at the early stage (Winter-
Nelson and  Amegbeto, 1998). Thus, few farmers have the means to construct terraces, 
unless support is provided by SWC programmes. During the period after 1994 and prior 
to 2006, farmers received extensive support from the government and NGOs via food 
and cash for work incentives to construct terraces on public and private lands in many 
parts of Rwanda (Bizoza et al.,2007; MINECOFIN, 2009). Later, the government 
introduced and reinforced institutions drawn from Rwandan traditional society, such as 
                                                 
7 This chapter  will be reworked into a journal article 
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public community work (known as Umuganda) and the performance contract (known as 
Imihigo). These institutions encourage collective action, sometimes used for terrace 
construction, and self-reliance in soil and water conservation and other development 
activities. The leading assumption in some of these interventions is that farmers will 
maintain and continue using established terrace structures beyond programme support. 
However, experiences from other African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Ethiopia, suggest this should not be taken for granted (Tenge et al, 2004; Pretty and Shah, 
1997; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998).  
 
Both past and ongoing efforts in soil conservation have led to a mixed situation where 
some farmers have some terraced plots that are well maintained and used, some farmers 
with terraced plots that are not maintained and underused, and some farmers with plots 
that are not terraced (although the plots are appropriate for terrace construction). This 
situation can be explained partly by a lack of sufficient transitional measures such as 
maintenance funds ( Bouma et al., 2007) that would allow farmers to better maintain and 
continue using terraces already established under various SWC interventions. If strategies 
to facilitate farmers continued use of existing and newly constructed terraces are not in 
place, effects linked to soil properties such as increased soil acidity, nutrient depletion 
and decreased crop yields are likely to be worse than before (Lewis, 1992; Clay and 
Lewis, 1990). It constitutes a challenge for future generations of soil conservation 
technologies in particular and agriculture development in Rwanda in general.  
  
This overview emphasizes the importance of studying technology adoption or 
disadoption as a dynamic process in the sense of early and late adopters or non-adopters. 
The present study contributes to this ‘dynamism’ of technology adoption or disadoption 
in agriculture by looking at the ability of small-scale farmers to invest in existing and new 
terraces in Rwanda. Having such information helps us to promote conservation 
agriculture in Rwanda, tailored to the social and economic conditions of farmers 
(Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). This paper addresses the question of whether farmers 
are willing to adopt new terraces in the future beyond current adoption and SWC 
programme interventions. The aim of this paper is to assess which factors affect farmers’ 
current and future decisions about adoption of bench terraces, focusing on their capacity 
to invest in inputs in Northern and Southern Rwanda. The capacity to invest has been 
overlooked by some SWC interventions; however, it is an important long-term 
investment principle (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003).   
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present some recent 
researches on agricultural technology adoption and subsequent decisions. Section 3 will 
produce a model for analysing current and future adoption decisions of farmers about 
their capacity to invest in bench terraces. Section 4 will describe the survey data used for 
the empirical analysis while Section 5 will present and discuss key results. Finally, Section 
6 will present the concluding remarks with some policy actions.  
 
6.2 Recent research on the adoption and continued use of agricultural       
technology  
 
Many recent studies have considered two-stage adoption decision processes rather 
than simple dichotomous adoption decisions. For example, Dimara and Skuras (2003) 
analysed the awareness and adoption decisions of technology as a two-stage partially 
observable process. Adegbola and Gardebroek (2007) investigated modification of 
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improved maize storage facilities by farmers to adapt them to their circumstances in 
Southern Benin as a second stage to adoption. Neill and Lee (2001) explain disadoption 
after adoption of maize–mucuna in Northern Honduras. Gebremedhin and Swinton 
(2003) considered the adoption of and long-term investments in stone terraces in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia. Amsalu and de Graaff (2007) also studied the adoption and 
continued use of stone terraces, in the Beressa watershed located in the central highlands 
of Ethiopia.  
 These recent studies and others observe the continuity of technology among (often 
early) adopters in terms of the second stage of the adoption model. The continuity 
reflects the intensity and the capacity to maintain and use the adopted technology. 
However, continuity of the technology can also be observed among late adopters, 
because when a new technology is introduced within the community it is either adopted 
or dis-adopted over time. Again, large-scale innovations such as soil and water 
conservation will have downstream effects and can lead to collective adoption. 
Therefore, continued use and future adoption can be observed among both early 
adopters and non-adopters (Rogers, 1962).   
 
Future adoption can be evaluated in terms of the perceived benefits of a technology 
among non-adopters. New adopters form part of the explanation of the continuity of 
technology and they should, therefore, be included in the model of technology adoption 
in agriculture. Thus, the continued use of bench terraces contains both current and 
potential adopters, who may learn from the early adopters within their respective 
communities that bench terraces can be beneficial assets (Rogers, 1962; Adegbola and 
Gardebroek, 2007). The learning period involves many issues. It may involve a search for 
further information on the costs and benefits of a given technique, a trial period, 
modification, valuation of the impact of adoption on economic activity, rejection or 
acceptance of the technology (Rogers, 1962; Winters et al. 2004; Dimara and Skuras, 
2003; Adegbola and Gardebroek, 2007). In this study, current and future adoption 
decisions of bench terraces are bridged by farmers’ abilities to invest in existing and new 
bench terraces.  
      
6.3  A model for analysing initial and future adoption of bench terraces  
 
In this paper, the adoption of bench terraces is regarded as a three-stage decision-
making process. Stage one comprises the analysis of current or initial adoption decisions 
of bench terraces, while stage two assesses farmers’ ability to continue the use of terraces. 
Per capita household income is used as a proxy for farmers’ capacity to invest. Stage 
three analyses future adoption proxied by farmers’ willingness to uptake more terraces. 
The analytical method starts from adoption rather than from awareness (Dimara and 
Skuras, 2003; Saha et al., 1994). It is assumed that farmers are already aware of adoption, 
a stage which has been well documented in the academic literature. A possible 
explanation could be that the government of Rwanda cautioned farmers against use 
terraces and other SWC measures through various nationwide campaigns since 1970s 
(Clay and Lewis, 1990). Assuming that farmers are aware of bench terraces established in 
many parts of the study area, omitting the awareness stage will not cause significant 
specification bias (Dimara and Skuras, 2003). Figure 1 examines the relationship between 
adoption decisions, farmers’ capacity to invest and future adoption of bench terraces in 
the highlands of Rwanda.  
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 (2) 
                                              Capacity to invest  
 2Y  
(1) (3) 
Adoption                                                                                  Future adoption  
 3Y  
 Figure1. Path diagram of recursive causality between current adoption, farmers’  
    capacity to invest and future adoption of soil and water conservation 
 
Assuming that appropriate land for terracing is available ( 0Lt ; with 25–55% gradient), 
adoption decision 1Y  is observed among early adopters also willing (or not) to construct 
new terraces. Farmers’ capacity to invest is assessed after some farmers have constructed 
terraces on some of their plots, this can possibly affect their income and hence the 
capacity to further invest in terraces, ceteris paribus. In order to test the effect of adoption 
( 1Y ) on farmers’ capacity to invest ( 2Y ), the relationship between (1) and (2) will be 
examined. In addition, early adopters are likely to take up more terraces in the future than 
non-adopters due to relatively better advantages (e.g. more information about terraces, 
terracing skills from ‘learning by doing’). This hypothesis will be validated through the 
assessment the relationship between (1) and (3) – that is, by calculating the effect of 
current adoption ( 1Y ) on future adoption ( 3Y ).  
Farmers’ decisions to develop more (new) terraces will depend, among others, on 
expected future benefits and on their capacity to invest in operating inputs (Shiferaw et 
al., 2009). Therefore, the capacity to invest in operating inputs ( 2Y ) is viewed here as a 
driving factor determining future adoption. It serves as an alternative proxy for the 
outcome of the valuation process that precedes the willingness for future adoption of 
bench terraces. The potential effect of farmer’s capacity to invest on future adoption is 
taken into account when assessing the impact of ( 2Y ) on ( 3Y ) – that is, the relationship 
between (2) and ( 3).  
 
Most of the SWC measures in the study area are promoted by government programmes 
and NGO’s concerned for the threat of erosion (Graaff et al., 2008). Adoption as 
currently observed is to some extent induced by incentives provided by these 
programmes (Bunch, 1999). It becomes important to know whether farmers are willing 
to implement new bench terraces beyond such interventions, which depends on the 
capacity to invest in long-term soil conservation. This ability determines whether already 
established terraces can be intensified and can be of continued use. The decision about 
actual or future investment in terraces also depends on other social, economic, and 
institutional factors sometimes overlooked by SWC programmes. Accordingly, these 
factors are hypothesized to affect future adoption of bench terraces. They are expected 
to affect per capita family income (a proxy for farmers’ capacity to invest), which, in turn, 
is expected to affect the decision for future adoption. For this purpose, a system of three 
equations is devised. The main hypothesis is tested for future adoption of bench terraces 
to be conditional upon both current adoption and farmers’ ability to invest in 
complementary inputs for sustained soil conservation and agricultural production.  
 
We assume two latent response variables for the current and future adoption equations 
( 1*Y  and *3Y ) and a continuous dependent variable for the capacity to invest in terraces 
( 2Y ). Each latent variable is a function of some explanatory variables, and the equations 
1Y
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contain some common variables in addition to some that appear only in one of the 
equations. Assuming a linear specification of the latent variables, the three equations are 
defined as: 
 
ii uxY 111
'*
1 += β                                                                                                              (1) 
ii uYxY 2112
,
22 ++= δβ                                                                                                   (2)  
ii uYYxY 32123
,
33
* +++= αδβ                                                                                         (3) 
   
Where iY *  and 2Y  represent the dependent variables; β  stands for a vector of 
parameters to be estimated; ix  is a vector of conditioning variables for the i
th individual 
household; iu  captures all unobservable factors that affect the dependent variables, 
assumed to be normally distributed ( iu ~ ),0(
2σN ). The potential effect of early 
adoption on farmers’ capacity to invest and on future adoption is assessed in the model 
by estimating the partial slope coefficients of dummy adoption 1δ and 2δ , respectively. 
The effect of farmers’ capacity to invest on future adoption is taken into account as when 
computing the slope coefficient α  in the recursive equation (3). The latent variables 
*
1Y and 
*
3Y  are not observed. What is observed though are the respective qualitative 
variables indicating the presence or not of current ( 1Y ) and future adoption ( 3Y ).  
 
11 =Y  if 0
*
1 >Y ; 0 otherwise                                                                                        (4) 
13 =Y  if 0
*
3 >Y ; 0 otherwise  
  
The above equations reveal a special case of the multiple equation model comprising 
both limited *iY  and continuous 2Y  dependent variables. At the same time, these two 
variables appear at the right hand side of equation (3) as endogenous dummy and 
continuous regressors. The logic of this model follows the recursive structure (Maddala, 
1980:110). Thus, the model is more likely to fall in the category of recursive multiple 
equation probit models than linear simultaneous equations (Nelson and Olson, 1978; 
Wilde, 2000). The reason for this is that the path of causality for the three variables is 
fully recursive (see Figure 1) (Maddala, 1983:108). Evaluation of this model is not a 
straightforward procedure considering the measured dependent variables represent a 
mixture of two different distributions. As a result, assessing the whole system (equations 
1 to 3) becomes difficult or can mislead predictions. We suggest three exit options to 
evaluate this model. 
  
Option 1. Here, each equation of the system is estimated individually with an appropriate 
technique. The probit ML method is applied to estimate current adoption ( *1Y ), while 
OLS estimates are obtained from equation (2), farmers’ capacity to invest ( 2Y ). A two-
stage method is applied to estimate future adoption ( *3Y ). First stage coefficient estimates 
are obtained from equations (1) and (2), which, in turn, are used to construct predicted 
values for their counterpart endogenous variables in equation(3). This leads to a single 
equation and the structural coefficient estimates are obtained in the second stage by the 
probit ML method (Nelson and Olson, 1978). Also Nelson and Olson contend that the 
standard errors reported in the second stage are not correct but may still guide as 
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approximations. To obtain adjusted standard errors, it becomes necessary to apply the 
bootstrapping option built into the Stata programme (Cameron and Trivedi , 2009).  
 
Option 2. Under this option, current ( *1Y ) and future adoption ( 3
*Y ) are estimated as 
a bivariate probit regression. Since some farmers who adopted (or not) can still be willing 
to construct more (or new) terraces on their unterraced plots, there is greater likelihood 
that the disturbance terms of these two equations are correlated: Var( iu1 )=Var( iu3 )=1, 
and i  is the individual index (Neill and Lee, 2001; Wilde, 2000). However, Maddala 
(1983: 123) affirms that, if iu1  and iu3  are not independent, the probit ML method will 
not give consistent estimates of the parameters for equation (3) due to the presence of 
the dummy endogenous adoption 1Y . Thus, following Maddala’s suggestion, equation (3) 
is respecified to become the next equation (5) in order to obtain consistent probit ML 
estimates. The effect of 2Y  can still be captured among conditional variables ix 3
'  as a 
continuous regressor. The model is reduced to a recursive system of two adoption 
equations ((1) and (5)). This new model can, therefore, be estimated by the two-stage 
method. First, probit ML estimates 1βˆ  of 1β  are obtained from equation (1) and 
)ˆ( 1
'
1 βixΦ  is substituted for 1
~Y  in equation (5). 
 
  ii uxY 111
'*
1 += β    
  ii uYXY 3123
,
33
* ~ ++= δβ                                                                                          (5) 
Where  
   =1
~Y Probl ( *1Y >0)  
 
If predicting joint probability of  is assumed, this yields to four possible cases 
of joint probability:  
)1,1( 31 == YYP , )0,1( 31 == YYP , )1,0( 31 == YYP , )0,0( 31 == YYP .  
 
 The case of )1,1( 31 == YYP  is possible if farmer i is currently an adopter and is willing 
to construct more terraces. )0,0( 31 == YYP  applies when farmer i  is not currently an 
adopter and is not willing to adopt terraces in the future, or do not have appropriate land 
available for more terracing, or he/she is unwilling to adopt at all.  
The joint probability of )1,0( 31 == YYP  implies that farmer i  is not currently an adopter 
but is willing to construct new terraces, all else being equal. As indicated above, farmers 
in this category have been ignored in some of past studies on adoption and continued 
use of agricultural technology. Future adoption and, hence, continuity of the same 
agricultural technology can be explained by both current adopters and non-adopters 
willing to construct new terraces. The log likelihood function to be maximized is given by 
Maddala (1983:123) as  
 
   )31)(11(00
3)11(
01
)31(1
10
31
11312 ),,(
YYYYYYYY PPPPL −−−−Π=ββδ                                                   (6) 
 
Option 3. The third option at hand is to estimate the system as a whole – Eq.(1) to 
Eq.(3) – using the classical two-stage least square (2SLS) technique. In the above two 
options, the probit ML, OLS and the two-step probit are applied to individual equations 
of the system and they ignore simultaneity (Nelson and Olson, 1978). The 2SLS is usually 
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used in the estimation of the linear simultaneous equations. Since the system is recursive 
and has some endogenous explanatory variables with no restriction on parameters, the 
2SLS method can be applied to estimate the whole system equation. The choice of 2SLS 
recalls the notion of identification of multiple equation probit models with an 
endogenous dummy variable. In this case, Wilde (2000:312) asserts that ‘no exclusion 
restrictions for exogenous variables are needed if there is sufficient variation in the data’. 
For Maddala (1983:120), the condition for identification holds if at least one conditional 
variable in one equation is not included in the other equation(s). For this model, the 
identification condition holds as each equation of the system has at least one variable that 
does not appear in the other equations. Another advantage of 2SLS is that it can be used 
for the instrumental variable (IV) estimation of an overidentified model or different 
variants of the GMM (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
  
6.4 Data and model variables  
 
The data used for this study were obtained from a random sample of 301 households 
in Northern and Southern Rwanda between March and May 2009. The survey 
respondents are from two agroecological zones namely Buberuka Highland zone 
(BHLZ) in Northern province and Congo-Crete Nil watershed zone (CNWZ) in 
Southern Rwanda. These two zones have a similar topography and received relatively 
more SWC interventions due to high erosion risk compared to other zones in Rwanda.  
For sampling purposes, the study area was divided into three topographic areas, based 
on the dominance of gradient percentages: 12–25%, 25–55% and 55–70% slopes. The 
first category is appropriate for progressive terraces while the second one is appropriate 
for bench terraces. The third category was rejected as it is meant for use other than 
agricultural production, such as tree plantation. Subsequently, the GIS mapping tool was 
used to map the dominance of soil conservation techniques, namely bench and 
progressive terraces, in 20 sectors – a sector is an administrative unit greater than a 
village. Of these sectors, 10 represent areas/sub-catchments where bench terraces are 
dominant, 6 areas are dominated by progressive terraces, while 4 sectors characterize 
sub-catchments with fewer or even no terraces at all.   
The data set contains information collected at sector, household, and plot levels. At 
the sector level, information was obtained from observation, interviews with key 
informants such as village leaders, in addition to other measured variables such as altitude 
and programme support. Data on household and plot characteristics were obtained from 
face-to-face interviews with 301 heads of households. The number of respondents 
selected is proportional to the size of each sector, and on average 15 households were 
interviewed per sector. Given this paper’s focus on long-term investments of bench 
terraces, only geophysical characteristics for unterraced plots of both adopters and non-
adopters of bench terraces are used in the analysis. The explanatory variables are 
specified with reference to previous studies on technology adoption (e.g. Feder et al., 
1985; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Dimara and Skuras, 2003; Gebremedhin and 
Swinton, 2003). The variables include socioeconomic characteristics of sample farmers, 
geophysical characteristics of unterraced plots, institution-related factors, and farmers’ 
perceptions of the benefits of bench terracing. Descriptions and measurements of these 
variables are summarized in the Table 1.A.   
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Table 1.A  
Description and definition of model variables  
 
Exp. Variables  Mean Std.Dev. Description  
(i) Socioeconomic Characteristics  
Female head  0.50 0.50 Equals 1 if female and 0, otherwise. 
Age of head  43.37 13.59 Number of years old of the head of household.  
Family size  5.73 2.07 Total family members.  
Available labour  2.99 1.36 Family members with ≥ 16 Years old. 
Farm size  107.4 255.46 Total farm sizes in Ares ( 1 are = 0.01 hectare).  
Head’s formal education  2.75 3.18 Years of formal education completed. 
Head’s informal 
 education  
0.31 0.46 Equals 1 if a farmer received agricultural training/field visit/ 
extension meeting and 0; if otherwise.  
Total livestock units  1.25 1.19 Cattle size (=0.8), pigs (=0.2) , sheep and goat (=0.1) 
(ii) Geophysical characteristics  
Gentle slope  0.55 0.49 Equals 1 if gentle slope and 0, otherwise. 
Steep slope  0.21 0.41 Equals 1 if steep slope and 0, otherwise. 
Very steep slope  0.05 0.23 Equals 1 if very steep slope and 0, otherwise. 
High erosion  0.17 0.37 Equals 1 if high potential erosion risks and 0, otherwise.  
Moderate erosion  0.33 0.47 Equals 1 if moderate potential erosion risks and 0, otherwise. 
Altitude (m absl) 2088 156.3 Meters above see level captured with GPS at sector level.  
Distance  13.13 17.14 Distance from home to the plot in walking minutes.  
(iii) Institutional factors  
Collective action  0.06 0.24 Equals 1 if the plot has been bench terraced through 
collective action by farmers themselves (mutual assistance).  
Land tenure security  0.84 0.37 Equals 1 if a farmer feels lifetime land secured her and 0, if 
otherwise.  
Association membership  0.36 0.48 Equals 1 if a farmer is a member of the association or a 
farmer cooperative and 0 if otherwise. 
Programme support  0.43 0.49 Equals 1 if a farmer/plot is from a sector supported by World 
Vision International and 0 if otherwise. 
(iv) Perception related factors  
Perceive benefits of bench 
terraces  
0.54 0.50 Equals 1 if a farmer perceive benefits of bench terraces and 0 
if otherwise. 
Dependent / Endogenous variables  
Current adoption of bench 
terraces  
     
0.60 0.49 Equals 1 if a given household has adopted bench terraces and 
0, if otherwise. Households with at least one row or one plot 
with bench terraces are considered as adopters.  
Future adoption of bench 
terraces  
0.68 0.46 Equals 1 if a farmer is willing to construct more or new bench 
terraces and, 0 if otherwise.  
Family income (agriculture)  137354  210075 Annual household income from agriculture for the period 
 ( 2008B and 2009 A). This is used as a proxy for farmer’s 
capacity to invest in bench terraces.  
 
The figures in Table 1.B represent Z values and respective significance levels of mean 
difference for socioeconomic characteristics between the three categories of sample 
households: early adopters of bench terraces (60%), late adopters (19%), and non-
adopters (21%). The characteristics that distinguish early adopters from late and non-
adopters are family size, labour availability, total livestock units, and household income 
(significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). These are some of the key socioeconomic 
characteristics hypothesized in the literature to affect the adoption (or not) of 
conservation agriculture. However, these characteristics do not provide universal 
evidence for the influences on the decision to adopt conservation agriculture (Knowler 
and Bradshaw, 2007).  
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Table1.B 
Mann-Whitney test for significance of mean difference between early, late, and non-adopters  
 
Sub-samples  Early adopters ( N=182)  Late adopters (N=57) Non-adopters (N=62)  
 Early versus Late adopters  Late versus Non-adopters Early versus Non-adopters  
Variable name  [Z ] Prob > [Z] [Z ] Prob > [Z] [Z ] Prob > [Z] 
Age of head  2.77*** 2.23** 0.03 
Family size  2.58*** 0.29 2.53*** 
Available labour  3.01*** 2.23** 2.12** 
Farm size  1.43 1.41 3.10*** 
Head’s formal Education  0.37 2.71* 2.85*** 
Head’s informal education  0.96 1.77* 3.02*** 
Total livestock unit s 2.22** 0.63 1.74* 
Family income (agriculture) 4.58*** 1.43 3.25*** 
Off-farm income  1.8* 2.43** 1.14 
* P  0.1, ** P 0.05, *** P 0.01  
 
6.5 Empirical results and discussion  
 
This section will evaluate the above-presented system of three equations: current 
adoption (Eq.(1)), farmers’ capacity to invest (Eq.(2)), and future adoption (Eq.(3)). The 
analysis focuses on future adoption of bench terraces conditional upon prior adoption 
and farmers’ capacity to invest in complementary inputs. The results contain three 
alternative sets of values corresponding with the application of the three above-
mentioned estimation options. Table 2.1 presents coefficient values and their significance 
levels of the current adoption using probit ML, bivariate probit ML, and classic 2SLS. 
Table 2.2 summarizes OLS, two-step probit ML, and 2SLS values of Eq.(2) and Eq.(3). 
Because Eq.(3) has been respecified under option (2), results from Eq. (5) are contained 
in column 4 of the Table 2.2. Observed changes of coefficient values – magnitude, 
expected signs, and statistical significance levels – as a result of altering the estimation 
approach of the three equations are also reported for comparison and discussion.  
6.5.1  Adoption of bench terraces  
 
 Stage one explores which socioeconomic, geophysical, and institutional factors affect 
current adoption of bench terraces. Ten of the nineteen identified parameters enter 
significantly at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Positive coefficients of some of these 
parameters (head’s informal education, gentle slope, steep slope, altitude, plot size, 
collective action) are associated with increased probability of adoption. Estimated 
coefficients with a negative sign are related with decreasing probability of adoption 
(female head, high erosion potential, moderate erosion potential, and distance from 
home to the plot). Apart from high and moderate erosion potentials, other statistically 
significant variables show anticipated effects on the adoption of bench terraces in the 
highlands of Rwanda.  
The negative sign of female head is expected and suggests that female-headed 
households are less likely to choose bench terraces compared to male-headed 
households. Terracing is labour intensive and if female-headed households face labour 
constraints then this is straightforward explanation. Hence, they are likely to adopt 
alternative SWC measures that are less labour intensive.  
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The effect of education on the decision to adopt is controversial. In their review, 
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) show incidences of insignificance and even negative 
correlation between formal education and adoption. A review of 21 analyses of the 
adoption of conservation agriculture, insignificant correlation between formal education 
and adoption was reported for 11 analyses. One reason for this could be that the 
relationship is site specific. Welch (1978) discovered a positive relationship between 
formal schooling and agricultural practices in regions that are in the midst of 
modernization, but not in traditional ones found in many developing countries. In small-
scale farming systems similar to Rwanda, farmers’ efficiency in resource allocation is 
determined largely by sharing experiences with neighbours, access to extension services, 
field visits, and less so by formal schooling. Informal education (such as trained in 
agricultural techniques, participation in formal or informal field visits and in extension 
meetings) is expected to explain decisions about adoption of bench terraces in the study 
area better than formal education. Table 2.1 suggests a positive and significant impact (at 
the 5% level) of the head’s informal education on the adoption of bench terraces while 
the head’s formal education is negative/positive and statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 2.1  
Probit ML, bivariate probit ML, and 2SLS values of current adoption of bench terraces  
 
Estimation option Probit ML Bivariate probit ML 1   Classic 2SLS 
Variables/Equation  Eq. (1) Eq.(1) Eq. (3)  Eq.(1)  
(i) Endogenous variables     
Adoption (dummy)   1.861**  
Family income (agriculture)   0.170  
(ii) Socio-economic characteristics     
Female head -0.274** -0.247*  -0.116*** 
Age of head -0.007 0.010  -0.0004 
Age of the head (squared) 3.85E-06 -0.00004  0.00003 
Family size 0.051 -0.088  0.009 
Farm size -0.067 -0.088  -0.016 
Head’s informal education  0.356** 0.41***  0.094*** 
Head’s formal education (years) -0.002 0.009  0.003 
Total livestock units (TLU) 0.035 0.041  0.002 
(iii) Geophysical characteristics     
Gentle slope 0.339*** 0.366***  0.091*** 
Steep slope 0.482*** 0.512*** 0.024 0.145*** 
Very steep slope   0.821  
High erosion potential -0.674*** -0.681*** 0.378 -0.188*** 
Moderate erosion potential -0.230** -0.250** 0.116 -0.085** 
Altitude (m absl) 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.0009 0.005*** 
Distance (walking minutes) -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.02*** -0.004*** 
Ln Plot size 0.132** 0.137** -0.073 0.035*** 
(iv) Institutional factors      
Collective action (farmers) 2.203*** 2.232*** -0.135 0.618*** 
Land tenure security 0.120 0.150 -0.003 0.031 
Association membership -0.119 -0.149 0.058 -0.039 
Program support ( village level) -0.110 -0.135 -0.367** -0.044 
(v) Perception related factors      
Perceive benefits of B. terraces    0.343*  
Constant  -3.939*** -3.728*** -0.223 -0.675*** 
Regression siagnostics      
Wald Chi-square  151.22 357.22  
Probability > 2χ /Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-square / R-Square  0.21  0.242 
LR -449.97 -933.87  
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/athrho  -0.404*  
Sample size (n) 904 895 
 
859 
Replications (Boot )  97 100  
* P  0.1, ** P 0.05, *** P 0.01 ; 1: Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit of Eq.(1) and Eq.(3) 
 
Geophysical characteristics associated with erosion risks, such as slope steepness, high 
or moderate potential soil erosion, altitude, plot size, and distance between the plot and 
the homestead, are important in the design and adoption of soil conservation measures 
such as bench terraces. The gentle and steep slope parameters are important factors 
explaining in adoption – significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Soil erosion 
might occur on plots within one slope category or another; however, the presence of 
different erosion rates needs serious consideration of protecting the land through bench 
terraces and other less erosive forms of land use (Clay et al., 1998). Plots with gentle 
slopes are generally not appropriate for bench terraces. However, due to food-for-work 
or cash-for-work incentives used by some of SWC interventions in the study area in the 
past, some plots with gentle slopes were bench terraced while they were meant for 
alternative and less costly SWC techniques such as progressive terraces. This recalls the 
need for sufficient consideration of technical aspects during SWC interventions. The 
negative sign of high and moderate erosion potentials is probably due to the fact that 
these erosion levels are associated to unterraced plots (i.e. endogenous variable) and that 
they are more associated with the decision about future adoption (Eq.(3)) rather than 
current adoption. This is verified in the subsequent estimation of future adoption.  
 
Altitude (m absl) is an important factor in the adoption of bench terraces (at the 1% 
level) – that is, households from villages/sub-cathments located in mountainous areas 
tend to suffer more from the threat of erosion than those in lowlands due to higher 
rainfall. Thus, there is a higher chance that they adopt bench terraces to counter potential 
soil erosion. It is also evident from the analysis that most of terraced plots are near the 
homestead. The estimated coefficient of the distance parameter is negative and 
significant, even at the 1% critical level. This can be supported by the fact that farmers 
prefer to cultivate plots that are close to their homes for easy transportation of fertilizers 
such as manure and household residues. Therefore, if a new technology is introduced, 
the plots close to the homestead are the most targeted by farmers, all else being equal. It 
is also clear from the analysis that the larger the plot, the more likely farmers are to 
integrate bench terraces in their farming (significant at the 5% level). In other words, 
farmers who adopted bench terraces have relatively large plots. Fixed infrastructures such 
as bench terraces are associated with different investment risks, which make smaller 
farmers reluctant to adopt, especially when profit levels are unclear in the first phase of 
technology adoption (Clay et al., 1998).  
 
Some of the institutional and social capital characteristics hypothesized to explain the 
adoption of bench terraces include collective action, land tenure security, association 
membership, and programme support. Only collective action affects significantly the 
current adoption of bench terraces at the 1% level. Different types of labour were used 
to construct bench terraces in Rwanda. These comprise labour paid by SWC programmes 
through food or cash for work, own labour, hired labour, prisoner’s labour within the 
current TIG programme, and collective labour mobilized by farmers themselves through 
various social arrangement (e.g. mutual assistance) or via small associations. In many 
cases of soil conservation with intensive labour inputs, farmers use the potential of their 
social capital to address many of the economic constraints, including labour. As also 
observed in the Machakos district in Kenya (Nyangena, 2008), farmers in the study area 
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take turns developing bench terraces on their own plots. While controlling for other 
factors, the availability of such social arrangements represents alternative assets that can 
have positive effects on farmers’ decisions to adopt terraces on their private lands.  
Unexpectedly, programme support is negative and not significant, making it not an 
easy parameter to explain. It is possible that the majority of terraced plots (about 65%) 
are from sectors that did not receive support from World Vision International, which 
might explain the negative association between adoption of bench terraces and 
programme support.  
  
6.5.2  Farmer’s capacity to invest in bench terraces  
Previous studies on adoption, as prominently reviewed by Feder et al. (1985) and 
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007), sustain that household characteristics (e.g. age, family 
size, farm size, education) do not explain regularly farmers’ adoption decisions. While 
keeping constant the context and the approach used to introduce a new conservation 
technology, these factors show more an indirect link with adoption than a direct one. 
Typically, these characteristics affect other people’s economic outcomes such as income, 
which, in turn, can affect directly the decision to adopt. Consistent with the analysis 
(Table 2.1), most of these characteristics do not explain significantly the decision to 
adopt bench terraces. In this analysis, socioeconomic household characteristics are 
hypothesized to affect future adoption via farmers’ income (proxy for farmers’ capacity 
to invest), among others. The assumption of the indirect links with future adoption was 
the reason why they were not included initially in equations (3) and (5). Here, the interest 
is to obtain estimates of socioeconomic factors that explain the capacity to invest in 
terraces (Eq.(2)). In turn, the effect of farmers’ capacity to invest on future adoption is 
assessed (Eq.(3)).  
Factors expected to influence the capacity to invest include cash flow, experience, 
family size, available labour, farm size, essential skills measured by formal and informal 
education, livestock, off-farm income, and other family resources (Gebremedhin and 
Swinton, 2003; Shiferaw et al., 2009). Per capita family income (from agriculture) is used 
as a proxy for farmers’ capacity to invest. Across the OLS and the 2SLS estimations, 
female head, total livestock units (TLU), and off-farm income explain consistently and 
significantly farmers’ capacity to invest in terraces (at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). On 
the other hand, family size, farm size, head’s formal and informal education, and available 
labour seem to be important only when the 2SLS technique is applied to assess the whole 
system of equations together under option (3).  
Female head and family size have negative and significant influences on farmers’ 
capacity to invest when measured by per capita family income. The negative effect of 
female head suggests that households headed by a female are likely to have lower income 
compared to those with male heads. This is consistent with the literature that in most 
developing countries like Rwanda, men have more off-farm opportunities than women, 
thus increasing the household income compared to female-headed households. In 
addition, family size is regarded in adoption researches as a measure for labour 
availability or the need to feed more people (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Bizoza et 
al., 2007). In this study’s context, it is viewed as the need to feed more people. Rwanda 
has a large family size of about six children (2007 baseline). Also, a high family 
dependency rate of 37% (SD=0.24) can be observed within the study population. 
Looking at the results, this would imply, ceteris paribus, that the more children a family has 
to feed, the more the capacity to invest is negatively affected.  
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Table 2.2.  
Coefficient values of farmers’ capacity to invest in and future adoption of bench terraces 
 
Estimation option  OLS (1.2) 2SProbit 
ML (a) 
2SProbit 
(b) 
2SProbit 
(c) 
Classical 2SLS 
Variables/ Equation (number )  Eq.(2) Equ. (3) Eq.(3) Equ.(5) Equ. (2) Eq. (3) 
(i) Endogenous variables       
Adoption (dummy) 0.169* 1.803** 0.438*** 2.22*** 0.002 0.42* 
Farmer’s capacity to invest  0.207 0.251* -0.008  0.085*** 
(ii) Socioeconomic characteristics      
Female head -0.277*    -0.297***  
Age of head -0.022    -0.022  
Age of the head (squared) 0.0002    0.0002  
Family size -0.066    -0.061**  
Available labour  0.1264    0.1268***  
Farm size 0.0005    0.0005***  
Head’s informal education  0.194     0.207**  
Head’s formal education (years) 0.018    0.018  
Total livestock units (TLU) 0.401***    0.403***  
Off-farm income  6.90E-07***    6.70E-07***  
(iii) Geophysical characteristics      
Steep slope  0.027 0.123 0.046  0.041 
Very steep slope  0.903** 0.732** 1.168***  0.2167** 
High erosion potential  0.354* -0.126 0.392*  0.128* 
Moderate erosion potential  0.121 0.037 0.128  0.045 
Altitude (m absl)  -0.0009 0.0001 -0.001*  -0.001 
Distance (walking minutes)  0.021*** 0.015** 0.022***  0.005**** 
Ln Plot size  -0.079 -0.075 -0.084  -0.031* 
(iv) Institutional factors       
Collective action (farmers)  -0.146 0.723** -0.403  -0.062 
Land tenure security  -0.005 -0.041 0.012  0.034 
Association membership  0.0513 -0.055 0.104  -0.004 
Program support   -0.360** -0.416 -0.405**  -0.112*** 
(v) Perception factors       
Benefits of terraces   0.362** 0.355** 0.373**  0.094*** 
Constant  10.912*** -0.668 -2.372 -2.00 10.941*** 0.144 
Regression diagnostics        
Wald Chi-square   58.70 64.28 64.28   
Probability > 2χ /Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-square / R-Square  0.264 0.115 0.1203 0.1203 0.2608 -0.0106 
LR  -495.17 -4792.96 -4792.96   
Sample size ( n) 860 895 896 896 859 859 
Replications (Boot)  100 94 90 84 100 100 
Notes: * P  0.1, ** P 0.05, *** P 0.01  
(a) Two-stage probit ML of future adoption (Eq.(3)) with first-stage estimates of Eq. (1) and (2) under option (1)  
(b) Two-stage probit ML of future adoption (Eq.(3)) with first-stage OLS estimates of Eq.(2) under option (1)  
(c ) Two-Stage probit ML of future adoption (Equ.(5)) with first-stage probit ML of Eq. (1) under option (2).  
 
 
The positive and significant coefficient of the endogenous dummy adoption variable in 
equation (2) suggests that current per capita household income is to some extent affected 
by prior adoption of bench terraces. However, no robust evidence exists that early 
adoption affects farmers’ capacity to invest. Relying on the estimate of dummy adoption, 
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it can be concluded that the farmers who adopted terraces in the past have higher and 
significant differential incomes than non-adopters (at the 10% level). The extent to which 
bench terraces contribute to household income needs further investigation; this lies 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 6.5.3  Future adoption of bench terraces 
 
At this stage, the assumption is tested that current adoption and farmers’ capacity to 
invest in inputs affect future adoption of bench terraces. Also, factors related to 
geophysical, institutional, and perceived benefits of bench terraces are identified to 
explain future adoption. Some of the geophysical and institutional factors specified for 
future adoption (Eq.(3)) are the same as for current adoption (Eq.(1)). However, the 
scale and the direction of their impacts can be different from the other two equations.  
It is interesting to note (see Table 2.2) that farmers with very steep plots are willing to 
adopt bench terraces in the future (significant even at the 1% level). Land scarcity is 
evident in Rwanda. As a result, marginal and very steep lands are now being cultivated by 
farmers. This is likely to accelerate agricultural erosion due to soil run-off (Lewis and 
Clay, 1990). For these very steep lands to be cultivated, they need to be terraced for two 
reasons: to increase agricultural production and to counter soil erosion. Likewise, plots 
located in areas with high erosion potential have a positive and significant association (at 
the 10% level) with future adoption of bench terraces. This is consistent with the theory 
that farmers who live on steep lands, like in Rwanda and elsewhere in the tropics, are 
likely to face more soil erosion effects and hence will adopt SWC measures such as bench 
or stone terraces. Farmers in lowlands face relatively less erosion and can use alternative 
techniques such as slow-forming terraces and other endogenous soil erosion control 
measures. 
 
Distance from plot to home appears to have a positive and significant impact on 
future adoption (at the 1% level), unlike in the adoption equation (Eq.(1)). It implies that 
even plots in areas remote from the homestead will be terraced in the future. Among 
other things, this is due to increased concern for soil erosion problems, land scarcity 
forcing the cultivation of plots isolated from home, and famers’ perception of the 
benefits of bench terraces. Descriptive statistics support the thesis that farmers are well 
aware of the benefits of bench terraces, in the sense that they increase production or 
have positive effects on production (85.3%), that they are effective for soil erosion 
control (90.6%), and that they increase soil fertility (56.2%). This awareness has been 
documented in the literature as conditional adoption (Saha et al., 1994; Dimara and 
Skuras, 2003). Results from regression analysis echo the descriptives that perceived 
benefits justify farmers’ willingness to develop new bench terraces in the future 
(significant at the 5% and 1% levels).  
  
The unexpected negative impact of programme support on future adoption is difficult 
to explain (significant even at the 1% level). It was expected that sectors receiving SWC 
support would be willing to choose more terracing than not supported ones, all else 
being equal. The analysis reveals that the more farmers receive support from SWC 
programmes, the less they are willing to construct new terraces without SWC support. 
This is perhaps due to the dependency mentality as a result from past SWC interventions, 
which used incentives for terrace construction in individual or public plots throughout 
Rwanda. Consequently, some farmers tend to believe that terracing is a social good to 
justify public intervention rather than individual investment. Second, farmers in sectors 
that received support previously are less likely to receive more support for terrace 
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construction in the future. Furthermore, the negative impact of support programmes on 
the future adoption of bench terraces may have been caused by the fact most suitable 
plots in supported sectors have been terraced already. Earlier studies also maintain that a 
combination of material incentives and direct public involvement in constructing SWC 
structures on private land undermines the individual motivation for private investment in 
soil conservation and may result to abandonment once the incentives are withdrawn 
(Bunch, 1999; Winters et al., 2004; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). However, further 
research is needed on how public and private investments in SWC work out in Rwanda.  
 
Predicted farmers’ capacity to invest (from OLS estimates of Eq.(2)) and the prior 
adoption dummy were calculated by altering the specification of Eq.(3). Out of four 
alterations, two-step probit ML and classic 2SLS estimates show that predicted farmers’ 
capacity to invest has a positive and significant impact on future adoption (at the 10% 
and 1% levels, respectively). This applies when Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) are estimated together 
using two-step probit ML and when the whole system (Eq.(1) to Eq.(3)) is estimated by 
the 2SLS method. Prior adoption measured by a dummy (option b) and as a predicted 
variable (options (a) and (c)) is statistically significant (at the 5% and 1% levels) in the 
four alterations (see Table 2.2). In addition, these results support the thesis that 
explanatory variables specified for farmers’ capacity to invest have an indirect and 
significant effect on the future adoption of bench terraces (at the 10% and 1% levels). 
Again, these findings verify the assumption made in this paper that farmers’ capacity to 
invest and early adoption are important factors explaining future adoption, all else being 
equal. Their marginal effects (sample mean=0.7099) are found to be statistically 
significant at the 10% and 1% levels , respectively. They help to put into perspective the 
marginal effects of farmers’ capacity to invest ( =dxdy / 0.0859) and early adoption 
( =dxdy / 0.1415) on the future adoption of conservation agriculture in the highlands in 
Rwanda.   
 
The results presented in this paper shed light on the question whether farmers are 
willing to construct more or adopt new terraces beyond current adoption and after 
extensive SWC programme interventions. The response lies, among others, in the farmers’ 
capacity to invest not only in the development of new terraces but also to supply other 
necessary inputs required to use on existing and new terraces. Also, the results show that 
farmers are willing to construct more terraces but that this is restrained probably by their 
inability to invest in complementary inputs as well as in terraces. Survey results confirm 
that farmers are aware of soil erosion as a problem and of the potential benefits of bench 
terraces. However, the challenge remains the capacity to invest in order to optimize this 
knowledge. From these findings, one can conclude that farmers’ perceptions of soil 
erosion as a problem and of the benefits of bench terraces are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for future adoption of the same technique. Farmer’s capacity to 
invest in existing or new terraces fulfils both the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
future adoption. Improving farmers’ incomes and hence their capacity to invest should 
receive particular interest for further interventions in conservation agriculture and for the 
overall development of farming systems in Rwanda. 
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6.6  Conclusions 
 
Recent studies show the need for a dynamic analysis of technology adoption rather 
than the usual static procedure. This paper went beyond the adoption decision model 
and investigate whether farmers are willing to adopt new bench terraces in Northern and 
Southern Rwanda. A three-stage analysis was used to estimate the current and future 
adoption decisions of bench terraces and farmers’ capacity to invest in bench terraces. 
Unlike previous studies that modelled farmers’ decisions to adopt bench terraces on 
those who had already adopted, here continued adoption of bench terraces was 
‘unpacked’ to consider both adopters willing to increase the use of already constructed 
terraces and non-adopters willing to develop new terraces. The analysis focused on 
whether farmers would adopt bench terraces conditional upon their capacity to invest in 
complementary inputs and upon early adoption of bench terraces elsewhere in their 
respective villages.  
 
Major findings of the analysis sustained the thesis that future adoption of bench 
terraces in the highlands of Rwanda depends on farmers’ capacity to invest in, early 
adoption of, and perceived benefits of bench terraces. Consistent with many other 
studies in the literature, the analysis supported the theory that farmers’ capacity to invest 
represents a long-term perspective on soil conservation and should receive attention 
when technologies are being introduced for conservation agriculture. Both early adopters 
and non-adopters of bench terraces are willing to adopt more or new bench terraces. A 
possible explanation for this lies in the perceived benefits of bench terraces as they have 
a  positive and important impact on future adoption. In other words, these perceived 
benefits justify why farmers are willing to take up more or new bench terraces in the 
research area, all else being equal.  
  
In accordance with previous studies, a second empirical result was that some 
socioeconomic, geophysical, and institutional factors determine current and future 
adoption. Female head of household and head’s informal education are important 
socioeconomic factors to explain observed adoption of bench terraces (Eq.(1)). 
Important geophysical factors estimated include gradient/slope, potential erosion levels, 
altitude, distance, and plot size. These factors had significant effects on both current and 
future adoption decisions but with different magnitudes and directions of their respective 
effects, depending on altered specifications of future adoption (Eq.(3)). Again, among 
institutional factors specified, collective action seemed to have an important effect on the 
adoption of bench terraces. This implies that some farmers adopted bench terraces 
because they were able to mobilize labour due to involvement in labour pooling within 
different social arrangements. In combination with perceived benefits of bench terraces, 
it can facilitate farmers to address labour needs in the construction of future terraces.  
Finally, the analysis showed that farmers are willing to take up new terraces (19% of 
late adopters). However, their capacity to invest in inputs required to use and construct 
new terraces is a key constraint on the materialization of said willingness. In view of the 
above, this paper recommends that particular attention should be focused on how to 
improve farmers’ capacity to invest in inputs for sustained interventions in soil and water 
conservation. If this is ensured, farmers will achieve both goals of soil erosion control 
and increased agricultural production as well as improve current farming systems in 
Rwanda. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis has dealt with questions related to soil and water conservation issues in 
Rwanda. The main objective was to increase the understanding of the complexity of soil 
erosion problems with a specific focus on how farmers and a variety of institutions affect 
the adoption and effectiveness of soil and water conservation measures in Rwanda.  
This final chapter aims to bring the conclusions of the various chapters together in an 
attempt to draw some main conclusions with which to seek active engagement with 
policy-makers.  
 
7.2 Discussion of key results and conclusions  
 
Major results are summarized and discussed with reference to each of the four specific 
question(s) raised in the introductory Chapter 1.  
 
SWC measures that have been used and the processes of their implementation in Rwanda  
 
The first specific question was addressed in Chapter 2 of this thesis and states: what 
soil erosion control measures have been used from the pre-colonial era to the 
independent state in Rwanda? There is evidence that soil erosion had been recognized as 
a problem among both political authorities and farmers during the pre-colonial period 
and during the early colonial period. Since then, soil conservation measures have been 
applied over time and under different government regimes. In pre-colonial times, SWC 
measures consisted primarily of inyanamo (strip-cropping), meant to create some space 
between cultivated areas as fallow, and rudumburi (stone rows), used to protect the land 
from ‘run-off’ (fluvial erosion). However, implementation of these techniques was rather 
small in scale. Later on, during the colonial era, the German and Belgian administrations 
introduced and enforced a number of SWC techniques and regulations. These included 
construction of hedgerows, keeping spaces between farms for movement of livestock, 
digging of trenches in combination with hedgerows, and planting exogenous tree species 
such as eucalyptus. Farmers and technicians contested, destroyed, and abandoned some 
of these techniques as they were imposed alongside fines and imprisonment for non-
adopters. The abandonment of these techniques by farmers was interpreted as an 
expression of regained freedom lost earlier at the hands of the colonial powers. Clearly, 
these top-down and coerced measures forced farmers to participate and did not give 
them space to appreciate potential and respective benefits (and costs) of each technique 
in order to decide whether or not they would want to adopt them. Later on again, in the 
era of independent government, the only new SWC measures were new hedge varieties 
(both for mulching and as fodder for livestock), agroforestry species, and bench terraces. 
After the 1994 war and genocide, the government enforced the construction of more 
terraces through various political and development policies such as the performance 
contract (Imihigo) and the ‘model hill’ (Agasozi Ndatwa), detailed in Chapter (3).  
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The colonial and post-colonial states implemented large-scale investments through 
mostly imported measures such as bench terraces for soil erosion control. Despite past 
and ongoing efforts of the state to promote imported and modern SWC techniques, 
farmers may still use indigenous SWC techniques. These indigenous measures were tried 
either inadequately or not at all before introducing the above-mentioned structural 
measures ( Hurn et al., 2008). However, these have been documented hardly at all in the 
literature; this constitutes a potential area for further research.  
In the history of soil erosion control, population pressure and land tenure have been 
regarded to be important development challenges to have shaped SWC interventions in 
Rwanda. Nevertheless, concern was more about soil erosion control than about finding 
connections with population control and security of land tenure. It is concluded that a 
‘big family’ on a ‘fixed’ piece of land are two conflicting believes that restrain land 
conservation and management in Rwanda. In order to escape this doom scenario, it is 
suggested that more efforts are put into diversifying the rural economy towards social 
and economic development in Rwanda.  
 
Farmer participation, role of farmer organizations, and effectiveness of SWC measures 
 
The objective in Chapter 3 was to respond to the second specific question: how do 
farmers participate in soil conservation and how do state–farmer relationships affect soil 
conservation strategies in Northern and Southern Rwanda?  
In soil conservation, farmer participation is usually measured by participation in the 
SWC programme in terms of whether or not incentives and services have been received, 
and also in the sense of supplying labour and land to easy SWC interventions. In this 
study, farmer participation was examined via their ‘decision-share’ during the design and 
implementation of SWC measures in Rwanda. Specifically, it was assessed whether 
farmers were involved in the decision-making process with respect to soil and water 
conservation measures. Bench terrace construction served as reference to inform who 
decides ‘when and where’ to construct terraces in the study area. Various actors involved 
in soil erosion control were pre-listed and pre-coded during the focus-group discussion 
and subsequently in the large farm survey: farmers themselves, their organizations, local 
leaders, and extension officials. 
Results showed that farmers play a marginal role in the decision ‘when’ and ‘where’ to 
establish terraces within their respective communities. Their participation involved 
mainly consultation about and self-mobilization in SWC measures. Development 
officials, including local leaders, still played a major role in the planning and 
implementation of SWC measures in the study area. Lower levels of decision-share of 
farmers has implications for ownership and sustainability of SWC measures in Rwanda. 
The more the government and NGOs are involved in terrace construction, the more 
farmers’ roles are evicted and hence the less responsible they will feel for terrace 
maintenance. Some experiences from Jamaica, Ethiopia, and Kenya show that farmers 
justified their resistance to maintain built terraces by arguing that it was government 
money that had built them, so it should be the same government money that should 
maintain them (Blustain, 1985: 128). It remains a challenge to come up with a 
development approach(es) that can sufficiently involve farmers (users) from the early 
stages of implementation of SWC measures. This could allow them to view established 
SWC structures not as societal goods but as their own structures, which they need to 
maintain and to effectively use for more years. This could also eventually reduce the 
direct role of local leaders, extension officials and, hence, of the state in soil conservation 
on private lands.  
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In the last 30 years, small-scale farmer organizations have been regarded as major local 
institutions through which farmers deal with their day-to-day needs. Farmers join their 
associations in order to access some of the resources needed and to share agricultural 
implements (Nyangena, 2008). Diverse social capital constituents such as ‘mutual 
assistance’ ( known as gufashanya in Kinyarwanda) and ‘group or collective action’ emerge 
from these farmer organizations to serve the commons. For instance, during the building 
of terraces, the farmer associations facilitate collective pooling and sharing of labour with 
individual farmers to construct and to ensure (to some extent) management of common 
or public terraced plots. These collective actions backed by the ‘mutual support spirit’ 
allowed some households to construct and maintain terraces on their individual plots in 
the study area. These results support the thesis that farmers may deploy alternatives to 
address labour constraints in terrace construction. However, lack of liquidity to supply 
complementary material inputs to maintain and to continue to use terraced plots is 
reported and remains one of the main challenges to confront in their farming strategies. 
 
Farmer organizations and their institutions co-operate with other government-led 
institutions and policies. Results of this thesis (see Chapter 3) revealed great political 
skills to crafting institutions from the traditional Rwandan forms of organization in order 
to facilitate state–farmer relationships in achieving different development goals. Policies 
such as Umuganda, Imihigo, Ubudehe, and Agasozi Ndatwa are drawn from traditional 
Rwandan society and are adapted to address contemporary soil erosion issues, among 
other development challenges. The core part of such an institutionalization process is to 
encourage the ideas of collective action, mutual assistance, and a mentality of self-reliance 
in tune with the spirit of competition and competitiveness. Earlier SWC interventions, 
especially those that used food for work under USAID support, misguided farmers in the 
sense that they created the dependency mentality through the use of material incentives 
and other short-term support. The ‘self-reliance mentality’ is, therefore, being re-
engineered by the government through such institutions to address various development 
challenges and to guarantee long-term and self-sustained agriculture development in 
Rwanda.  
 
Farmers’ perceptions about the technical effectiveness of terraces made before and 
after 2006 have been investigated too. Results substantiated that terraces made before 
2006 suffered technical shortfalls. Most of these terraces were constructed collectively 
using food-for-work and cash-for-work incentives. Farmers involved in terracing public 
and private lands were primarily concerned with accomplishing the task and getting paid 
the food ratio or the amount of cash due. Less attention was paid to the technical 
standards required to constructing a terrace in some areas. As a result, soil nutrients of 
terraced plots were disturbed, explaining increased use of fertilizers to regain soil fertility 
and some plots being abandoned or not used fully by farmers. In a situation of extensive 
use of subsidies and other material incentives to conserve soils, Blustain (1985) points 
out that farmers view their participation primarily in terms of immediate cash rewards 
rather than long-term resource conservation benefits.  
In contrast, bench terraces constructed after 2006 were perceived to be technically well 
made. The reason being that these were developed after cognizance of some technical 
principles that were not much considered by farmers in the past: saving nutrient soils and 
spreading them following the terrace lay-out, better construction and grassing of terrace 
risers, and the details of spacing a terrace – all of which depended on the steepness of the 
plot (see also Chapter 4 for soil suitability). These findings highlighted the need of farmer 
training before and during collective soil conservation so that future maintenance and 
user costs can be avoided or reduced (Anderson and Thampapillai, 1990).  
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Findings in this thesis also supported the customary knowledge that programme 
support is not evenly distributed within the study area (Bingen and Munyankusi, 2002). 
Farmers in remote areas received less support compared to those bordering the town or 
district administrations. It reflects some geographical biases of programme intervention 
in soil conservation. In addition, this support ‘basket’ contained more about payment of 
labour for terrace construction. The supply of credits to acquire agricultural inputs and to 
market crops received fewer attention, while farmers claimed this to be the main 
restraining factor to terrace adoption and to their faming activities. 
 
Financial returns of bench terraces  
 
Do farmers with bench terraces receive higher investment returns from cultivating 
plots compared to those with slowly forming terraces or plots with no terraces at all? 
This question was addressed in Chapter 4. Terraces may reduce soil erosion and increase 
production but they should also provide sufficient financial gains at the farm level. Little 
is known about the attention paid to the suitability of the soils and to the eventual 
financial profitability of bench terraces for farmers in Rwanda. Descriptive analysis in 
this study showed that farmers were aware that the benefits of bench terraces were 
increased productivity (85.3 per cent), increased soil fertility (56.2 per cent), and effective 
for soil erosion (90.6 per cent). However, this was not sufficient to explain effectiveness 
of bench terraces from the farmers’ perspective. Financial returns of bench terraces were 
hypothesized to impact the adoption and the maintenance of terraces by farmers.  
Plot-level financial cost–benefit analysis (CBA) was used to examine under which 
social and economic conditions bench terraces are financially viable in Northern and 
Southern Rwanda. The analysis focused on the most common cultivation: potatoes as the 
dominant cash and subsistence food crop in the research area. A plot-level CBA 
compared two cases: subsidized bench terraces (SBT) and non-subsidized bench terraces 
(NSBT) as the ‘with’ case and non-terraced plots as the ‘without’ case. Results showed 
that SBT are not profitable when market prices are applied. The NPV was negative (–
47384 Frw)8 and the IRR (11 per cent) was lower than the discount rate of 13 per cent. A 
possible explanation is that subsidized households have a (too) large plot size but do not 
use it fully due to a lack of liquidity, among others. In contrast, the NSBT seemed to be 
just about profitable when considering both the positive NPV (27959 Frw) and the IRR 
(14 per cent) criteria. 
Labour and manure form major parts of the operating costs and their markets are also 
imperfect. The formal price of labour and the market price of manure are relatively high. 
Given that the labour and manure used are from the family and their farms, an 
opportunity cost of 50 per cent of the market value was alternatively applied. When this 
option was considered, SBT were financially viable, with an IRR of 25 percent. Positive 
NPVs and IRRs higher than the discount rate (13 per cent) were observed for NSBT, 
even with no opportunity cost for labour and manure. It is, therefore, concluded that 
bench terracing can be a financially viable option for soil and water conservation, when 
either costs of labour and manure can be reduced or more intensive use can be made of 
the terraces. Profitability explains, in turn, the likelihood of continued use of bench 
terraces beyond SWC interventions in Rwanda. Furthermore, it is concluded that 
adoption of terraces is necessarily but not sufficiently explained by its profitability in the 
study area (Lutz et al., 1994). Anderson and Thampapillai (1990) arrived at a similar 
conclusion that projects and other interventions in soil conservation should be justified 
by being both ecologically sound and economically viable. The challenge for policy 
                                                 
8 1 US$ equals an average 550 Rwandan Francs  
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intervention is to pay attention not only to soil erosion control but also to the eventual 
financial profitability of established terraces. However, financial profitability does not 
provide the entire explanation of adoption and maintenance of bench terraces. Other 
factors may also contribute to this explanation (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
  
 The successful construction of terraces requires a good analysis of soil suitability. An 
attempt was made in this study to investigate on which soil types terraces were built, 
using farmers’ classifications of soil types (see details in section 4, Chapter 4). Results 
indicated that both bench terraces (33 per cent) and progressive terraces (35 per cent) 
were established mostly on Urunombe soils (Nitosols high in loam and clay) and found 
proportionally less on Mugugu soils (Ferralsols), with 19 per cent and 11 per cent of 
bench and progressive terraces, respectively. The effectiveness of terraces established on 
Urunombe soils depends mainly on the depth of the soils and whether the soils are (not 
too) compacted. In some situations, low permeability of these soils are vulnerable to a 
type of soil erosion known as isuri ya nyamurigita, which is observed by farmers and which 
has destroyed their terraced land. It brings about the need for sufficient technical 
guidance during terrace construction to lower maintenance costs. Unlike on Urunombe 
soils, the effectiveness of bench terraces established on plots with Mugugu soils 
(Ferralsols) will depend more on soil fertility and less on soil permeability. Considering 
relatively good drainage on Mugugu soils, crop performance on terraces can be explained 
by other factors, including subsequent use of fertilizers, farm management and, in 
particular, the inherent variation of physical and chemical soil properties (Kannan et al., 
2010; Siriri et al., 2005).  
  
Local institutions and adoption of bench terraces  
 
In Chapter 5, responded to question 4: Which factors explain current and future 
adoption of terraces in Northern and Southern Rwanda? The main point was to find out 
which institutional and geographical factors were relevant for explaining adoption of 
terraces in the research area. Two equations were constructed. The institutional variables 
identified for model estimation included tenure security and social capital measured in 
terms of trust, co-operation in collective action and membership of farmers’ 
associations/organizations. Echoing earlier work on adoption of agricultural technology, 
some geographical, farm and household, and plot-level variables explained adoption of 
bench terraces. The findings showed that farmers seemed to focus their terracing efforts 
on plots that were relatively large, steep and close to their homestead. Family size and 
informal education in terms of training and field visits did have significant impacts on the 
decision to invest in bench terraces.  
Furthermore, the impacts of different dimensions of social capital on the adoption of 
bench terraces was explored. It was found that trust and collective action had a positive 
and significant effect (at the 1 per cent level) on the adoption of bench terraces. Contrary 
to previous studies (e.g. Nyangena, 2008; Rezvanfar et al., 2009), membership of farmers’ 
associations/organizations had a negative and not significant association with bench 
terrace adoption. With these results, it was concluded that some dimensions of social 
capital (trust and collective action) were conducive to the adoption of bench terraces. 
None of the institutional variables explained adoption of progressive terraces. 
Empirical findings in Chapter 5 reflected that social and institutional arrangements 
were required more for establishing bench terraces than for progressive terraces. This 
suggests that the more a given technology is demanding in terms of labour inputs, the 
more farmers are likely to rely on reciprocal forms, such as sharing of labour and 
agricultural implements (Nyangena, 2008). In other parts of this thesis, it has been 
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indicated that many interventions in soil erosion control in Rwanda focused more on 
establishing soil and water conservation structures than on their subsequent use by 
farmers. Results from Chapter 5 echoed the qualitative insights obtained in Chapter 3 
that farmers can still support the establishment costs of bench terraces through social 
arrangements. Hence, further efforts from government organizations and NGOs should 
focus on the supply of material inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds needed for 
the subsequent use of established SWC structures. 
Tenure security did not explain adoption of either bench or progressive terraces. There 
is a general understanding in the literature that tenure security is necessary for 
investments in land conservation. However, results in this thesis showed that tenure 
security may not be a necessarily condition to soil conservation adoption because 
customary land rights are functioning well. About 80 per cent of survey respondents 
confirmed that they felt land secured. Therefore, land tenure security may depend on 
other factors, which, in turn, may impact on adoption of bench terraces. Therefore, it 
was suggested that better analysis of the impact of tenure security on investments in soil 
conservation in Rwanda is needed beyond the microanalysis that has guided past research 
on agriculture adoption.  
Typically, findings in this thesis support the growing scientific debate that local 
institutions matter in investments in soil and water conservation. However, not all forms 
of institutions are found relevant in the present case. Therefore, whether formal or 
traditional land rights are conducive to the adoption of soil conservation measures 
should be considered context specific and remains open to empirical debate in Rwanda.  
 
Adoption and farmers’ ability to invest in bench terraces  
 
Chapter 6 deals also with question 4: which factors affect farmers’ current and future 
decisions about adoption of bench terraces, focusing on their capacity to invest in inputs 
in Northern and Southern Rwanda? Farmers’ capacity to invest has been overlooked by 
some SWC interventions; however, it is an important long-term investment perspective 
(Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). It was argued that terracing that does not fit farmers’ 
capacity to invest in additional inputs may explain why some of the established terraces 
in the study area are not maintained and used effectively by farmers. The literature on 
adoption and continued use of conservation agriculture was expanded by ‘unpacking’ the 
adoption process of bench terraces in Rwanda. Different econometric models were 
applied to analyse the adoption of bench terraces in a three-stage procedure. Both data 
from household and plot levels were used to estimate a system of three equations (see 
Chapter 6). 
 The empirical results supported that some geophysical, socioeconomic, and 
institutional factors determine current and future adoption of bench terraces. Farmers’ 
capacity to invest was determined by socioeconomic factors, which in turn had an 
indirect effect on future adoption. The size and the direction of specified vector variables 
in all equations differed from one specification to another. Female head and head’s 
informal education were important socioeconomic factors explaining the current 
adoption of bench terraces in the study area. Head’s informal education was a more 
important estimated factor to adoption (significant at the 5 per cent level) than head’s 
formal education in the study area. If new soil conservation technologies are to be 
introduced and to call for farmers’ decisions to adopt, then informal education should 
receive extra attention before and during technology performance. This can be translated 
into field experiments/visits and other training approaches as is well documented in the 
existing literature on technology adoption and diffusion. 
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Another keyed result was the relative significant impact of social capital in terms of 
trust and collective action in the construction of bench terraces (significant at the 1 per 
cent level). The analysis showed that some farmers adopted bench terraces because of 
labour pooling through social arrangements made it easier to construct terraces on their 
private plots. This validated empirically the qualitative effect of ‘mutual assistance’ on 
terrace adoption maintained in Chapters 3 and 5: collective action constitutes an 
important feature of social capital, which substitutes the sometimes unaffordable costs of 
labour and the absence of credits for soil erosion control using terraces. Future 
interventions in soil conservation by government organizations and NGOs based on 
these farmer-led collective actions can decrease soil erosion. However, the challenge 
ahead that needs further investigation is how this ‘collectiveness’ can be maintained in a 
society where labour is being commoditized or monetized. In other words, these 
collective actions will persist only in certain conducive contexts such as the ongoing 
institutionalization process (detailed in Chapter 3) or in a situation of imperfect and/or 
less-developed labour markets. 
Positive and significant effects of distance to and very steep slopes of the plot are two 
geophysical factors that need closer attention in future land conservation. What these 
findings imply is that, due in part to scarce land resources, farmers will possibly construct 
terraces even on remote and very steep plots, which were deemed not suitable for bench 
terrace construction previously (Siriri et al., 2005). Hence, increased soil erosion effects 
are to be felt more than before if no extra measures become available. These results point 
to the need for strategies to increase crop production on available land and to terrace 
lands that are appropriate. Marginal and steeper lands can serve other purposes, such as 
tree plantation. 
 
Finally, farmers in the study area have the intention to use existing and new bench 
terraces in the future. However, their inability to secure complementary inputs for 
existing and new terraces may explain a disinclination for future adoption of soil 
conservation in Rwanda. The same inability explains possibly why some of the terraced 
plots are not used in full by farmers, which has negative effects for both soils and crop 
yields. Due to the perceived benefits of bench terraces observed among farmers 
(significant at the 5 per cent level) and their experiences in soil erosion control using 
terraces, farmers require sufficient resources to optimize such knowledge to continue use 
and future adoption of SWC measures in Rwanda. Future interventions in soil 
conservation should, therefore, pay closer attention to how to improve farmers’ capacity 
to invest in terraces as well as to their farming activities.  
 
General conclusions  
 
Overall, this thesis has increased the understanding of the complexity of soil erosion 
problems and how farmers and a variety of institutions affect the adoption and 
effectiveness of soil and water conservation measures in Rwanda. The vast majority of 
past and current studies hypothesized that socioeconomic, geophysical, and institutional 
factors affect adoption of soil and water conservation practices. However, this thesis 
concludes that in most developing countries, including Rwanda, the decision to adopt 
soil and water conservation measures is mostly an outcome of the state–farmer 
relationships. Similar to earlier studies, it is concluded that local institutions such as social 
capital affect the decision to adopt SWC measures. However, these local institutions are 
not empowered enough to ensure long-term sustainability of established SWC measures.  
Bench terraces are promoted for soil erosion control through policy. However, they 
are expected to be more ecologically effective than economically profitable. Returns on 
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established bench terraces are still too low to allow further investments in terraces by 
farmers themselves. Subsequent measures to allow farmers to use their terraced plots in 
full should include compulsory conditions to ensure that bench terraces are beneficial 
from both public and private perspectives. 
Typically, perception of soil erosion as a problem, the decision to use soil erosion 
control practices, and soil conservation efforts are the major components of the 
decision-making process to adopt soil conservation measures (Ervin and Ervin, 1982). 
Evidence from this thesis showed that farmers can be aware of soil erosion as a problem 
and still not adopt soil conservation practices. Again, they can also adopt soil 
conservation structures but not use them effectively due mainly to their inability to 
supply additional material and required labour inputs. Therefore, future interventions by 
government organizations and NGOs should focus on how to improve farmers’ capacity 
to invest and empower local institutions for sustainable land conservation in Rwanda. 
 
In all the above, approaches to land conservation in Rwanda have shifted from top-
down to some form of participation. The decision to adopt soil conservation measures is 
not solely the result of an individual decision-making process but also the result of the 
role played by the state and the room for maneouvre of local-level institutions. In 
addition, less attention is paid to the financial profitability of bench terraces when 
introduced by government and NGOs in Rwanda. If introduced terraces are not 
profitable at the farm level, this may discourage further adoption and possibly the 
abandonment of established terraces. Hence, more erosion is likely to occur, possibly 
followed by more soil erosion effects such as declining soil fertility and reduced 
production. Incentives such as input subsidies, if well tailored, can allow established 
bench terraces to reduce soil erosion effects while providing better economic returns. In 
addition, the decision whether or not to adopt soil and water conservation practices such 
as bench terraces is more than simply a one of acceptance. The capacity to invest in the 
subsequent use of established measures and to ensure long-term sustainability through 
empowering local-level institutions are part of the adoption process.  
Therefore, the results of this study may contribute to the overall debate of land 
conservation in developing countries. In addition, the institutional and socioeconomic 
perspective opted in this study may increase the understanding of soil and water 
conservation issues in Rwanda.  
 
7.3 Some reflections on perspectives and approaches to land conservation  
 
The role of the state, farmer participation, incentives, and institutions are major topics  
drawn from the perspectives and approaches to land degradation and conservation 
introduced in Chapter 1. These were relevant to develop the understanding of the 
complexity of the soil erosion problem and of how farmers and various forms of 
institutions affect the adoption and effectiveness of SWC measures in Rwanda.  
The role of the state was found central in the environmental discourse about soil and 
water conservation issues in Rwanda. Even though populist and neo-liberal approaches 
argue for an anti-state position in land conservation, it has been difficult to dissociate the 
role of the state in rural development and environmental management in most 
developing countries. It will always be a challenge to do so as long as development 
interventions bear some externalities or off-site effects, which in turn require the state 
and its agents to secure public goods and social benefits. This does apply not only to 
Southern countries but also to Northern developing countries as well as to developed 
ones, although with different ‘clothing’ or ‘branding’.  
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 The concept of farmer participation was useful in coming to grips with the 
perceptions of farmers about their participation, the role of their organizations and 
institutions, and how state–farmer relationships affect strategies for soil and water 
conservation in Rwanda. Farmer participation draws from the populists who argue for 
bottom-up development approaches in contrast to the classical or top-down 
development approach. One of the challenging parts of this approach is the empirical 
measurement of the extent to which farmers participate; it often ends up to being more 
subjective. The Rwandan case-study shows a ‘hybrid’ development approach, especially 
in land conservation where both government and farmer organizations and local-level 
institutions coexist. The emerging government policies for rural development are 
designed by the state from traditional repertoires aimed to foster notions of collective 
action, reciprocity  and self-reliance. On the other hand, farmer-led institutions are found 
to be conducive to farmers’ investments in soil conservation through the construction of 
bench terraces  (Chapter 3 and 5). This gives an idea of how difficult it is to position the 
development approach opted for in Rwanda exclusively within the classical or populist 
development approaches. Instead, the important task is to understand how the approach 
functions in its historical contexts and whether expectations of the peasants from the 
government are met.  
 
Incentives and institutional arrangements to induce adoption of land conservation are 
the two concepts that drive the thesis of the neo-institutional economics paradigm. 
These two concepts were helpful in exploring the adoption process of soil and water 
conservation measures in Rwanda. Incentives such as food-for-work used by SWC 
projects and consequent institutional arrangements can induce farmers to adopt soil 
conservation, although for the wrong reasons. Some farmers adopted not for soil erosion 
control reasons but for these incentives rather than for the perceived benefits (incentives) 
such as increased production and income due to soil conservation and improved soil 
fertility. In such situations, the economist’s invisible hand of the market promoted by the 
neo-liberals does no longer play a role in allocating resources optimally (Blaikie, 2000). 
Also, the notion of institutional innovation remains uncertain, especially in situations 
where the roles of the state and of farmers in land conservation are linked.  
Overall, the findings of this study have brought to the fore that one-directional 
thinking of development approach(es) to land degradation and conservation deserves 
criticism. What is needed, rather, is a multiple and interdisciplinary approach that takes 
into account aspects and dimensions raised by the classical, populists, and neo-liberal 
approaches.  
 
7.4 Policy options  
 
In order to understand what soil and water conservation (SWC) issues emerge during 
the design, implementation and continued use of established SWC structures in Rwanda, 
one needs to put soil and water conservation within its socioeconomic and institutional 
contexts. Findings in this study pointed towards policy options for the future prospects 
of soil and water conservation in Rwanda. However, it is difficult to suggest (an) accurate 
policy option(s) in a country subjected to the following threefold development 
challenges: small per capita land size (sample estimate of 0.7 ha), declining soil fertility, 
and the highest population density in Africa (376 inhabitants per km2). In order to 
increase agricultural production and improve people’s livelihoods under such situations, 
further and careful development approaches are essential to modernize current farming 
systems, increase soil fertility, and respond to the ever-increasing population growth. 
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 Soil conservation has been regarded as part of the solution, shaping farmer strategies 
and project or policy interventions. Findings in Chapter 2 showed that more attention 
was given to soil erosion control per se than to the slowing population growth vis-à-vis 
the available land. This calls for development strategies on how to improve the land 
(effectively intensified land) and the overall farming system. If this is possible, then 
population pressure may be less problematic. Results from Chapter 2 and also from 
Chapter 3 underscored the marginal roles and lower farmer participation in the process 
of soil and water conservation in the past. The state represented by its agents (local-level 
leaders and extension officials) led mostly the planning and the implementation of SWC 
measures on both public and private lands. State–farmer relationships in soil 
conservation were facilitated by government policies, farmers’ organizations and other 
institutions. These results showed how terrace construction in Rwanda encompassed not 
only technical dimensions but also social and institutional ones. Now Rwanda needs a 
development strategy that induces an indirect role of the state and that enhances farmers’ 
capacity to innovate and adapt in response to soil erosion problems and other 
development challenges. The watershed development approach, as already initiated in 
some parts of the country, if well implemented, can promote soil conservation that is 
participatory and compatible to the socioeconomic conditions of farmers. This approach 
has been proven a better alternative in some cases such as India (Mafuka et al., 2005). 
Under this option, government will focus more on how to support farmer initiatives 
through demand-driven institutions and improved infrastructure in the rural area (e.g. 
market institutions, road connectivity, education and health facilities). Also, large-scale 
implementation of SWC measures leads often to off-site effects or to public goods that 
still require government intervention to some extent.  
 
The findings in Chapter 4 highlighted the need to consider both conservation benefits 
(reduced soil run-off and preserved water resources) and financial incentives of bench 
terraces. Results sustain that bench terraces can be financially profitable when either 
costs of labour and manure can be reduced or more intensive use is made of terraced 
plots. Non-use or ineffective use of terraced plots may result in negative effects. 
Terracing can reduce crop yields in the first years after construction if no extra fertilizers 
are used. Increased soil acidity is likely to occur on terraced plots when no better 
maintenance is ensured. For farmers to gain more benefits from bench terraces, 
government subsidies should be directed instead to the maintenance part of already 
established terraces. If well maintained, already constructed terraces can lead to the 
effective use of terraced plots and better financial returns will probably follow, all else 
being equal. This option contributes simultaneously to addressing land shortage and 
declining soil fertility. 
 The analysis in Chapter 4 showed also that some of terraces constructed earlier were 
destroyed due to a soil erosion type known as isuri ya nyamurigita. Agricultural 
mechanization is hardly applied in Rwanda. Terraces are hand built by farmers, difficult 
to replicate, and almost not renewable. Sufficient technical guidance during terrace 
construction and continued advice about maintenance can reduce user costs for 
generations to come. This advice is expected from the agronomists at sector levels whose 
roles are multiple rather than focusing solely on agriculture-related activities. This often 
justifies their excuses for insufficient extension service delivery to the farmers. If their 
tasks are reviewed by the government to solely focus on agriculture-related activities, this 
is likely to improve the quality of education and other extension services hypothesized in 
the literature (also supported by this thesis) to play an important role in soil conservation.  
 Results in Chapter 5 provided empirical evidence that local institutions such as social 
capital matter for the adoption of bench terraces in Rwanda. Co-operation in collective 
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labour is an important institution resulting from social arrangements. However, such 
local institutions are likely to be functional when they are well recognized by policy and 
other interventions in rural development in Rwanda. This needs closer attention from 
research and policy on how such local institutions can play their roles effectively and on 
the extent to which they can substitute direct interventions by government organizations 
and NGOs in soil and water conservation in Rwanda.  
 
The three-stage analysis of the adoption of bench terraces in Chapter 6 showed that 
the future adoption of bench terraces in the highlands of Rwanda depends significantly 
on farmers’ capacity to invest in complementary materials (e.g. lime, improved seeds, and 
fertilizers) and labour inputs. Most of terraces constructed in the past were developed 
within the context of project and policy support. Now subsidies used to construct these 
terraces are reduced or even non-existent in some places. The question remains whether 
an average farmer will be able to continue to use existing terraces and whether they will 
be able to construct new terraces on plots that need terraces? This is a long-term soil 
conservation issue.  
The thesis argued that farmers are willing to use and add new bench terraces. This will 
be possible if farmers’ financial capacity to invest in terraces is enhanced. The labour 
costs for terrace construction constitute a major part of investments in terraces. There is 
evidence from this thesis that farmers can still address these labour costs by collective 
actions fostered through social arrangements, their organizations, and by government 
policies that promote collectiveness (see Chapters 3 and 5). The main challenge ahead 
remains the effective use of developed terraces. Improving access to input credit would 
be an alternative option to empower farmers to use their terraced lands. On the other 
hand, lack of immediate financial returns from terraces explains less attractive bank 
investments in soil conservation. This is not unique to Rwanda but applies to other 
places as well. Again, banks that were created for the purpose of rural and agricultural 
development, such as Banque Populaire, are serving more other interests than those 
primarily meant for.  
This study’s findings pointed to an alternative source of credits, what farmers call 
‘Ikimina’, through which they lend and borrow money from each other. This prevents 
them from going to the bank or local money lenders who charge high interests. This 
farmer arrangement allows them to pay for inputs and other services. Then honesty, 
ubunyangamugayo or ubupfura, and the ‘mutual assistance spirit’, umutima wo gufashanya’, are 
collaterals. An alternative strategy would be to improve and support these farmer-based 
institutions in order for them to access credits to supply material inputs. If a better policy 
option is possible, then this can help to address the direct role of the state in soil 
conservation on private lands in the future. Also, farmers will gain confidence and react 
responsibly towards soil erosion conservation and overall agricultural development in 
Rwanda.  
 
Findings of this study also disclosed that, due to limited land sizes, there is a potential 
risk of terracing very steep plots that are inappropriate for terracing. Again, the existing 
land holdings are still under registration to secure formal land rights. Private land rights 
are regarded as favourable for land markets and for efficient investments in land. Yet, 
there is limited evidence from the literature that private land rights are conducive to 
investments in soil and water conservation measures in other developing countries. The 
land consolidation policy, if successful, can allow large-scale investments in land use and 
management. However, this is constrained by the dispersed nature of settlements, which, 
in turn, has been for long time a development challenge in Rwanda.  
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In all, the task is more difficult than finding a proper policy for soil and water 
conservation alone. Other development challenges are exigent. Increased investments in 
other off-farm agriculture-related activities (such as agri-enterprises) in rural areas could 
be a long-term exit option to addressing some of the challenges facing agriculture 
development in Rwanda. This is likely to reduce the number of dependents and the 
pressure on land, but also to create markets for agricultural products resulting in the 
remaining farmers being well off. However, further investigation beyond this thesis is 
needed. Finally, investments are needed to foster education, which in turn can lead to the 
creation of other economic activities that may assist the agricultural sector towards the 
overall development of Rwanda in the long run.   
 
7.5 Future research  
 
This thesis has contributed to the understanding of the complexity of soil erosion 
problems in Rwanda. The focus was on how farmers and a variety of institutions affect 
the adoption and effectiveness of soil and water conservation measures in Rwanda. 
However, there are areas not addressed by this thesis that would be useful to be 
addressed by future research in soil and water conservation in Rwanda.  
• To establish better knowledge of the existing indigenous soil and water 
conservation practices, as these can guide alternative and less-costly SWC measures 
in Rwanda. 
• Further investigation at the macro level is needed to show how farmers are learning 
from and partly share emergent agricultural and development policy processes in 
Rwanda. 
• Research by geologists and/or the soil scientists is needed to inform about physical 
and chemical micro-realities, such as variability of soil particles on terraced plots 
compared to plots with no terraces, in order to predict long-term effects (in terms 
of soil and water) of ongoing terrace construction in many parts of Rwanda  
• An Economic and Social Cost–Benefit Analysis of bench terraces to determine 
costs and benefits of bench terraces beyond the private perspective in Rwanda. 
• More research on the governance of farmer organizations and other local-level 
institutions to indicate how they can play effective roles to complement government 
and non-government interventions in rural development and land conservation in 
Rwanda  
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Appendix  1.1  Sampling Maps  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.1 Maps for Slope dominance in the research area (© Bizoza, January 2009). 
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Appendix 1.2  
 
 
 
 
Kageyo Sector  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Farmer based mapping of terraces dominance ( BT, PT and NT) in sample 
  sectors ( Kibirizi and Kageyo), South and Northern Rwanda. 
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Appendix 1.3.  
 Northern Province _Gicumbi District (BHLZ) 
  
  
 Rwanda 
 
Southern Province _Nyamagabe District (CNWZ) 
 
 Figure 1.3:  Research sites and their location vis-à-vis Rwanda 
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Appendix 2: Sources of agricultural advice  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.Source of agricultural advise for farmers in nearest Sectors 
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Figure 5.2. Source of agricultural advice for farmers in remote sectors 
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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is about soil and water conservation (SWC) issues in Rwanda. Land 
conservation in Rwanda started in the early twentieth century, in the same era as in many 
African countries. Despite tremendous efforts in soil erosion control by the state and 
other development agents, it remains a major development challenge in Rwandan 
agriculture. Bench terracing is the main SWC technique to receive much attention from 
various interventions in land conservation since the 1970s. This study ‘unpacks’ the 
adoption process of bench terraces that has become popular in agriculture development 
in Rwanda and elsewhere in the developing world. Hence, it is possible to increase the 
understanding of the complexity of land degradation problem and how farmers affect the 
adoption and effectiveness of  SWC measures in rural Rwanda.  
This research  contributes to an understanding of this issue from an institutional and 
socio-economic perspective. It aims to: (i) provide a historical account of SWC measures 
used from the pre-colonial to the independent state in Rwanda; (ii) assess how farmers 
participate in soil conservation and how state–farmer relationships affect SWC strategies; 
(iii) investigate under which socio-economic conditions bench terraces are financially 
viable; and (iv) explore which factors explain current and future adoption of terraces, 
with closer attention to the potential effects of local institutions and farmers’ capacity to 
invest in bench terraces in Northern and Southern Rwanda. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an account of soil erosion control in Rwanda in a historical 
perspective. Findings indicate that the approach used to introduce SWC techniques in 
Rwanda has shifted over time from top-down to somewhat participatory, in tune with 
the major developmental and political changes that occurred before and after the 
independent state. Some of the techniques introduced during the colonial period were 
abandoned by farmers because top-down approaches led to coerced SWC measures with 
little space for farmers to learn, appreciate, and materialize the benefits of adopting soil 
conservation. Throughout the history of soil conservation in Rwanda, population growth 
and reduced soil fertility have been major driving factors. However, the focus was more 
on soil erosion control rather than joining this to control of population growth, which, in 
turn, led to small and fragmented per capita land holdings (often less than 1 ha). Yet, a 
‘big family’ on a fixed piece of land are two conflicting factors and remain key challenges 
for  land conservation and management in Rwanda. 
 
In Chapter 3, information is used from focus-group discussions with members of 
small-scale associations to assess how farmers participate in soil conservation and how 
state–farmer relationships affect SWC strategies in Rwanda. The argument guiding this 
analysis is that bench terraces can not be understood in isolation from their social and 
institutional environments. Farmers’ perceptions of and participation in SWC can be 
understood in the context of state–farmer relationships. It is found that farmers play a 
marginal role in the design and implementation of SWC measures. They only participate 
in terms of consultation and self-mobilization to supply labour, time and sometimes land 
for terrace construction. This affects the ownership and, hence, the sustainability of 
established SWC structures.  
From a private perspective, bench terraces do not seem to be a better option. They 
require external support and skills from the experts (development officials) as well as new 
forms of organization. Findings in this thesis reveal different forms of institutional 
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arrangements (policies) initiated by the government to promote collective action and self-
reliance mentality in soil conservation. At the same time, ‘local’ institutions such as 
collective action and ‘mutual assistance’ or reciprocity evolve from farmers’ organizations 
and other social arrangements. These enable farmers to tackle some of the farming 
constraints, including labour for terrace construction, through co-operation in collective 
action. However, the commoditization of labour as a result of food and cash incentives 
used to induce adoption of bench terraces by SWC projects may have distorted a real 
sense of collective action found in traditional Rwandan society. In addition, most terraces 
constructed under such incentives are perceived by farmers to be not technically 
effective. This will result in more soil erosion and soil acidity, creating higher 
maintenance and user costs for future generations of soil conservation.  
 
In Chapter 4, a plot level financial cost-benefit analysis was conducted to show under 
which socio-economic conditions bench terraces are financially viable. A subsample of 
101 plots of 82 households was selected randomly out of the total sample of 907 plots. 
The assumption is that terraces may reduce soil erosion and increase production but they 
should also provide sufficient financial gains. The analysis shows that the adoption of 
bench terraces in the research area is not sufficiently explained by its profitability. An 
initial analysis involving farmers’ estimates and market prices shows that bench terracing 
is hardly profitable. Labour and manure represent the major part of operating costs. 
Subsequent analysis introducing 50% opportunity costs of market prices for labour and 
manure shows that bench terraces are profitable. Therefore, sample bench terraces are 
likely to be profitable when these costs are reduced or when terraced plots are used more 
intensively by farmers.   
The effectiveness of bench terraces was also assessed based on farmers’ classification 
of soil types. Successful construction of bench terraces requires detailed analysis of soil 
suitability. Both bench terraces and progressive terraces are  established on Urunombe soils 
(Nitosols high in loam and clay). In some situations, these low permeable soils are 
sensitive to Nyamurigita soil erosion type, which leads to rotational land slides and the 
destruction of terraced land. This reflects the need for technical guidance to lower future 
user costs of bench terraces.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the role of local institutions and farmers’ 
capacity to invest in terraces. Information was used that was collected during the survey 
conducted in Northern and Southern Rwanda among 301 households who also provided 
information on their 907 plots. The analysis in Chapter 5 is closely related to Chapter 3. 
The focus is on the effect of local institutions on the adoption of bench and progressive 
terraces. The findings showed that social capital, measured as trust and co-operation in 
collective action, is conducive to bench terrace adoption. None of the institutional 
variables identified are estimated important in explaining adoption of progressive 
terraces. This implies that some social and institutional arrangements are required more 
for establishing bench terraces than for progressive ones. Social capital presents itself as 
alternative asset(s) for further investments in bench terraces in rural Rwanda.  
In Chapter 6, a recursive model of current and future adoption decisions of bench 
terraces is evaluated, including farmers’ capacity to invest in complementary inputs. It is 
hypothesized whether farmers are willing to uptake more or new terraces in their 
respective villages. Results sustain that future adoption of bench terraces proxied with 
farmers’ willingness to adopt bench terraces depends significantly on farmers’ capacity to 
invest in inputs, prior adoption of bench terraces, and other factors. Improving farmers’ 
income should receive particular attention in future interventions in land conservation to 
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ensure not only adoption but also maintenance and continued use of bench terraces by 
farmers in the highlands of Rwanda.  
 
Chapter 7 presents some conclusions and policy options based on results detailed in 
Chapters 2 to 6. In this Chapter, the specific research questions are revisited to offer key 
results and their implications; they are followed by policy and research options.  
 
Overall, the thesis provides an explanation to why some previously constructed 
terraces are not maintained and used effectively by farmers in Rwanda. Throughout the 
history of soil and water conservation, farmers have been forced to adopt SWC 
measures, generally in the colonial period. Bottom-up approaches promoted by 
development agents, including the government in post colonial Rwanda, are not 
sufficiently effective to ensure full participation of farmers in the design and 
implementation of SWC measures. Despite their role in soil conservation, local 
institutions are not sufficiently empowered to ensure interdependency, which, in turn, 
may guarantee long-term sustainability of established SWC measures. Financial returns 
from established bench terraces are still lower to allow additional investments by farmers 
themselves in the maintenance of existing terraces or the construction of new ones. 
Farmers’ inabilities to secure additional inputs required by terraces after construction may 
restrain the take-up of more terracing in the study area. Further interventions should 
focus on improving institutional and socio-economic conditions before high cost-based 
investments similar to bench terraces are introduced within the existing farming systems. 
The incompatibility of bench terracing with prevailing institutional and socio-economic 
conditions is likely to facilitate more soil erosion.   
 
Future research should focus on physical and chemical micro-realities to predict long-
term effects of ongoing terrace construction. Assessment of externalities of or 
downstream bench terraces could inform the potential role of local institutions. How 
they can supplement or substitute direct interventions by the government and NGOs in 
soil conservation constitutes interest for the policy and research. Furthermore, advanced  
research is needed to indicate the extent to which bench terraces can (or cannot) be 
renewed or replaced by other soil conservation techniques. This needs yet further 
investigation to benefit future generations of soil and water conservation in Rwanda.    
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over bodem- en waterconserveringsissues (BWC) in Rwanda. 
Begin twintigste eeuw startte landconservering in Rwanda. Ondanks de enorme 
inspanningen van de staat en andere ontwikkelingsinstanties in de beheersing van 
bodemerosie, blijft het een van de grote uitdagingen van de Rwandese landbouw. De 
voornaamste BWC-techniek is ‘bench teraccing’ (terras landbouw)en speelt een rol in 
verschillende interventies op het gebeid van land conservering sinds de jaren ‘70. Deze 
studie ontleedt het adoptieproces van ‘bench terraces’ dat populair is geworden in de 
ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Rwanda en . Hierdoor krijgen we meer inzicht in de 
complexiteit van het probleem van landdegradatie en hoe boeren de adoptie en 
effectiviteit van BWC maatregelen beïnvloeden in Rwanda. 
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan een beter inzicht in dit onderwerp vanuit een 
institutioneel en sociaaleconomisch perspectief. Het beoogt;(i) een historisch overzicht te 
geven van de BWC maatregelen gebruikt vanaf de pre-koloniale tot de 
onafhankelijkheidsperiode in Rwanda, (ii) te bekijken hoe boeren participeren in 
bodemconservering en hoe de relatie tussen staat en boer de BWC strategieën 
beïnvloedt, (iii) te onderzoeken onder welke sociaaleconomische condities ‘bench 
terracing’ financieel levensvatbaar is; en (iv) het verkennen  van de factoren die de 
huidige en toekomstige adoptie van terrassen verklaren, met speciale aandacht voor de 
mogelijke effecten op lokale instituties en op de capaciteiten van boeren om te investeren 
in ‘bench terracing’ in het Noorden en Zuiden van Rwanda. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een historisch overzicht van bodemerosie beheersing in Rwanda. 
Bevindingen wijzen op een verschuiving in de gebruikte benadering om BWC technieken 
te introduceren in Rwanda, van to-down naar een meer participatieve benadering, in lijn 
met de grote ontwikkelingen en politieke veranderingen in Rwanda voor en na de 
onafhankelijkheid. Sommige technieken die werden geïntroduceerd gedurende de 
koloniale periode zijn door boeren opgegeven mede doordat de top-down benaderingen 
leidden tot dwingende BWC maatregelen die weinig ruimte overlieten aan boeren om de 
voordelen van bodem conservering te leren, te waarderen, en meet te experimenteren. 
Door de geschiedenis heen zijn groeiende populatie en afnemende bodemvruchtbaarheid 
zijn de grote drijvende krachten geweest achter bodemconservering in Rwanda. De focus 
lag op de controle van landerosie zonder dat dit werd gecomplementeerd met een 
beperking van de bevolkingsgroei, wat daardoor weer leidde tot kleine en 
gefragmenteerde land holdings per hoofd van de bevolking (vaak minder dan 1 ha).  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt informatie van focus-groep discussies met leden van 
kleinschalige associaties gebruikt om te bepalen hoe boeren participeren in 
bodemconservering en hoe de relatie tussen de staat en de boer de BWC strategieën in 
Rwanda beïnvloedt. Het argument luidt dat ‘bench terraces’ niet kunnen worden 
begrepen los van hun sociaal institutionele omgeving. De percepties van boeren en hun 
participatie in BWC kan worden begrepen in de context van staat-boer relaties. Er is 
geconstateerd dat boeren een marginale rol spelen in het ontwikkelingen en 
implementeren van BWC maatregelen. Zij participeren alleen in termen van consultatie 
en zelf-mobilisatie bij het leveren van arbeid, tijd en soms land voor de bouw van 
terrassen. Dit beïnvloedt ownership’’ en, dus, de duurzaamheid van de BWC structuren. 
Vanuit een individueel perspectief lijken ‘bench terraces’ niet een betere optie. Zij 
behoeven externe ondersteuning en vaardigheden van expert (ontwikkelingsdeskundigen) 
zowel als nieuwe vormen van organisatie. Bevindingen in dit proefschrift tonen 
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verschillende vormen van institutionele arrangementen (beleid) geïnitieerd door de 
overheid om collectieve actie en een mentaliteit van vertrouwen in bodemconservering te 
promoten. Tegelijkertijd ontvouwen zich ‘lokale’ instituties zoals collectieve actie en 
‘gelijke hulp’ of reciprociteit vanuit boeren organisaties en andere sociale arrangementen. 
Deze geven boeren de mogelijkheid om enkele landbouwkundige beperkingen aan te 
pakken, inclusief arbeid voor terrasbouw, door samenwerking. Echter, de commoditisatie 
van arbeid als gevolg van de prikkels, voedsel en geld, die zijn gebruikt om aan te sporen 
tot de adoptie van ‘bench terraces’ door BWC projecten kunnen het daadwerkelijke 
gevoel van collectieve actie aanwezig in de traditionele Rwandese maatschappij hebben 
aangetast. Daarbij, de meeste terrassen die met deze prikkels zijn bewerkstelligd, worden 
door boeren niet als technisch effectief gezien. Dit zal resulteren in meer bodemerosie en 
bodemverzuring, wat leidt tot meer onderhoud en hogere gebruikskosten voor komende 
generaties. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat met behulp van gegevens verkregen op het veld niveau met behulp 
van een financiële kosten-baten analyse zien onder welke sociaal-economische condities 
‘bench terraces’ financieel levensvatbaar is. Een steekproef van 101 plots van 82 
huishouden is willekeurig geselecteerd uit een totale groep van 907 plots. De aanname is 
dat terrasbouw de bodemerosie kan verminderen en de productie kan laten toenemen. 
Maar terrasbouw moet ook voldoende financiële opbrengsten opleveren. De analyse 
toont dat de adoptie van terrasbouw in het onderzoeksgebied niet voldoende verklaard 
wordt vanuit winstoogmerk. Een initiële analyse van de schattingen van boeren en 
marktprijzen laat zien dat ‘bench terracing’ nauwelijks winstgevend is. Arbeid en dierlijke 
mest vertegenwoordigen het overgrote deel van de vaste kosten. Om die reden zijn 
voorbeeld ‘bench terraces’ zeer waarschijnlijk winstgevend omdat de deze kosten zijn 
gereduceerd of omdat de plots intensiever worden gebruikt door boeren. 
De effectiviteit van ‘bench terraces’ is ook beoordeeld op basis van de classificatie 
van bodemtypen door boeren. Succesvolle bouw van ‘bench terraces’ vraagt 
gedetailleerde analyse van bodemgeschiktheid. Zowel ‘bench terraces’ als progressieve 
‘terraces’ zijn gebouwd op Urunombe bodems (Nitosols zijn rijk aan leem en klei). In 
sommige situaties zijn deze slecht doorlaatbare bodems gevoelig voor het type 
Nyamurigita bodemerosie, wat leidt tot roterend landverschuiving en de destructie van 
‘terraced’ land. Dit reflecteert de behoeften voor technische raadgeving om de 
toekomstige gebruikskosten naar beneden te brengen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 hebben betrekking op de rol van lokale instituties en de 
boerencapaciteit om te investeren in terrassen. De informatie die is gebruikt is verzameld 
gedurende een survey in Noord en Zuid Rwanda onder 301 huishoudens die ook 
informatie gaven over hun 907 plots. De focus van hoofdstuk 5 ligt op het effect van 
lokale instituties op de adoptie van bench en progressive terrassen. De bevindingen 
tonen aan dat sociaal kapitaal, gemeten als vertrouwen en samenwerking in collectie actie, 
leidend is bij de adoptie van bench terraces. Geen van de geïdentificeerdeinstitutionele 
variabelen blijken de adoptie van bench terraces te kunnen verklaren. Dit betekent dat 
sommige sociale en institutionele arrangementen belangrijker zijn voor bench terraces 
dan voor progressieve terrassen. Sociaal kapitaal is een alternatieve hulbronnen voor 
toekomstige investeringen in ‘bench terraces’ in Rwanda. 
Hoofdstuk 6 evalueert een recursief model van huidige en toekomstige 
adoptiebeslissingen met betrekking tot bench terraces inclusief de capaciteit van boeren 
om te investeren in complementaire inputs. Het bestudeert of boeren bereid zijn om 
meer of nieuwe terrassen op te nemen in hun dorpen. Resultaten steunen de toekomstige 
adoptie van ‘bench terraces’ gemeten als de bereidwilligheid van boeren om ‘bench 
terreces’ te adopteren, hangt significant samen met de capaciteit van boeren om te 
kunnen investeren in inputs, vorige adoptie van bench terraces en andere factoren. Het 
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verbeteren van de inkomsten van boeren zou nadrukkelijk de aandacht moeten krijgen in 
toekomstige interventies in landconservering om niet alleen adoptie maar ook onderhoud 
en voortgezet gebruik van ‘bench terraces’ door boeren in de hooglanden van Rwandate 
waarborgen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat terug naar de onderzoeksvragen en presenteert enkele conclusies en 
beleidsopties. 
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